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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
FOREIGN SUBSIDIARY MANAGEMENT IN THE CONTEMPORARY
MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE
by
Daniel S. Andrews
Florida International University, 2021
Miami, Florida
Professor Stav Fainshmidt, Co-major Professor
Professor Ronaldo Parente, Co-major Professor
As multinational enterprises (MNEs) expand into foreign markets that are not only
heterogeneous but also change in an unsynchronized manner, the locus of strategic
decision-making increasingly lies with foreign subsidiaries as a means of coping with
complex multinational operations. However, although this shift towards more subsidiary
autonomy seemingly represents a key building block of contemporary MNE strategy,
existing international business literature offers little theoretical clarity regarding when an
MNE’s headquarters will increase levels of autonomy over foreign subsidiary strategic
decisions. Moreover, while prior research highlights increased decision-making
autonomy as a key driver of subsidiary performance outcomes, several studies point to
efficiency- and agency-based problems associated with higher levels of autonomy.
Following the predominance of subsidiary-focused research in international
business studies over the last two decades, the aforementioned issues have resulted in
scholarly calls to better our understanding of foreign subsidiary management by MNE
headquarters and more generally revisit the role of MNE headquarters in subsidiary
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success. Accordingly, this dissertation aims to propel a more coherent and contextualized
understanding of these interrelated and pressing issues, thus advancing theory of MNE
strategy and structure. I submit three essays towards that end.
Specifically, essay one leverages existing empirical evidence to conduct a metaanalysis of foreign subsidiary autonomy determinants, focusing on theoretically relevant
conditions shaping the headquarters’ inclination to increase subsidiary autonomy. Essay
two offers a more nuanced, contextualized theory of the outcomes of subsidiary
autonomy by demonstrating that subsidiaries can innovate without autonomy in specific
contextual settings. Finally, essay three assesses the role of the MNE headquarters,
relative to other classes of explanatory variables, in explaining foreign subsidiary
performance differences. The result of these efforts is a more lucid theory of global MNE
strategy and structure.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

The strategy and structure of the multinational enterprise (MNE) has experienced
considerable changes in recent decades (Menz, Kunisch & Collis, 2015). Historically, the
MNE was viewed as a hierarchical organization where corporate strategy would originate
centrally at the headquarters (Chandler, 1991). This was seen to be more structurally
efficient than engaging in a series of disperse market activities across business units
(Williamson, 1975). However, due to increasing local and global demands, firms began
to expand into unfamiliar product and geographic markets that are heterogeneous and
change in an unsynchronized manner (Andersson, Forsgren & Holm, 2002; Mudambi,
2011). To cope with such complex multinational operations, the locus of strategic
decision-making began to shift to the foreign subsidiary (Birkinshaw, 1997; Ambos &
Birkinshaw, 2010; Mudambi, Pedersen & Andersson, 2014). As a result, subsidiary
autonomy – the extent to which a foreign subsidiary makes strategic decisions in its
operating environment without interference by MNE headquarters (Ghoshal & Nohria,
1989; Birkinshaw & Morrison, 1995; Young & Tavares, 2004) – became a fundamental
aspect of the MNE strategy and, thus, of international business (IB) theory.
However, although subsidiary autonomy represents a fundamental building block
of contemporary MNE strategy, it is still unclear as to when an MNE’s headquarters will
increase levels of autonomy or maintain control over foreign subsidiary strategic
decisions. In part, this is due to theory on its antecedents not being developed
harmoniously – or, at least, complementarily. On the one hand, several theories suggest
that increased autonomy may be beneficial. It helps to achieve strategic alignment with
local conditions, foster entrepreneurial subsidiary behaviors, and fulfill subsidiary roles

1

within the MNE (Birkinshaw & Morrison, 1995; Ambos & Birkinshaw, 2010).
Meanwhile, autonomy may also result in efficiency- (Sengul & Gimeno, 2013) and
agency-based problems (Mudambi & Navarra, 2004; Bouquet & Birkinshaw, 2008) that
may offset the benefits of increased autonomy. Thus, an understanding of why a given
subsidiary is autonomous seems to be at a theoretical impasse.
Relatedly, while prior research highlights increased decision-making autonomy as
a key driver of subsidiary performance outcomes such as innovation (Rugman &
Verbeke, 2001; Cantwell & Mudambi, 2005; Phene & Almeida, 2008), several more
recent contributions argue that this view is incomplete and warrants more conceptual
nuance (Slangen & Hennart, 2008; Kawai & Strange, 2014). Prior research indicates that
decision-making autonomy is a key determinant of innovation by foreign subsidiaries. It
gives subsidiary managers the latitude to become locally embedded, develop network
ties, and compile valuable inputs for their innovation efforts (Monterio, Mol &
Birkinshaw, 2017). Yet, Ghoshal and Bartlett (1990) initially argued that autonomy might
be beneficial only in some environmental and organizational contexts, and subsidiaries
should be structurally differentiated to achieve an optimal trade-off “between the cost of
each structural element and its efficacy in the context of the subsidiary” (Nohria &
Ghoshal, 1994: 493). This suggests that while higher degrees of decision-making
autonomy may be beneficial for some subsidiaries, an acontextual view of this structural
lever may be problematic. Autonomy may foster product innovation only in specific
institutional contexts and when deployed with complementary knowledge sources. From
this perspective, subsidiary autonomy outcomes are likely not straightforward but rather
conditional (Lazarova, Peretz & Fried, 2017).
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The emergence of subsidiary autonomy is evident through the proliferation of
subsidiary focused research, which, consequently, has come at the expense of our
collective understanding of the MNE headquarters (Egelhoff, 2010; Menz et al., 2015).
Prior literature has shown how the headquarters can either create (Nell & Ambos, 2013)
or destroy value (Decreton, Nell & Stea, 2019) in local subsidiaries. However, research
on the drivers of subsidiary performance is disparate and, at times, incoherent. One
stream of research investigates how subsidiary performance is determined by the parent
MNE (Feldman, 2020), while a related research stream focuses on the subsidiaries
themselves as the main drivers of performance differences (Rugman & Verbeke, 2001).
Although there are good theoretical and empirical reasons to expect that both the MNE
and the subsidiary play a role in subsidiary performance (Menz et al., 2015), the relative
importance of the MNE vis-à-vis the subsidiary remains unclear.
In this dissertation, I contribute to these interrelated discussions through a series
of essays on foreign subsidiary management as a reflection of a broader global MNE
strategy and structure. I integrate various literature streams to propel a coherent,
contextualized understanding of subsidiary autonomy’s antecedents and consequences
and the effect of MNE headquarters on subsidiary performance. Further, I provide a
comprehensive synthesis of literature, address several recent calls to explore theoretically
relevant contextual conditions, and engage in a theory-based discussion on MNE
strategy. This dissertation advances theory of the antecedents and outcomes of subsidiary
autonomy and subsidiary management more broadly.
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II.

STRUCTURAL DIFFERENTIATION WITHIN THE MNE: A REVIEW AND
META-ANALYSIS OF SUBSIDIARY AUTONOMY

INTRODUCTION
Foreign subsidiaries of multinational enterprises (MNE) have been a central focus of
international business (IB) research over the last four decades. As globalization
progressed and MNEs established operations in disperse and heterogenous foreign
locations, many MNEs increasingly evolved from centralized, hierarchical entities to
various forms of interconnected federations (Andersson, Forsgren & Holm, 2002;
Mudambi, 2011). Commensurately, subsidiaries came to be “at the forefront of many
international business challenges as they operate in complex international environments
and control some of the firm-specific advantages (FSAs) of the MNE” (Meyer, Li &
Schotter, 2020: 538). To better understand these realities, IB scholars developed a rich
research program on how MNE managers (should) configure their subsidiaries’ strategy
and structure to contribute to the success of the MNE. A fundamental facet of this
literature is the locus of strategic decision making.
Starting with early works (e.g., Picard, 1977; Gates & Egelhoff, 1986; Ghoshal &
Bartlett, 1990) and even in recent articles (e.g., Belenzon, Hashai & Patacconi, 2019;
Rabbiosi & Santangelo, 2019; Ambos, Fuchs & Zimmerman, 2020), the role of
subsidiary autonomy to IB research looms large. Cross-cultural management and
organization theory scholars similarly emphasize the importance of autonomy, allowing
subsidiary managers to adapt practices to local contexts (e.g., Slangen & Hennart, 2008;
Sengul & Gimeno, 2013). However, because contemporary MNEs often find themselves
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in unfamiliar and complex environments, MNE managers face inherent difficulties in
centralizing control and efficiently making locally adaptive decisions. Accordingly, IB
theory suggests that autonomy may be deployed to help MNE managers and their
subsidiaries become embedded in their local context and develop, deploy, and revise
capabilities and drive MNE success abroad (Beugelsdijk & Jindra, 2018). A recent metaanalysis on the performance outcomes of subsidiary autonomy suggests that, in general,
autonomy leads to improved performance, but not always (Geleilate, Andrews &
Fainshmidt, 2019).
Although MNE managers may be aware of the potential benefits of autonomy,
prior research suggests that it is not systematically assigned, and some antecedents of
autonomy may not necessarily be conducive to improving internationalization success
(Ambos, Asakawa & Ambos, 2011). In some instances, autonomy may even have
deleterious effects, such as inefficient resource allocation and self-isolating subsidiary
behaviors (Filatotchev & Wright, 2011; Sengul & Gimeno, 2013). These reasons are
likely related to why a subsidiary may be autonomous in the first place, but the
commensurate research on the drivers of autonomy has been dispersed and incohesive,
lacking a concentrated effort towards developing a more lucid theory of subsidiary
autonomy. Barring notable explanations (e.g., Kostova, Nell & Hoenen, 2018; CuervoCazurra, Mudambi & Pedersen, 2019), it remains conceptually unclear as to what
ultimately drives differences in decision-making autonomy across subsidiaries, but it is
such understanding that can help propel theory of the antecedents of global MNE
strategy.
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To answer this call, I comprehensively review existing research and synthesize
the main research traditions that underpin autonomy’s antecedents: First, research
utilizing agency theory suggests that MNE headquarters may differentially allocate
decision-making as a means to maintain strategic alignment between MNE headquarters
and subsidiary (Björkman, Barner-Rasmussen, & Li, 2004). Second, work rooted in
institutional theories argues that autonomy may facilitate local embeddedness and the
establishment of legitimacy; thus, it is driven by host country environments as well as
their similarity to the MNE home country (Kostova & Zaheer, 1999; Fenton-O’Creevy,
Gooderham & Nordhaug, 2008). Third, studies leveraging resource-based perspectives
suggest that autonomy is related to subsidiary roles, power, and responsibilities within the
MNE, a broad category I label ‘global strategy’ (Cantwell & Mudambi, 2005; see
Tallman & Yip, 2009). What is clear from this rich literature is that levels of autonomy
vary by MNE and, more importantly, by subsidiary (Nohria & Ghoshal, 1994). Why that
is the case, however, remains much more ambiguous, making this body of literature ripe
for taking stock of the existing fragmented knowledge and formulating a revitalized
roadmap for future inquiry.
Towards this end, my study follows the structure of Kostova et al. (2019) and has
three objectives: First, I take stock of existing literature to distill a cumulative,
comprehensive account of research traditions and their underlying mechanisms, thereby
contributing to the construction of a nomological network of subsidiary autonomy
research. Second, using the nomological network as a guiding framework, I conduct a
quantitative, quasi-exploratory meta-analysis of autonomy’s antecedents. A meta-analysis
allows me to rigorously test prior predictions in a comprehensive sample and, perhaps
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more importantly, test relationships stemming from multiple literature streams in the face
of each other. Using 131 studies from 1986 to 2020 comprised of 31,017 subsidiaries, I
provide robust and rigorous estimations of prior theoretical arguments. Finally, I combine
these efforts and provide a theory-driven roadmap for future research into the drivers of
autonomy, explicating how such research can propel a more lucid theory of MNE
strategy, structure, and evolution.

SUBSIDIARY AUTONOMY: THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
Over the last forty years, IB research has extensively examined the antecedents of
subsidiary autonomy and, by extension, global MNE strategy and structure (e.g., Stopford
& Wells, 1972; Gates & Egelhoff, 1986; Hedlund, 1986; Ghoshal & Bartlett, 1990; Wang
et al., 2014; Rabbiosi & Santangelo, 2019). With an initial focus on hierarchical
organizations to, now, various forms of networked, subsidiary-focused perspectives
(Mudambi, 2011), the allocation of autonomy to MNE subsidiaries seems to be a
complex rather than a straightforward, performance-driven phenomenon. Moreover, as
research progressed, so have the attitudes towards and various theoretical perspectives
applied to subsidiary autonomy research, reflecting promising variety but unstructured
scholarly conversations.
A review of prior research suggests varying nomenclature of subsidiary
autonomy. IB scholars typically define it as the extent to which a subsidiary makes
strategic and operational decisions without headquarters interference. With increased
autonomy, subsidiaries can make decisions to improve new products and processes
(Phene & Almeida, 2008), pursue subsidiary initiatives and local opportunities
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(Birkinshaw, 1997), adapt to local conditions (Fenton-O’Creevy et al., 2008), and
contribute to MNE knowledge stocks (Cantwell & Mudambi, 2005). Autonomy can also
be demarcated by functional area, such that a subsidiary can exhibit autonomy in sales
and marketing (Homburg & Prigge, 2014), research and development (Feinberg & Gupta,
2004), and other functional domains (Beugelsdijk & Jindra, 2018). The thesis is that
autonomy enables subsidiary managers to independently allocate resources without
attaining approval from its corporate headquarters.
Early work introduced the concept of decision-making autonomy in a way to
optimize non-essential business activities in large corporations. Often limited to only a
few specific functional areas, prior research argued that autonomy should only be
sparsely allocated, all while the remainder of core decisions were centralized to unify cost
savings (Williamson, 1975). For instance, Vernon (1966) suggested that key functions
and decisions, such as product development, would take place centrally at the
headquarters, and then products would be distributed abroad and sold by local
subsidiaries with varying degrees of decision-making latitude. Subsidiary roles and the
locus of decisions were thus pre-determined to match the corporation’s strategy and
structure (Chandler, 1962), with an overall emphasis on hierarchical control systems and
planning. Several scholars probed into when the headquarters may begin to allocate more
local (Pryor, 1965), regional (Williams, 1967), and even global (Buzzell, 1968)
autonomy; however, findings mostly converged to suggest that key strategic decisions
were to be made centrally by the headquarters.
As the global scope and diversity of firms increased, MNEs began to focus on
scale economies and the efficient location of production. Here, MNEs sought to relocate
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production to low-cost environments, and standardization subsequently became a
prominent global strategy (Chandler, 1991). However, as globalization continued to
progress, strategy formation became “excessively complex” (Paterson & Brock, 2002:
152), and MNEs began to face new challenges, such as pressures for local embeddedness
and responsiveness (Doz & Prahalad, 1984). Bartlett and Ghoshal’s (1989) transnational
solution became the canonical work, and subsidiary autonomy consequently was seen as
an important structural lever by which the MNE can differentially implement across
subsidiaries to improve success in foreign locations (Nohria & Ghoshal, 1994). The
cumulative research over the last several decades investigates how and when autonomy
should be allocated to enable subsidiary leaders to adapt subsidiary strategy to fit local
opportunities and needs (Meyer et al., 2020).
However, although the benefits of autonomy are well documented (Geleilate et
al., 2019), several studies note that its allocation might yield incentive problems,
inefficient resource allocation, and coordination costs (Ecker, van Triest & Williams,
2013). Consequently, MNEs may prefer to centralize decision-making to steer
subsidiary’s behavior and facilitate global coordination. Centralization – the exercising of
fiat decision-making control by headquarters – facilitates a more definitive MNE strategy
and streamlines global integration across disperse MNE networks of foreign subsidiaries
(Sengul & Gimeno, 2013). Moreover, centralization helps prevent the misallocation and
duplication of resources, particularly when headquarters managers are equipped to make
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locally adaptive decisions (Keupp, Palmié & Gassmann, 2011). In this sense, autonomy is
inversely related to centralization.1
What is clear from this literature is that although decision-making, broadly and
autonomy in particular are evidently important to understanding differences MNE
strategy (e.g., Cantwell & Mudambi, 2005; Fenton-O’Creevy et al., 2008; Kawai &
Strange, 2014), it has been differentially applied and thus lacking a concentrated theory.
While such diversity is often promising, a review of prior research points to several
unclear theoretical prescriptions as to when a subsidiary will be more autonomous.
Indeed, a comprehensive review on the state of autonomy research can be useful to
bolster core IB theory and propel a concentrated theory of MNE strategy and structure.

ANTECEDENTS OF SUBSIDIARY AUTONOMY: THREE RESEARCH
TRADITIONS
My review of literature points to numerous theoretical insights on the antecedents
underpinning subsidiary autonomy differentials. To consolidate these, I followed prior
studies taking a similar approach as mine and subsumed past research into three
overarching research traditions: Agency theory, institutional theory, and global strategy.
In Table 1, I outline each literature stream and their rationale. In the remaining sections, I
synthesize these arguments to develop a cumulative, comprehensive account of

1

Although autonomy is inversely related to centralization, it is not necessarily the opposite of global
integration. Prior research suggests that subsidiary autonomy and integration may co-exist (Ghoshal &
Bartlett, 1990). However, centralization and control are not interchangeable as control does not necessarily
reflect centralization. Headquarters can maintain control through various coordination mechanisms, such as
formalization and socialization (Zeng et al., 2018), while a subsidiary is still locally autonomous. For
instance, headquarters control may help facilitate global integration and then subsidiary autonomy gives
subsidiary managers the latitude to become locally embedded and identify how to best use their resources
and capabilities to fit local conditions. The diversity in nomenclature is one cause for the mentioned
conceptual ambiguity.
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autonomy’s antecedents, contributing to the construction of a theoretical nomological
network of global MNE strategy and structure.2

---Insert table 1 here---

Agency theory
First, agency theory is a prominent theoretical lens for analyzing headquarterssubsidiary relationships (e.g., O’Donnell, 2000; Björkman et al., 2004; Ambos et al.,
2019), and concerns the design of optimal contracts by headquarters (principal) to curtail
opportunism by and misalignment of the subsidiary (agent) (Jensen & Meckling, 1976;
see Kostova et al., 2018). Hoenen and Kostova (2015: 105) argue that headquarterssubsidiary agency can be explained in three-parts: (a) the headquarters may allocate
decision-making rights to a subsidiary to more easily perform MNE functions in foreign
locations. However, (b) the headquarters cannot always fully observe subsidiary
operations, and (c) the loss of control through the delegation of decision-making
authority may result in the divergence of the subsidiary, inducing undesirable behaviors
and potentially plaguing subsidiary success. In this sense, the allocation of subsidiary
autonomy is seen as comparatively riskier than headquarters centralization.
Prior research suggests that the possibility for opportunistic subsidiary behavior is
a root agency concern and thus a key determinant of a headquarters’ decision to limit

2

I acknowledge that there are other theoretical perspectives relevant to understanding subsidiary autonomy,
such as the attention-based view (Bouquet & Birkinshaw, 2008), network theory (Gammelgaard et al., 2012),
and internalization theory (Verbeke & Kano, 2016). I include these perspectives and their contributions to
autonomy’s nomological network in my review. However, given their relatively low prevalence in autonomy
research, for the purposes of this study, I subsume these various peripheral perspectives within my threepronged framework.

13

subsidiary autonomy (Kostova et al., 2018). Subsidiary opportunism occurs when a
subsidiary pursues self-interests and incongruent behaviors with the MNE. Even if
subsidiaries are given only limited decision-making latitude to strategize around
pressures for local adaptations (Ambos et al., 2019), subsidiary managers may still use
that autonomy to “build their own little empires” (Birkinshaw, 1998: 362) and extend
their roles to pursue independent objectives and self-interests (Mudambi & Navarra,
2004). While foreign subsidiaries are not mere mechanical instruments of their MNEs
and may need autonomy to generate local competitive advantages (Cuervo-Cazurra et al.,
2019), it is difficult to curtail subsidiary opportunism once a subsidiary has decisionmaking latitude.
Moreover, subsidiaries are boundedly rational, such that they have a limited
capacity to interpret and attend to MNE strategies and directives (Kostova & Roth, 2003).
Because subsidiaries are embedded in both their local and MNE context, it becomes
difficult for a subsidiary to interpret MNE objectives, judge situations, and take
appropriate action (Hoenen & Kostova, 2015). Subsidiaries may rely on their own
heuristics and interpretation of MNE strategies, which may increase the risk of role
overestimation and task misinterpretation (Foss & Weber, 2016). Headquarters
themselves may also be boundedly rational, and Hendry (2002) argues that “there will be
some degree of misunderstanding, misinterpretation, or misjudgment…corresponding to
the difference in utility between achieving their objectives as they would understand them
and achieving their objectives as the agents understand them” (p.102). The upshot is that
although autonomy can be useful to drive MNE success in foreign locations, potential
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misalignment in goals and objectives make the allocation of autonomy risky (Nohria &
Ghoshal, 1994; Ghoshal & Moran, 1996).
In the context of disperse MNEs, it is particularly difficult for headquarters to
monitor subsidiary behavior and differentially manage their network of subsidiaries.
When monitoring mechanisms becomes too costly, headquarters may utilize
performance-based contracts that are designed to reward (curtail) subsidiaries contingent
upon their local performance. By implementing performance-based controls,
headquarters can objectively implement varying global strategies while making the
subsidiary a bearer of risk (e.g., Roth & O’Donnell, 1996; Gong, 2003). That is,
subsidiaries that perform well will be rewarded with more autonomy as a subsidiary’s
outcome is tied to its exposure to risk (Chatzopoulou, Spanos & Lioukas, 2020);
however, underperforming subsidiaries should exhibit less autonomy because they have
not proven themselves as deserving more decision-making latitude (Jensen & Meckling,
1976). Hence, headquarters may use performance to make subsidiary behavior more
verifiable and visible (Kim, Prescott & Kim, 2005). In sum, headquarters-subsidiary
agency seems to be theoretically relevant, but there are various ways in which the theory
has been applied to understand subsidiary autonomy (e.g., Björkman et al., 2004;
Filatotchev & Wright, 2011), making it ripe for additional empirical evidence.

Institutional theory
In recent years, a proliferation of research has adopted institutional theory to
examine the importance of local environmental settings and organizations’ contextual
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embeddedness (Kostova & Zaheer, 1999; Hall & Soskice, 2001; Witt & Jackson, 2016).3
Such research argues that differences among host-country environments affect subsidiary
strategy, structure, and performance and thus MNE success in foreign locations (e.g.,
Gaur & Lu, 2007; Lazarova, Peretz & Fried, 2018). In particular, with the rapid
expansion of MNEs to disperse markets, firms are increasingly finding themselves in
unfamiliar territories, which requires differential management of subsidiaries to cope
with complex multinational operations. With a primary purpose of foreign subsidiaries
being to tap into host-country resources to absorb, generate, and disseminate knowledge
across the MNE network (Foss & Pedersen, 2002; Andersson et al., 2002), subsidiary
autonomy might be indispensable and hence a critical part of contemporary MNE
strategy.
When applied to headquarters-subsidiary domain, institutional theory primarily
focuses on cross-country differences, often elucidating the role of institutional distance
(Kostova et al., 2019). Institutional distance demarcates the “extent of similarity or
dissimilarity between the regulatory, cognitive, and normative institutions of two
countries” (Xu & Shenkar, 2002: 608). A broad overview of institutional distance
encompasses cultural, regulatory, and cognitive elements (Kostova, 1999), and distance is
a measure to capture the relative familiarity of the parent MNE with subsidiary hostcountry conditions.

3

Prior research suggests that there are three branches of institutional theory: institutional economics,
organizational institutionalism, and comparative institutionalism (see Hotho & Pedersen, 2012). To facilitate
narrative cohesion, I adopt a broad conceptualization of institutional theory as “companies doing business
across national borders are embedded and exposed to multiple and different institutional environments in
their home and host countries, and, as a result, face unique difficulties and risks” (Kostova et al., 2019: 469).
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Prior research suggests with increasing distance between home and host-country
institutions, headquarters managers are likely to have larger knowledge gaps of hostcountry conditions, making the allocation of resources and capabilities more difficult
(Dellestrand & Kappen, 2012). In such environments, decision-making autonomy
becomes an important structural mechanism as subsidiary managers can more easily
become locally embedded and strategize around local institutions’ norms and regulations
(Geleilate et al., 2019). Alternatively, not all institutional environments present obstacles
for local embeddedness and integration processes for the MNE. In lower distance
contexts between the home and host country, the headquarters may more easily retain
decision-making control while still achieving similar local responsiveness benefits (Cui et
al., 2006). Here, autonomy should be differentiated according to the distance between the
home and host environments (Luo, 2001).
However, although autonomy may yield embeddedness enhancing benefits in
distant environments, it may simultaneously inhibit global integration (Hartmann, Feisdel
& Schober, 2010). While integration and local responsiveness are not inversely related,
local pressures, such as low regulatory quality and economic instability, may
significantly impact global integration (Luo, 2001; Holtbrügge, 2005). Thus, with
increasing uncertainty in the host country environment, autonomous subsidiaries may
focus too much on navigating the local environment and losing out on global integration
benefits (Cuervo-Cazurra & Genc, 2008; Beulgelsdijk et al., 2017). As a result, the MNE
may wish to retain some decision-making control to prevent a subsidiary from focusing
too much on local adaptation and becoming a silo within the MNE network.
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Institutional scholars also posit that host country conditions might influence the
salience of subsidiary autonomy, irrespective of their similarity to the home country
context. For instance, MNEs will alter their local strategies when entering a host country
that is unstable and presents numerous constraints, such political uncertainty and lack of
governance mechanisms (e.g., Rodriguez, Uhlenbruck, & Eden, 2005; Sartor & Beamish,
2018). Rabbiosi and Santangelo (2018) argue that in such cases, autonomy will help to
reduce the costs of uncertainty and information processing as autonomy equips local
managers to navigate local issues and make adaptive decisions. While autonomy might
come with inconsistencies in internal strategy, structure, and processes, it helps to
legitimize the subsidiary in the local market. Moreover, in countries with high tolerance
for uncertainty and corruption, MNEs may face pressures to engage in corrupt behavior
to maintain salience in the local environment. Here, subsidiary autonomy might be
deployed as a means for the MNE to distance itself from the subsidiary in case of corrupt,
misaligned behavior (e.g., Spencer & Gomez, 2011; Cuervo-Cazurra, 2016). As these
brief examples illustrate, while various aspects of institutional theory are relevant to
understanding why a subsidiary will be more or less autonomous, they warrant additional
theoretical and empirical work to understand their underlying effect.

Global strategy
Finally, research in the global strategy tradition originally argued that
“ownership-specific advantages were developed at the corporate headquarters and
leveraged overseas” (Birkinshaw & Hood, 1998: 773). In this sense, the subsidiary was
dependent on the MNE, and its role was mostly competence-exploiting (Cantwell &
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Mudambi, 2005). As globalization progressed, subsidiaries began to assume new
mandates (Lee, Chung & Beamish, 2019), develop unique and sustainable resources
(Birkinshaw, 1997), and contribute to MNE success abroad. Indeed, Menz et al. (2015)
argue that as the MNE evolved, so did the foreign subsidiary – taking on new valueadding roles within the organization by identifying, absorbing, and generating unique and
sustainable resources and capabilities.
The transformation of subsidiary roles and mandates is closely related to
resource-based traditions (Rugman & Verbeke, 2001). As subsidiaries evolve over-time,
they accumulate more resources and capabilities to develop their own competitive
advantages (Birkinshaw & Hood, 1998; Lim, Hemmert & Kim, 2017). The control of
resources increases the bargaining power of a subsidiary, enhancing its visibility and
reshaping the headquarters-subsidiary relationship. Resources are a reflection of intraorganizational power dynamics (Cuervo-Cazurra et al., 2019): Subsidiaries with more
strategically important resources can assume power, influence strategy, and, perhaps,
operate with more autonomy.
In addition, and as previously mentioned, it is difficult for the contemporary MNE
to retain decision-making control across all subsidiaries, primarily due to the diversity in
market structures, processes, and consumer demands. Because of the limited capacity of
headquarters managers, they may attempt to move subsidiaries from a local-market
orientation into competence-creating (Cuervo-Cazurra et al., 2019), tapping into
knowledge pools to become a key source of competitive advantage. Such subsidiaries
move beyond being subservient executors of MNE commands towards more strategically
important to the MNE (Ryan et al., 2020). Here, subsidiaries slowly take on more
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responsibilities within the organization, assuming responsibility for new value-chain
functions as well as becoming more locally embedded (Riviere, Bass and Andersson,
2020). The general notion is that subsidiaries will not always be dependent on their
parent MNE and thus will differ in their local strategy, which might reflect varying levels
of decision-making autonomy (Mudambi & Navarra, 2004).
In sum, the preceding discussions and extant literature suggest that the allocation
of subsidiary autonomy is not a straightforward decision. I presented several arguments
for each research tradition that illustrate cases for an increase and limiting of decisionmaking autonomy. For instance, agency theory posits that headquarters might maintain
decision rights to prevent goal misalignment, while it might also argue for more
autonomy for other agency variables, such as past performance. Similarly, institutional
theory emphasizes the importance of autonomy to cope with complex contextual settings,
although too much autonomy may result in deleterious effects for global integration.
Then, global strategy suggests that autonomy allocation will be most salient for those
subsidiaries with more functional responsibilities and that have a locally focused strategy,
but not all subsidiaries have the need for autonomous decision making. Each of these
views has helped advance our understanding of why a subsidiary might be autonomous in
the first place, but arguments have been piecemeal, and theory of subsidiary autonomy
has been disaggregated. Hence, to better understand the drivers of autonomy, in the next
section, I meta-analyze dispersed empirical findings to empirically explore the underlying
effects of key variables stemming from each research tradition.

20

METHODOLOGY
Sampling procedures
The sample selection procedure comprised of a five-step structured approach consistent
with established guidelines of recent management studies (e.g., Kirca et al., 2011;
Fainshmidt et al., 2016; Beugelsdijk et al., 2017). First, I read and analyzed existing
conceptual reviews (Paterson & Brock, 2002; Young & Tavares, 2004; Kostova, Marano
& Tallman, 2016; Meyer et al., 2020) and related meta-analyses (Zeng, Grøgaard &
Steel, 2018; Geleilate et al., 2019) to both identify a base of studies and to help formulate
a set of autonomy-related keywords. Second, I developed a series of paired search terms,
one set targeting subsidiaries, and another decision-making rights. Specifically, I had six
prefix terms (subsidiary, subunit, affiliate, division, foreign, local) and seven suffix terms
(autonomy, decision-making, centralization, decentralization, control, independence,
responsiveness), resulting in 42 paired search terms. I complemented these with a set of
methodological keywords (e.g., findings, results, empirical, data) to identify only
quantitative, empirical articles (Fainshmidt et al., 2016). I used these search parameters to
survey major electronic databases, including ABI Inform, EBSCO, and Google Scholar,
targeting all peer-reviewed scholarly journals.
Third, I engaged in a manual search of 15 relevant IB, strategy, and general
management journals for additional studies. During this process, I focused on those
journals with an Academic Journal Guide (ABS) rating of “3” or higher (Cuervo-Cazurra
& Li, 2020), which includes outlets such as the Journal of International Business Studies,
Journal of World Business, Journal of International Management, Global Strategy
Journal, Strategic Management Journal, Organization Science, Journal of Management,
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and Journal of Management Studies. This step allowed me to identify articles that I may
have missed in my initial search and identify other keywords and topics relevant to my
analysis (Aguilera, Marano & Haxhi, 2019).
Fourth, I surveyed previously identified studies’ reference lists and examined
their citations in Google Scholar. Using a snowballing technique (Beugelsdijk et al.,
2017), I searched for frequently used references in prior studies on or related to
autonomy. This process yielded new articles published in previously missed journals,
including the Journal of Organizational Design and International Entrepreneurship and
Management Journal. Finally, I sent an e-mail to the Academy of Management (AOM)
and the Academy of International Business (AIB) listserv to identify any missing articles,
thereby addressing the file-drawer problem (Rosenthal, 1979). Although studies that
explicitly focus on autonomy better contribute to the nomological network, for a study to
be considered for final review during any of the five steps it only needed to have a
correlation matrix or empirical information with which a correlation for autonomy can be
computed (Hunter & Schmidt, 1990). Hence, this allowed me to bring together studies
that did not focus exclusively on autonomy and test ideas that might have been missed in
any single study (Combs et al., 2019).
Next, I downloaded all correlations in my sample to capture the entire
nomological network of subsidiary autonomy research. Because this study does not metaanalyze any particular relationship (e.g., autonomy and performance), it was imperative
to cast a wide net before reducing correlations through a coding process. Once all
correlations were downloaded, I followed a rigorous coding protocol to identify which
constructs should be included in the final sample. My coding process included an
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iterative assessment of definitions and measurements (Lipsey & Wilson, 2001).
Specifically, I first identified granular themes and, later, grouped smaller, less-frequent
constructs into broader themes to establish a theoretically relevant and empirically
feasible framework (Zeng et al., 2018; Geleilate et al., 2019). In practice, meta-analytic
evidence can be deduced from as few as two empirical studies (see Rosenthal, 1979).
However, such an approach does not allow for reliable causal inference and is not wellsuited for this study. Finally, I ensured that there were not multiple effects of the same
construct within each study. If the effects were from distinct samples within one study
(e.g., Raziq, Borini & Perry, 2012) or operationalized in different ways (e.g., Newburry,
Zeira & Yeheskel, 2003), I retained them for further analysis; otherwise, I collapsed these
effects into an average effect size (Geyskens, Steenkamp & Kumar, 2006).4
The culmination of these processes yielded 131 relevant empirical studies
spanning 1986 to 2020 (see Appendix A) and encompassing a global sample of 31,017
foreign subsidiaries. My sample consists of 547 bivariate observations between
subsidiary autonomy and its antecedents and 1,585 observations across all constructs.
Notably, my sample is not restricted to any particular timeframe; however, the early
contributions of Gates and Egelhoff (1986) and Hedlund (1986) cemented the importance
of subsidiary autonomy to IB research. The studies in my sample come from a wide range
of academic domains, such as strategy, entrepreneurship, human resources, and

4

While several studies might use the same dataset, Kirca et al. (2011) argue such studies can be included as
long as the correlations arise between different constructs or alternative operationalizations of the same
construct. These differences yield meaningful inferential information and thus are retained for analysis (Van
Wijk, Jansen & Lyles, 2008). Prior meta-analytic studies suggest that the collapsing of correlations does not
significantly alter the results (e.g., Geleilate et al., 2019).

23

technology and innovation, but, expectedly, the majority (54%) were published in
international business outlets.

Construct measurement
As previously mentioned, meta-analyses require a rigorous coding process to
organize disperse constructs around conceptual themes. Following prior studies, I engage
in a four-step process (Greyskens et al., 2006; Kirca et al., 2011): First, I surveyed all
constructs and their operationalizations to identify the underlying conceptual foci.
Second, I grouped constructs according to broad schematic themes, such as
environmental context, headquarters-subsidiary relationship, and subsidiary strategy.
Third, I re-examined the themes, becoming stricter with each iteration in terms of
nomenclature and operationalizations of constructs, ultimately settling on constructs that
closely align with the three previously discussed research traditions. Finally, I probed
differences between more granular groupings, confirming that my final measurements did
not substantively impact my meta-analytic results (Hunter & Schmidt, 2004). In Table 2,
I provide a summary of the main constructs in my final sample.

---Insert Table 2 here---

My outcome variable, subsidiary autonomy, captures the extent to which foreign
subsidiaries make independent strategic decisions across various functional areas, such as
product development (Roth & O’Donnell, 1996), marketing (Tran, Mahnke & Ambos,
2010), and human resources (Fenton-O’Creevy et al., 2008). While the majority of prior
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studies explicitly measure autonomy (61%), several studies focus on its inverse,
centralization (Ambos & Schlegelmilch, 2008), or varying nomenclatures, such as control
(Puck et al., 2016) and technocratic coordination (Holtbrügge, 2005) (see Appendix B,
Table 1B). I acknowledge the heterogeneity of various operationalizations and, to ensure
commensurability, I test the implications of these differences in a series of additional
analyses below.
To capture variables that reflect agency-related arguments, I first measure goal
alignment by examining the extent to which a subsidiary has shared goals (shared vision)
with its MNE headquarters (e.g., Fey & Furu, 2008; Ahlvik, Smale & Sumelius, 2016).
This measure of alignment combines several labels, such as goal incongruence (e.g.,
Chen, Paik & Park, 2010), organizational climate (Foley, Ngo & Loi, 2012), and role
conflict (Gupta & Govindarajan, 1999) as well as contains responses from the subsidiary
(e.g., Bouquet & Birkinshaw, 2008), headquarters (e.g., Birkinshaw et al., 2000), or both
(Ambos et al., 2019). Next, I measure past performance as a subsidiary’s prior (e.g., t-1)
financial and operational performance (e.g., Nell, Ambos & Schlegelmilch, 2011;
Nguyen & Rugman, 2015). Prior research suggests that both goal alignment and strong
prior performance help to mitigate headquarters’ uncertainty that a subsidiary will act
opportunistically (Gong, 2003), thereby signaling trust in the subsidiary and reducing the
need to centralize decision-making rights.
Second, I include two variables that relate to institutional theory: Institutional
distance captures the extent of formal and informal institutional similarity between the
MNE home and subsidiary host country environments (Nell & Ambos, 2013; Kawai &
Strange, 2014). Although the effects of institutional distance are well documented
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(Geleilate et al., 2019; Kostova et al., 2019), prior research suggests that institutional
distance is a broad construct and that there might be differences in informal (e.g., culture,
language, religion) and formal (e.g., governance, intellectual property rights, labor laws)
distance measures (cf., Slangen, 2013; Schomaker & Zaheer, 2014; Rabbiosi &
Santangelo, 2018). I explore these differences in series of additional analyses below.
Next, I include host country constraints, which reflect differences in host country
volatility (O’Donell, 2000), political and economic instability (Chiao & Ying, 2013), and
government restrictions (Chen et al., 2010). Together, these institutional measures
capture complexities that the MNE might experience in the host country environment,
increasing the salience of subsidiary autonomy to cope with complex multinational
operations (de Jong et al., 2015; Santangelo, Meyer & Jindra, 2016).
Third, to capture constructs relevant to the global strategy tradition, I include
value chain breadth as the number of functional activities the subsidiary undertakes (e.g.,
marketing, sales, R&D, human resources) (Chang & Taylor, 1999; Ambos, Andersson &
Birkinshaw, 2010). I also include localization to measure the degree of subsidiary local
responsiveness (e.g., Luo, 2006) versus global integration (e.g., Sarabi et al., 2020). Prior
research suggests that subsidiaries who are active in more value-chain functions are
oftentimes strategically independent from its MNE headquarters (Ambos & Birkinshaw,
2010; Nell & Ambos, 2013). Similarly, the importance of decision-making autonomy is
heightened for locally responsive subsidiaries, whereby autonomy is a mechanism to
facilitate adaptive decisions that fit host country conditions (Beugelsdijk & Jindra, 2018).
With these measures I capture differences in local subsidiary strategy and, by extension,
global MNE strategy.
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I also include several additional variables consistently found in prior studies.
First, I account for differences in contextual settings by measuring industry pressures as
the rate of change, volatility, and uncertainty in the subsidiary’s primary industry context
(Kawai & Strange, 2014), and geographic distance as the physical distance between the
headquarters and subsidiary (Tran et al., 2010). Second, I introduce several subsidiary
characteristics: Greenfield entry assumes a value of “1” if the subsidiary is a greenfield,
otherwise “0” (Drogendijk & Slangen, 2006), and wholly owned subsidiaries are coded as
“1”, otherwise “0” (Luo, 2006). I also include global focus as whether the subsidiary’s
products and services are intended for a global or local market use (Bouquet &
Birkinshaw, 2008), subsidiary age (Rabbiosi, 2011), and subsidiary size (Slangen, 2013).
Third, autonomy may vary by MNE thus I include MNE characteristics, such as MNE
size (Sengul & Obloj, 2017) and MNE experience measured as the number of years with
foreign subsidiaries or the number of subsidiaries in a given host country (Puck et al.,
2016). Finally, I introduce several variables at the headquarters-subsidiary interface:
socialization measures the degree of social interaction and cooperation among
subsidiaries and the MNE headquarters (Ambos et al., 2019), formalization captures the
explicit rules, procedures, and coordination of activities (Nell & Ambos, 2013), and
communication frequency is how often the headquarters and subsidiary communicate
with each other (Birkinshaw, Hood & Jonsson, 1998).

Meta-analytic procedures
Meta-analyses have become central to management research, and Combs et al.
(2019) argue that there are several dominant approaches. In this study, I use two of such
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approaches: Hedges and Olkin meta-analysis (HOMA) (Hedges & Olkin, 1985) and
meta-analytic structural equation modeling (MASEM) (Bergh et al., 2016).5
First, HOMA is a method to determine the mean effect size of a predictor on an
outcome, such as goal alignment on subsidiary autonomy. This method provides a
confidence interval and a heterogeneity test for the given effect size (Lipsey & Wilson,
2001). To perform the computations, I collected bivariate correlations and computed a
Fischer-Z score to account for distribution skewness. I used random-effects HOMA and
the transformed correlation (i.e., the inverse of its variance weight) to calculate the mean
effect size (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002).
Second, MASEM uses a path model to provide robust and rigorous estimations of
effects. It helps assess the size of an effect, thereby determining the most salient
predictors across a set of predictors. Moreover, MASEM helps alleviate concerns of
endogeneity bias as it conducts a series of simultaneous equations, including control
variables and their effects on the dependent variable (Bergh et al., 2016). Indeed,
MASEM is well suited for this study as it “allows for powerful simultaneous tests of
multiple theoretical relationships” (Combs et al., 2019: 5).
To conduct a MASEM path model, I calculated the adjusted mean effect size for
each relationship and then organized these relationships into a meta-analytic correlation
matrix (Viswesvaran & Ones, 1995). Next, I use the resulting matrix as an input for my
path model, whereby each cell in the matrix is derived from a different set of “K” studies

5

An alternative approach would be to use meta-analytic regression analysis (MARA) (e.g., Beugelsdijk et
al., 2017). This approach uses the raw effect sizes as inputs to the regression analysis and is particularly
useful when testing boundary conditions. However, compared to the alternatives, MARA is sensitive to the
number of included studies and thus lacks power if an adequate N is not achieved, increasing the risk of Type
I and Type II errors (Combs et al., 2019).
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with an “N” number of observations. I use the harmonic mean as a conservative approach
to determining the sample size for my model and check model fit using commonly used
indices (Hunter & Schmidt, 2004).

RESULTS
First, I explore the direct effects of each construct independently through a set of HOMA
procedures. In Table 3, I display the “K” number of studies exhibiting the relationship for
“N” subsidiaries, corrected mean effect size, 95% confidence interval, and Cochran’s Qtest for sample heterogeneity. The results suggest that only four predictors are
statistically significant and not due to chance (p < 0.05): Industry pressures (r = -0.076),
socialization (r = -0.177), formalization (r = -0.181), and communication frequency (r = 0.137).6 The Cochran’s Q-test for all relationships indeed reveals statistically significant
heterogeneity, thereby indicating considerable variation in each of the samples and the
need for more robust estimation models (Hunter & Schmidt, 2004).

---Insert Table 3 here---

Second, to provide robust estimations of each effect I formulated a structural
equation model of simultaneous equations. In Appendix B (Table 2B), I present the metaanalytic correlation matrix, which is the source input for my structural model.

6

In practice, HOMA procedures are most useful when examining the mean effect size of a well-documented
relationship, such as the effects of institutional distance on establishment mode choice (e.g., Kostova et al.,
2019). However, the empirical efforts of this study are quasi-exploratory in nature and thus HOMA provides
only preliminary evidence for autonomy’s antecedents. The HOMA results as used as an input to the MASEM
analysis.
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Importantly, I include only those additional variables that are most commonly used as
controls in prior studies and that are theoretically and empirically feasible. Using the
SEM function in Stata 15 and a maximum likelihood estimation (Kirca et al., 2011), my
first path model includes all variables as predictors of autonomy as well as paths from
institutional distance and host country constraints to the four agency and global strategy
variables. Prior research suggests that institutional conditions might be best understood as
determinants on headquarters-subsidiary relations and strategy decisions (e.g., Slangen &
Hennart, 2008; Dellestrand & Kappen, 2012). However, I noticed that the model fit could
be improved by removing the additional linkages, suggesting that agency relations and
strategy decisions appear to not be endogenous to institutional variables. With their
removal, I attain satisfactory fit indices (Chi-square = 46.74, RMSEA = 0.00, CFI = 0.99,
TLI = 0.99) and I present my results in Table 4.
Results from my path model suggest that goal alignment (r = -0.0.69), past
performance (r = 0.077), value chain breadth (r = 0.115), and localization (r = 0.079) are
relevant predictors of subsidiary autonomy and are not due to chance (p < 0.05).
Additionally, industry pressures, greenfield entry, and MNE size are partially significant
control variables (p < 0.10). Looking at the specific relationships, goal alignment and past
performance operate in conflicting directions, such that subsidiaries that share common
goals with their MNE are less likely to exhibit higher levels decision-making autonomy,
while well performing subsidiaries have more autonomy. Next, subsidiaries that
undertake more functional activities and are locally responsive often operate with
increasing decision-making latitude. The predictors for institutional theory – institutional
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distance and host country constraints – are not statistically relevant predictors of
subsidiary autonomy.
To then compare the mean effect sizes of the significant relationships, I employ
the confidence interval construction method (Olkin & Finn, 1995). This method
computes a 95% confidence interval between two separate effects, and if the interval does
not include zero then the difference is not due to statistical chance (p <0.05).7 The results
suggest that the new confidence intervals for all effect comparisons do not include zero;
hence, the differences are not due to chance. Therefore, holding the remaining variables
constant, value chain breadth is the most salient predictor, followed by localization, past
performance, and goal alignment.

Additional analyses
To assess the stability of my meta-analytic results and provide corroborating
evidence, I ran several additional analyses. First, I probed for differences in the
operationalization of key constructs (see Appendix B, Table 3B). For instance, prior
research suggests that goal alignment may differ depending on who is being survey, i.e.,
the subsidiary or headquarters (Kostova et al., 2018). Thus, I tested whether autonomy is
sensitive to the survey respondent, and results for all three subsamples indicate that there
are no statistical differences between responses from the subsidiary, headquarters, or
both. Furthermore, the direction of the mean effect size remains negative across all three
samples.

7

The confidence interval is computed using the following formula: R2VarA – R2VarA ± (1.96)*var^(R2VarA –
R2VarB). The term R2VarA is the coefficient of Variable A (e.g., goal alignment) and R2VarB is the coefficient
for Variable B (e.g., past performance).
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Second, there might be differences in the effect of financial and strategic
(operational) performance on subsidiary autonomy. For instance, subsidiaries may be
performing well financially (e.g., ROA), but the importance of such performance metrics
may differ across for each subsidiary (Birkinshaw & Hood, 1998). Results indicate no
statistical differences in types of past performance measures.
Third, I tested for differences between formal and informal institutional distance
measures. While the two constructs are often highly correlated (Beugelsdijk, Ambos &
Nell, 2018), several studies argue that they should not be consolidated as both capture
complementary or even contradictory aspects of distance theorizing (Tung & Verbeke,
2010). Therefore, I split distance into formal and informal institutional distance, and I
find no statistical difference between the two and that the direction of the effect is
consistent with the main model. Additionally, cultural distance is not sensitive to those
studies that use Kogut and Singh (1988) and those that do not. I further probed into the
informal and formal measures by splitting each into high and low values (e.g., low
informal distance), which helps assess whether the effects of distance are more
pronounced at extreme levels. Again, the results reveal no statistically significant
relationship (p > 0.05).
Fourth, to explore whether there are differences in autonomy measurements, I
split my outcome into holistic and functional autonomy. Prior research suggests that there
might be instances when the MNE allocates autonomy in select functional areas to
facilitate subsidiary activities (e.g., Beugelsdijk & Jindra, 2018), while retaining control
in other functions. The results for holistic autonomy indicate that only localization (r =
0.185) is related to autonomy and not due to chance (p < 0.05). I also find that
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localization (r = -0.263) is related to functional autonomy. Interestingly, the direction of
the coefficient for localization is different between holistic and functional autonomy. This
finding aligns with recent research suggesting that MNE’s might centralize control of
core functions, such as R&D and product (e.g., Colombo et al., 2020). I also find that
value chain breadth (r = 0.203) has a positive, significant effect on functional autonomy;
however, due to its small sample size I interpret this result with caution. Next, I discuss
the implications of these findings below.

FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS
In this study, I took an important first step to identify the conceptual ambiguity
underpinning subsidiary autonomy research. Specifically, I developed a comprehensive,
cumulative account of past research to develop a nomological network around three main
research traditions. I then empirically demonstrated how the key variables within each
perspective might operate in various ways as well as are certain traditions are perhaps
potentially important in face of others. However, as with many conceptual and empirical
reviews, these processes might have opened up more questions than they answered (Shaw
& Ertug, 2017). Aguinis et al. (2020) argues that the identification of such inconsistencies
helps to reinvigorate conversations and drive future scholarly work. Hence, in this
section, I complement my findings with a theory-driven roadmap for future research into
the drivers of autonomy, explicating how such research can propel a more lucid theory of
MNE strategy, structure, and evolution. Building on recent work in the area, I propose an
agenda of novel research questions that can break new ground in IB theory.
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Contemporary MNE structure
First, a better understanding of the antecedents of subsidiary autonomy ought to
focus on the evolving nature of MNE governance (e.g., Mudambi, 2011). For instance,
with the emergence of the federative MNE, subsidiaries may utilize their lateral
relationships with peer subsidiaries to access resources, strengthen their power, and take
on new roles in the MNE network (Schotter & Beamish, 2011). From a global strategy
perspective, such collaboration may enhance the bargaining power of a focal subsidiary,
particularly as it leverages its lateral relationships to develop resources and capabilities
central to MNE success (see Geppert & Dörrenbächer, 2014). At the same time, agency
theory may try to mitigate these relationships to control subsidiary behavior and maintain
control over MNE operations. These sorts of interactions may increase in new forms of
MNEs, such as digital firms and emerging market MNEs (Schmitt, Decreton & Nell,
2019).
Moreover, MNEs are increasingly adopting regional management centers
(intermediary units, regional headquarters) to optimize value adding activities in foreign
locations (e.g., Verbeke, Kano & Yuan, 2016). The use of regional centers again shifts
the power dynamics within the MNE and can thus influence local subsidiary autonomy.
For instance, Dörrenbächer and Gammelgaard (2011) examined how a regional center
abandoned its MNE directive and developed a new IT system, highlighting differences in
strategy implementation within one MNE. The upshot is that with new MNE forms, the
ways in which autonomy and thus strategy are implemented will be differentially
observed. Hence, tracing the evolving nature of autonomy differentials, especially in
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different types of MNEs, can illuminate MNE structure and thus inform theory of the
MNE.

Microfoundations of autonomy
Barring notable exceptions (e.g., Nuruzzaman, Gaur & Sambharya, 2019), there is
a scarcity of research on how subsidiary and MNE managers – notably, their cognition
and social relationships – influence the allocation of autonomy. For instance, subsidiary
managers may utilize their social relationships to bargain for more autonomy, on the one
hand, (Dörrenbächer & Geppert, 2006) and headquarters managers may act
opportunistically when allocating autonomy (Hendry, 2002), on the other hand.
Moreover, prior research suggests differences in assigned versus assumed autonomy,
such that subsidiary managers may act autonomously without formally being given
decision-making latitude by their parent MNEs (Cavangh et al., 2017). Studying the
cognitive and behavioral underpinnings of autonomy over time can shed light on why a
subsidiary may be more autonomous than others as well as on MNE governance more
broadly.
Another relevant area concerning the individual focuses on conceptual differences
when theorizing on expatriates, top management, and boundary spanners (Meyer et al.,
2020). For instance, expatriates play an essential role in the governance of foreign
subsidiaries, implementing MNE strategy and maintaining alignment with headquarters
(Bird & Mendenhall, 2016). However, they are also contextually embedded and might
realize a need for more autonomy to absorb local knowledge (Gaur, Delios & Singh,
2007), regardless of intended MNE control. At the same time, subsidiary managers might
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be considered boundary spanners (e.g., Klueter & Monteiro, 2017; Tippmann, Scott, &
Parker, 2017) and thus find themselves extending their roles beyond their local mandate.
Mäkelä et al. (2019) detail why certain boundary spanners may be more effective in their
roles, but future research can expand upon these differences to better understand how
individuals make decisions and their implications for within-MNE differences in global
strategy.

Contextual importance
In recent years, we have experienced a series of global shifts that are impacting
firms and governments alike (Witt, 2019). For instance, recent calls for de-globalization
are shaping modes of value creation and how organizations operate abroad (e.g., CuervoCazurra, Doz & Gaur, 2020). While prior research considers the importance of
institutional and industrial environments, there is little research on how dynamic
environmental changes influence subsidiary autonomy and global MNE strategy. Future
research may probe these dynamics and how they affect the location of global value
chains, intra-MNE power dynamics, resource dependencies and, thus, the allocation of
(distinct aspects of) autonomy. At this point, the effects of these external pressures are
unclear, including whether they operate similarly across institutional contexts, such as
emerging and developed markets.
An exploration on contextual dynamics is inherently tied to temporal dynamics as
well. Ambos et al. (2011) took an important first step to understand how autonomy
changes over time, and future research can build on these insights. For instance,
subsidiary autonomy may change in relation to environmental dynamics (e.g., Karna,
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Richter & Riesenkampff, 2016); however, it is unclear whether that autonomy will persist
once the subsidiary and MNE headquarters learns of the changing environment.
Similarly, while the MNE may wish to retain control when entering a new foreign
location (Slangen & Hennart, 2008), such control may subdue as the subsidiary becomes
more embedded and lessens its dependence on the MNE headquarters (Birkinshaw &
Hood, 1998). I am motivated by recent longitudinal cases designs in IB research (e.g.,
Birkinshaw, Ambos & Bouquet, 2017; Parente et al., 2020), which I believe can be a
fruitful opportunity for future research to explore the changes in MNE strategy and
structure over time, particularly during periods of environmental dynamism.

Gestalt-like approach
Finally, like much of IB phenomena (Fainshmidt et al., 2020), subsidiary
autonomy is inherently gestalt-like, such that any single theory is unable to capture the
entire complexity of its allocation. In fact, I demonstrate that many of my main variables
are statistically insignificant in relation to autonomy, indicating the complex nature of
understanding autonomy differentials. Initially, Nohria and Ghoshal (1994) argued that
autonomy assignments should fit the subsidiary’s (1) local environment and (2) internal
resource-based advantages, but there may also be conditions beyond the headquarterssubsidiary relationship that may influence autonomy (Cantwell & Mudambi, 2005).
Accordingly, I believe future research could emulate prior works, such as CuervoCazurra et al. (2019) to understand how various theoretical prescriptions interact,
complement, or substitute for each other to explain subsidiary autonomy and, thus, MNE
governance. There are promising opportunities to integrate theoretical perspectives
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toward studying the interplay of within-MNE and between-MNE differences in
autonomy.
While the purpose of this study was not to explore boundary conditions (e.g.,
Geleilate et al., 2019), I believe that doing so can directly inform research on subsidiary
management and theory of MNE structure, strategy, and evolution. For instance, goal
alignment was shown to have a negative relationship with subsidiary autonomy; however,
it might be that such alignment is particularly salient in distant institutional settings
where the MNE cannot fully observe subsidiary operations and is thus associated with
greater bounded rationality (Hendry, 2002). Similarly, the effects of distance might
become more pronounced when subsidiaries take on more value chain activities,
reflecting differing strategies within a sample of foreign subsidiaries (Bartlett & Ghoshal,
1989). Thus, an important next step in this research area is to explore not only what
drives autonomy differences but also when such drivers are most salient.

DISCUSSION
Over the past forty years, research on subsidiary autonomy has continued to appear at the
forefront of many core IB phenomena and grand challenges (Kostova et al., 2016; Meyer
et al., 2020). Initially, the introduction of the autonomy construct was used in a limited
manner, focusing on its sparse allocation to optimize non-essential business activities in
foreign locations. As globalization later progressed and multinational operations became
increasingly complex, so did research on subsidiary autonomy (Mudami, 2011). A recent
meta-analytic review found that subsidiary autonomy generally leads to performance
outcomes (Geleilate et al., 2019), thereby demonstrating why a discussion of autonomy is
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important in the first place. However, the commensurate research on its antecedents has
absent of a concentrated scholarly conversation, limiting the advancement of a more lucid
theory of autonomy. In this review, I take an important step to resolve this ambiguity by
synthesizing prior studies to develop a nomological network of autonomy research.
Furthermore, I provided exploratory, meta-analytic evidence of 131 sample studies,
which allowed me to rigorously test prior theoretical prescriptions in a comprehensive
study.
What is true from this body of research is that the promising diversity has been
both a benefit and hindrance to theory development (cf., Björkman et al., 2004; Cantwell
& Mudambi, 2005; Rabbiosi & Santangelo, 2018). For instance, subsidiary managers
might need autonomy to take local action and cope with host country demands (Kim et
al., 2005), but more autonomy creates opportunities for agency problems, such as
subsidiary opportunism (Ambos et al., 2019). Meanwhile, the need for autonomy might
be particularly relevant in high institutional distance contexts due to the resulting
challenges for headquarters managers to make locally adaptive decisions (Luo, 2003).
My study suggests that latter explanation may be more appropriate, as internal,
headquarters-subsidiary relationships may be more salient to understanding autonomy
differentials than environmental conditions. As these brief examples illustrate, the
plurality of explanations has contributed to the development of a nomological network,
while until now have also rendered an unclear theory of autonomy’s drivers. Hence, a key
benefit of this study is that it takes a first step to provide cumulative evidence for key
variables underpinning various research traditions and thus guide future scholarly work.
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Indeed, the diverse findings of this study contribute to the guiding notion that
autonomy is not a straightforward, performance-driven phenomenon, and that there are
multiple explanations for its allocation. For instance, although IB scholars has
extensively examined the effects of institutional distance (e.g., Dellestrand & Kappen,
2012) and host country conditions (e.g., Santangelo et al, 2018), headquarters managers’
decision to allocate autonomy appears to not be directly determined by such
environmental differences. This insight adds nuance to recent work in which suggests
institutional mechanisms are not always in sync with their theoretical prescriptions,
highlighting potential inconsistencies in arguments and applications (Kostova et al.,
2019). Similarly, the two agency mechanisms provide alternative effects on autonomy:
Goal alignment drives headquarters centralization while strong past performance
increases autonomy. Thus, subsidiary performance is a stronger indicator of autonomy
than maintaining alignment with MNE goals and strategies, raising the questions of how
much headquarters-subsidiary relations (e.g., micro-politics) matter vis-à-vis measurable
outcomes (e.g., performance) (Hoenen & Kostova, 2015).
Finally, my study implicitly speaks to the importance of configurational logic,
particularly when capturing how global MNE strategy and structure is determined
(Nohria & Ghoshal, 1994). A better understanding of autonomy’s antecedents requires
that research considers multiple explanations in concert rather than individually (e.g.,
Cuervo-Cazurra et al., 2019). In other words, while each research tradition on its own
makes theoretical predictions for the allocation of autonomy, they are inherently
interrelated and need to be considered simultaneously to account for potential perils of
autonomy. For instance, a locally responsive subsidiary requires more autonomy
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(Andersson et al., 2002), although that is only true when accounting for other relational,
environmental, and strategy conditions. The broader implication is that there is a need to
further unpack not only what conditions drive autonomy but also when those conditions
matter most.
In sum, my review takes an important step to provide conceptual clarity and
sufficient grounds to progress the state of autonomy research. I developed a
comprehensive review of prior theoretical and empirical, bringing together disjointed
studies to construct a nomological network of autonomy. I then utilized the cumulative
body of research to conduct explorative meta-analytic testing of key variables and
research traditions. These efforts allowed me to answer longstanding questions pertaining
to structural differentiation within the MNE, while also identify gaps and facilitate a
discussion for future research opportunities and scholarly work. Many of the discussions
had in this study help to answer recent calls to develop a more lucid theory of subsidiary
autonomy and, by extension, global MNE strategy, structure, and evolution. I hope that
my study reinvigorates research on subsidiary autonomy in the contemporary MNE.

41

REFERENCES 8
Aguilera, R. V., Marano, V., & Haxhi, I. (2019). International corporate governance: A
review and opportunities for future research. Journal of International Business
Studies, doi.org/10.1057/s41267-019-00232-w.
Aguinis, H., Ramani, R. S., & Alabduljader, N. (2020). Best-practice recommendations
for producers, evaluators, and users of methodological literature
reviews. Organizational Research Methods, doi.org/10.1177/1094428120943281.
Ahlvik, C., Smale, A., & Sumelius, J. (2016). Aligning corporate transfer intentions and
subsidiary HRM practice implementation in multinational corporations. Journal
of World Business, 51(3), 343-355.
Ambos, B., & Schlegelmilch, B. B. (2008). Innovation in multinational firms: Does
cultural fit enhance performance?. Management International Review, 48(2), 189.
Ambos, B., Asakawa, K., & Ambos, T. C. (2011). A dynamic perspective on subsidiary
autonomy. Global Strategy Journal, 1(3‐4), 301-316.
Ambos, T. C., & Birkinshaw, J. (2010). Headquarters’ attention and its effect on
subsidiary performance. Management international review, 50(4), 449-469.
Ambos, T. C., Andersson, U., & Birkinshaw, J. (2010). What are the consequences of
initiative-taking in multinational subsidiaries?. Journal of International Business
Studies, 41(7), 1099-1118.
Ambos, T. C., Fuchs, S. H., & Zimmermann, A. (2020). Managing interrelated tensions
in headquarters–subsidiary relationships: The case of a multinational hybrid
organization. Journal of International Business Studies, doi.org/10.1057/s41267020-00307-z.
Andersson, U., Forsgren, M., & Holm, U. (2002). The strategic impact of external
networks: subsidiary performance and competence development in the
multinational corporation. Strategic Management Journal, 23(11), 979-996.
Bartlett, C. A., & Ghoshal, S. (1989). The transnational solution. Boston: Harvard
Business School.
Belenzon, S., Hashai, N., & Patacconi, A. (2019). The architecture of attention: Group
structure and subsidiary autonomy. Strategic Management Journal, 40(10), 16101643.
Bergh, D. D., Aguinis, H., Heavey, C., Ketchen, D. J., Boyd, B. K., Su, P., Lau, C., &
Joo, H. (2016). Using meta‐analytic structural equation modeling to advance
strategic management research: Guidelines and an empirical illustration via the
8

Not all studies used to populate tables are not included in the reference list. A complete list is available
upon
request.

42

strategic leadership‐performance relationship. Strategic Management
Journal, 37(3), 477-497.
Beugelsdijk, S., & Jindra, B. (2018). Product innovation and decision-making autonomy
in subsidiaries of multinational companies. Journal of World Business, 53(4),
529-539.
Beugelsdijk, S., Ambos, B., & Nell, P. C. (2020). Conceptualizing and measuring
distance in international business research: Recurring questions and best practice
guidelines. In Research methods in international business (pp. 449-498). Palgrave
Macmillan, Cham.
Beugelsdijk, S., Kostova, T., Kunst, V. E., Spadafora, E., & Van Essen, M. (2018).
Cultural distance and firm internationalization: A meta-analytical review and
theoretical implications. Journal of Management, 44(1), 89-130.
Bird, A., & Mendenhall, M. E. (2016). From cross-cultural management to global
leadership: Evolution and adaptation. Journal of World Business, 51(1), 115-126.
Birkinshaw, J. (1997). Entrepreneurship in multinational corporations: The characteristics
of subsidiary initiatives. Strategic Management Journal, 18(3), 207-229.
Birkinshaw, J. (1998). Corporate entrepreneurship in network organizations:: How
subsidiary initiative drives internal market efficiency. European Management
Journal, 16(3), 355-364.
Birkinshaw, J., & Hood, N. (1998). Multinational subsidiary evolution: Capability and
charter change in foreign-owned subsidiary companies. Academy of Management
Review, 23(4), 773-795.
Birkinshaw, J., Ambos, T. C., & Bouquet, C. (2017). Boundary spanning activities of
corporate HQ executives insights from a longitudinal study. Journal of
Management Studies, 54(4), 422-454.
Birkinshaw, J., Holm, U., Thilenius, P., & Arvidsson, N. (2000). Consequences of
perception gaps in the headquarters–subsidiary relationship. International
Business Review, 9(3), 321-344.
Birkinshaw, J., Hood, N., & Jonsson, S. (1998). Building firm‐specific advantages in
multinational corporations: the role of subsidiary initiative. Strategic Management
Journal, 19(3), 221-242.
Björkman, I., Barner-Rasmussen, W., & Li, L. (2004). Managing knowledge transfer in
MNCs: The impact of headquarters control mechanisms. Journal of International
Business Studies, 35(5), 443-455.
Bouquet, C., & Birkinshaw, J. (2008). Weight versus voice: How foreign subsidiaries
gain attention from corporate headquarters. Academy of Management
Journal, 51(3), 577-601.

43

Buzzell, R. D. (1968). Can you standardize multinational marketing? (pp. 102-113).
Harvard Business Review.
Cantwell, J., & Mudambi, R. (2005). MNE competence‐creating subsidiary
mandates. Strategic Management Journal, 26(12), 1109-1128.
Cavanagh, A., Freeman, S., Kalfadellis, P., & Herbert, K. (2017). Assigned versus
assumed: Towards a contemporary, detailed understanding of subsidiary
autonomy. International Business Review, 26(6), 1168-1183.
Chandler, A. D. (1962) Strategy and structure. Cambridge, MA: M.I.T. Press.
Chandler, A. D. (1991). The functions of the HQ unit in the multibusiness firm. Strategic
Management Journal, 12(S2), 31-50.
Chang, E., & Taylor, M. S. (1999). Control in multinational corporations (MNCs): The
case of Korean manufacturing subsidiaries. Journal of Management, 25(4), 541565.
Chatzopoulou, E. C., Spanos, Y. E., & Lioukas, S. (2020). Headquarters′ monitoring
mechanisms, subsidiaries’ financial slack, and the contingent role of subsidiaries′
external embeddedness. Long Range Planning,
doi.org/10.1016/j.lrp.2020.102044.
Chen, D., Paik, Y., & Park, S. H. (2010). Host-country policies and MNE management
control in IJVs: Evidence from China. Journal of International Business
Studies, 41(3), 526-537.
Chiao, Y. C., & Ying, K. P. (2013). Network effect and subsidiary autonomy in
multinational corporations: An investigation of Taiwanese
subsidiaries. International Business Review, 22(4), 652-662.
Combs, J. G., Crook, T. R., & Rauch, A. (2019). Meta‐analytic research in management:
Contemporary approaches, unresolved controversies, and rising
standards. Journal of Management Studies, 56(1), 1-18.
Cuervo-Cazurra, A. (2016). Corruption in international business. Journal of World
Business, 51(1), 35-49.
Cuervo-Cazurra, A., & Genc, M. (2008). Transforming disadvantages into advantages:
Developing-country MNEs in the least developed countries. Journal of
International Business Studies, 39(6), 957-979.
Cuervo-Cazurra, A., & Li, C. (2020). State ownership and internationalization: The
advantage and disadvantage of stateness. Journal of World Business,
doi.org/10.1016/j.jwb.2020.101112.
Cuervo‐Cazurra, A., Doz, Y., & Gaur, A. (2020). Skepticism of globalization and global
strategy: Increasing regulations and countervailing strategies. Global Strategy
Journal, 10(1), 3-31.

44

Cuervo‐Cazurra, A., Mudambi, R., & Pedersen, T. (2019). Subsidiary power: Loaned or
owned? The lenses of agency theory and resource dependence theory. Global
Strategy Journal, 9(4), 491-501.
Cui, A. S., Griffith, D. A., Cavusgil, S. T., & Dabic, M. (2006). The influence of market
and cultural environmental factors on technology transfer between foreign MNCs
and local subsidiaries: A Croatian illustration. Journal of World Business, 41(2),
100-111.
de Jong, G., Van Dut, V., Jindra, B., & Marek, P. (2015). Does country context distance
determine subsidiary decision-making autonomy? Theory and evidence from
European transition economies. International Business Review, 24(5), 874-889.
Dellestrand, H., & Kappen, P. (2012). The effects of spatial and contextual factors on
headquarters resource allocation to MNE subsidiaries. Journal of International
Business Studies, 43(3), 219-243.
Dörrenbächer, C., & Gammelgaard, J. (2011). Subsidiary power in multinational
corporations: the subtle role of micro‐political bargaining power. Critical
Perspectives on International Business.
Dörrenbächer, C., & Geppert, M. (2006). Micro-politics and conflicts in multinational
corporations: Current debates, re-framing, and contributions of this special
issue. Journal of International Management, 12(3), 251-265.
Doz, Y., & Prahalad, C. K. (1984). Patterns of strategic control within multinational
corporations. Journal of International Business Studies, 15(2), 55-72.
Drogendijk, R., & Slangen, A. (2006). Hofstede, Schwartz, or managerial perceptions?
The effects of different cultural distance measures on establishment mode choices
by multinational enterprises. International business review, 15(4), 361-380.
Ecker, B., van Triest, S., & Williams, C. (2013). Management control and the
decentralization of R&D. Journal of Management, 39(4), 906-927.
Fainshmidt, S., Pezeshkan, A., Lance Frazier, M., Nair, A., & Markowski, E. (2016).
Dynamic capabilities and organizational performance: a meta‐analytic evaluation
and extension. Journal of Management Studies, 53(8), 1348-1380.
Fainshmidt, S., Witt, M. A., Aguilera, R. V., & Verbeke, A. (2020). The contributions of
qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) to international business research.
Journal of International Business Studies, doi.org/10.1057/s41267-020-00313-1.
Feinberg, S. E., & Gupta, A. K. (2004). Knowledge spillovers and the assignment of
R&D responsibilities to foreign subsidiaries. Strategic Management
Journal, 25(8‐9), 823-845.
Fenton-O'Creevy, M., Gooderham, P., & Nordhaug, O. (2008). Human resource
management in US subsidiaries in Europe and Australia: centralisation or
autonomy?. Journal of International Business Studies, 39(1), 151-166.
45

Fey, C. F., & Furu, P. (2008). Top management incentive compensation and knowledge
sharing in multinational corporations. Strategic Management Journal, 29(12),
1301-1323.
Filatotchev, I., & Wright, M. (2011). Agency perspectives on corporate governance of
multinational enterprises. Journal of Management Studies, 48(2), 471-486.
Foley, S., Ngo, H. Y., & Loi, R. (2012). The adoption of high performance work systems
in foreign subsidiaries. Journal of World Business, 47(1), 106-113.
Foss, N. J., & Pedersen, T. (2002). Transferring knowledge in MNCs: The role of sources
of subsidiary knowledge and organizational context. Journal of International
Management, 8(1), 49-67.
Foss, N. J., & Weber, L. (2016). Moving opportunism to the back seat: Bounded
rationality, costly conflict, and hierarchical forms. Academy of Management
Review, 41(1), 61-79.
Gammelgaard, J., McDonald, F., Stephan, A., Tüselmann, H., & Dörrenbächer, C.
(2012). The impact of increases in subsidiary autonomy and network relationships
on performance. International Business Review, 21(6), 1158-1172.
Gates, S. R., & Egelhoff, W. G. (1986). Centralization in headquarters–subsidiary
relationships. Journal of International Business Studies, 17(2), 71-92.
Gaur, A. S., & Lu, J. W. (2007). Ownership strategies and survival of foreign
subsidiaries: Impacts of institutional distance and experience. Journal of
Management, 33(1), 84-110.
Gaur, A. S., Delios, A., & Singh, K. (2007). Institutional environments, staffing
strategies, and subsidiary performance. Journal of Management, 33(4), 611-636.
Geleilate, J. M. G., Andrews, D. S., & Fainshmidt, S. (2019). Subsidiary autonomy and
subsidiary performance: A meta-analysis. Journal of World Business,
doi.org/10.1016/j.jwb.2019.101049.
Geppert, M., & Dörrenbächer, C. (2014). Politics and power within multinational
corporations: Mainstream studies, emerging critical approaches and suggestions
for future research. International Journal of Management Reviews, 16(2), 226244.
Geyskens, I., Steenkamp, J. B. E., & Kumar, N. (2006). Make, buy, or ally: A transaction
cost theory meta-analysis. Academy of Management Journal, 49(3), 519-543.
Ghoshal, S., & Bartlett, C. A. (1990). The multinational corporation as an
interorganizational network. Academy of Management Review, 15(4), 603-626.
Ghoshal, S., & Moran, P. (1996). Bad for practice: A critique of the transaction cost
theory. Academy of Management Review, 21(1), 13-47.

46

Gong, Y. (2003). Subsidiary staffing in multinational enterprises: Agency, resources, and
performance. Academy of Management journal, 46(6), 728-739.
Gupta, A. K., Govindarajan, V., & Malhotra, A. (1999). Feedback‐seeking behavior
within multinational corporations. Strategic Management Journal, 20(3), 205222.
Hall, P. A., & Soskice, D. (2001). An introduction to varieties of capitalism. op. cit, 2127.
Hartmann, E., Feisel, E., & Schober, H. (2010). Talent management of western MNCs in
China: Balancing global integration and local responsiveness. Journal of World
Business, 45(2), 169-178.
Hedges, L. V., & Olkin, I. (1985). Statistical methods for meta analysis. Orlando, FL:
Academic Press.
Hedlund, G. (1986). The hypermodern MNC - A heterarchy?. Human Resource
Management. (1986-1998), 25(1), 9.
Hendry, J. (2002). The principal's other problems: Honest incompetence and the
specification of objectives. Academy of Management Review, 27(1), 98-113.
Hoenen, A. K., & Kostova, T. (2015). Utilizing the broader agency perspective for
studying headquarters–subsidiary relations in multinational companies. Journal of
International Business Studies, 46(1), 104-113.
Holtbrügge, D. (2005). Configuration and co-ordination of value activities in German
multinational corporations. European Management Journal, 23(5), 564-575.
Homburg, C., & Prigge, J. K. (2014). Exploring subsidiary desire for autonomy: A
conceptual framework and empirical findings. Journal of International
Marketing, 22(4), 21-43.
Hotho, J. J., & Pedersen, T. (2012). Beyond the'rules of the game': Three institutional
approaches and how they matter for international business. Handbook of
Institutional Approaches to International Business.
Hunter, J. E., & Schmidt, F. L. (1990). Dichotomization of continuous variables: The
implications for meta-analysis. Journal of Applied Psychology, 75(3), 334.
Hunter, J. E., & Schmidt, F. L. (2004). Methods of meta-analysis: Correcting error and
bias in research findings. Sage.
Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1976). Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior,
agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3(4), 305360.

47

Karna, A., Richter, A., & Riesenkampff, E. (2016). Revisiting the role of the environment
in the capabilities–financial performance relationship: A meta‐analysis. Strategic
Management Journal, 37(6), 1154-1173.
Kawai, N., & Strange, R. (2014). Subsidiary autonomy and performance in Japanese
multinationals in Europe. International Business Review, 23(3), 504-515.
Keupp, M. M., Palmié, M., & Gassmann, O. (2011). Achieving subsidiary integration in
international innovation by managerial “tools”. Management International
Review, 51(2), 213-239.
Kim, B., Prescott, J. E., & Kim, S. M. (2005). Differentiated governance of foreign
subsidiaries in transnational corporations: An agency theory perspective. Journal
of International Management, 11(1), 43-66.
Kirca, A. H., Hult, G. T. M., Roth, K., Cavusgil, S. T., Perryy, M. Z., Akdeniz, M. B.,
Deligonul, S., Mena, J., Pollitte, W., Hoppner, J., Miller, J. C., & White, R.
(2011). Firm-specific assets, multinationality, and financial performance: A metaanalytic review and theoretical integration. Academy of management
Journal, 54(1), 47-72.
Klueter, T., & Monteiro, F. (2017). How does performance feedback affect boundary
spanning in multinational corporations? Insights from technology scouts. Journal
of Management Studies, 54(4), 483-510.
Kogut, B., & Singh, H. (1988). The effect of national culture on the choice of entry
mode. Journal of International Business Studies, 19(3), 411-432.
Kostova, T. (1999). Transnational transfer of strategic organizational practices: A
contextual perspective. Academy of Management Review, 24(2), 308-324.
Kostova, T., & Roth, K. (2003). Social capital in multinational corporations and a micromacro model of its formation. Academy of Management Review, 28(2), 297-317.
Kostova, T., & Zaheer, S. (1999). Organizational legitimacy under conditions of
complexity: The case of the multinational enterprise. Academy of Management
Review, 24(1), 64-81.
Kostova, T., Beugelsdijk, S., Scott, W. R., Kunst, V. E., Chua, C. H., & van Essen, M.
(2019). The construct of institutional distance through the lens of different
institutional perspectives: Review, analysis, and recommendations. Journal of
International Business Studies, doi.org/10.1057/s41267-019-00294-w.
Kostova, T., Marano, V., & Tallman, S. (2016). Headquarters–subsidiary relationships in
MNCs: Fifty years of evolving research. Journal of World Business, 51(1), 176184.
Kostova, T., Nell, P. C., & Hoenen, A. K. (2018). Understanding agency problems in
headquarters-subsidiary relationships in multinational corporations: A
contextualized model. Journal of Management, 44(7), 2611-2637.
48

Lazarova, M., Peretz, H., & Fried, Y. (2017). Locals know best? Subsidiary HR
autonomy and subsidiary performance. Journal of World Business, 52(1), 83-96.
Lee, H., Chung, C. C., & Beamish, P. W. (2019). Configurational characteristics of
mandate portfolios and their impact on foreign subsidiary survival. Journal of
World Business, 54(5), 100999.
Lim, C., Hemmert, M., & Kim, S. (2017). MNE subsidiary evolution from sales to
innovation: Looking inside the black box. International Business Review, 26(1),
145-155.
Lipsey, M. W., & Wilson, D. B. (2001). Practical meta-analysis. SAGE.
Luo, Y. (2001). Determinants of entry in an emerging economy: A multilevel
approach. Journal of Management Studies, 38(3), 443-472.
Luo, Y. (2006). Political behavior, social responsibility, and perceived corruption: A
structuration perspective. Journal of International Business Studies, 37(6), 747766.
Mäkelä, K., Barner-Rasmussen, W., Ehrnrooth, M., & Koveshnikov, A. (2019). Potential
and recognized boundary spanners in multinational corporations. Journal of
World Business, 54(4), 335-349.
Menz, M., Kunisch, S., & Collis, D. J. (2015). The corporate headquarters in the
contemporary corporation: Advancing a multimarket firm perspective. Academy
of Management Annals, 9(1), 633-714.
Meyer, K. E., Li, C., & Schotter, A. P. (2020). Managing the MNE subsidiary:
Advancing a multi-level and dynamic research agenda. Journal of International
Business Studies, doi.org/10.1057/s41267-020-00318-w.
Mudambi, R. (2011). Hierarchy, coordination, and innovation in the multinational
enterprise. Global Strategy Journal, 1(3-4), 317-323.
Mudambi, R., & Navarra, P. (2004). Divisional power, intra-firm bargaining and rentseeking behavior in multidivisional corporations. Economics Bulletin, 4(13), 1-10.
Nell, P. C., & Ambos, B. (2013). Parenting advantage in the MNC: An embeddedness
perspective on the value added by headquarters. Strategic Management
Journal, 34(9), 1086-1103.
Nell, P. C., Ambos, B., & Schlegelmilch, B. B. (2011). The MNC as an externally
embedded organization: An investigation of embeddedness overlap in local
subsidiary networks. Journal of World Business, 46(4), 497-505.
Newburry, W., Zeira, Y., & Yeheskel, O. (2003). Autonomy and effectiveness of equity
international joint ventures (IJVs) in China. International Business Review, 12(4),
395-419.

49

Nguyen, Q. T., & Rugman, A. M. (2015). Internal equity financing and the performance
of multinational subsidiaries in emerging economies. Journal of International
Business Studies, 46(4), 468-490.
Nohria, N., & Ghoshal, S. (1994). Differentiated fit and shared values: Alternatives for
managing headquarters‐subsidiary relations. Strategic Management
Journal, 15(6), 491-502.
Nuruzzaman, N., Gaur, A. S., & Sambharya, R. B. (2019). A microfoundations approach
to studying innovation in multinational subsidiaries. Global Strategy
Journal, 9(1), 92-116.
O’Donnell, S. W. (2000). Managing foreign subsidiaries: agents of headquarters, or an
interdependent network?. Strategic Management Journal, 21(5), 525-548.
Olkin, I., & Finn, J. D. (1995). Correlations redux. Psychological Bulletin, 118(1), 155.
Parente, R., Melo, M., Andrews, D., Kumaraswamy, A., & Vasconcelos, F. (2020).
Public sector organizations and agricultural catch-up dilemma in emerging
markets: The orchestrating role of Embrapa in Brazil. Journal of International
Business Studies, doi.org/10.1057/s41267-020-00325-x.
Paterson, S. L., & Brock, D. M. (2002). The development of subsidiary-management
research: review and theoretical analysis. International Business Review, 11(2),
139-163.
Phene, A., & Almeida, P. (2008). Innovation in multinational subsidiaries: The role of
knowledge assimilation and subsidiary capabilities. Journal of International
Business Studies, 39(5), 901-919.
Picard, J. (1977). How European companies control marketing decisions
abroad. Columbia Journal of World Business, 12(2), 113-121.
Pryor, M. H. (1965). Planning in a world wide business. Harvard Business Review, 43(1),
130.
Puck, J., Hödl, M. K., Filatotchev, I., Wolff, H. G., & Bader, B. (2016). Ownership
mode, cultural distance, and the extent of parent firms’ strategic control over
subsidiaries in the PRC. Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 33(4), 1075-1105.
Rabbiosi, L. (2011). Subsidiary roles and reverse knowledge transfer: An investigation of
the effects of coordination mechanisms. Journal of International
Management, 17(2), 97-113.
Rabbiosi, L., & Santangelo, G. D. (2019). Host country corruption and the organization
of HQ–subsidiary relationships. Journal of International Business Studies, 50(1),
111-124.
Raudenbush, S. W., & Bryk, A. S. (2002). Hierarchical linear models: Applications and
data analysis methods (Vol. 1). sage.

50

Raziq, M. M., Borini, F. M., & Perry, M. (2014). Subsidiary initiatives and subsidiary
autonomy: Evidence from New Zealand and Brazil. International
Entrepreneurship and Management Journal, 10(3), 589-605.
Riviere, M., Bass, A. E., & Andersson, U. (2020). Dynamic capability development in
multinational enterprises: Reconciling routine reconfiguration between the
headquarters and subsidiaries. Global Strategy Journal, doi.org/10.1002/gsj.1389.
Rodriguez, P., Uhlenbruck, K., & Eden, L. (2005). Government corruption and the entry
strategies of multinationals. Academy of Management Review, 30(2), 383-396.
Rosenthal, R. (1979). The file drawer problem and tolerance for null
results. Psychological Bulletin, 86(3), 638.
Roth, K., & O'Donnell, S. (1996). Foreign subsidiary compensation strategy: An agency
theory perspective. Academy of Management Journal, 39(3), 678-703.
Rugman, A. M., & Verbeke, A. (2001). Subsidiary‐specific advantages in multinational
enterprises. Strategic Management Journal, 22(3), 237-250.
Ryan, P., Buciuni, G., Giblin, M., & Andersson, U. (2020). Subsidiary upgrading and
global value chain governance in the multinational enterprise. Global Strategy
Journal, 10(3), 496-519.
Santangelo, G. D., Meyer, K. E., & Jindra, B. (2016). MNE subsidiaries’ outsourcing and
insourcing of R&D: The role of local institutions. Global Strategy Journal, 6(4),
247-268.
Sarabi, A., Froese, F. J., Chng, D. H., & Meyer, K. E. (2020). Entrepreneurial leadership
and MNE subsidiary performance: The moderating role of subsidiary
context. International Business Review, doi.org/10.1016/j.ibusrev.2020.101672.
Sartor, M. A., & Beamish, P. W. (2018). Host market government corruption and the
equity-based foreign entry strategies of multinational enterprises. Journal of
International Business Studies, 49(3), 346-370.
Schmitt, J., Decreton, B., & Nell, P. C. (2019). How corporate headquarters add value in
the digital age. Journal of Organization Design, 8(1), 1-10.
Schomaker, M. S., & Zaheer, S. (2014). The role of language in knowledge transfer to
geographically dispersed manufacturing operations. Journal of International
Management, 20(1), 55-72.
Schotter, A., & Beamish, P. W. (2011). Performance effects of MNC headquarters–
subsidiary conflict and the role of boundary spanners: The case of headquarter
initiative rejection. Journal of International Management, 17(3), 243-259.
Sengul, M., & Gimeno, J. (2013). Constrained delegation: Limiting subsidiaries’ decision
rights and resources in firms that compete across multiple
industries. Administrative Science Quarterly, 58(3), 420-471.

51

Sengul, M., & Obloj, T. (2017). Better safe than sorry: Subsidiary performance feedback
and internal governance in multiunit firms. Journal of Management, 43(8), 25262554.
Shaw, J. D., & Ertug, G. (2017). The suitability of simulations and meta-analyses for
submissions to academy of management journal. Academy of Management
Journal, doi.org/10.5465/amj.2017.4006
Slangen, A. H. (2013). Greenfield or acquisition entry? The roles of policy uncertainty
and MNE legitimacy in host countries. Global Strategy Journal, 3(3), 262-280.
Slangen, A. H., & Hennart, J. F. (2008). Do foreign greenfields outperform foreign
acquisitions or vice versa? An institutional perspective. Journal of Management
Studies, 45(7), 1301-1328.
Spencer, J., & Gomez, C. (2011). MNEs and corruption: The impact of national
institutions and subsidiary strategy. Strategic Management Journal, 32(3), 280300.
Stopford, J. M., & Wells, L. T. Managing the Multinational Enterprise: Organization of
the Firm and Ownership of the Subsidiary. NY: Basic Books, 1972, French ed.
Tallman S, & Yip G. (2009). Strategy and the multinational enterprise. In The Oxford
Handbook of International Business, 2ºed, Oxford University Press: New York,
pp. 307– 340.
Tippmann, E., Sharkey Scott, P., & Parker, A. (2017). Boundary capabilities in MNCs:
Knowledge transformation for creative solution development. Journal of
Management Studies, 54(4), 455-482.
Tran, Y., Mahnke, V., & Ambos, B. (2010). The effect of quantity, quality and timing of
headquarters-initiated knowledge flows on subsidiary performance. Management
International Review, 50(4), 493-511.
Tung, R. L., & Verbeke, A. (2010). Beyond Hofstede and GLOBE: Improving the quality
of cross-cultural research. Journal of International Business Studies, 41, 12591274.
Van Wijk, R., Jansen, J. J., & Lyles, M. A. (2008). Inter‐and intra‐organizational
knowledge transfer: a meta‐analytic review and assessment of its antecedents and
consequences. Journal of Management Studies, 45(4), 830-853.
Verbeke, A., & Kano, L. (2016). An internalization theory perspective on the global and
regional strategies of multinational enterprises. Journal of World Business, 51(1),
83-92.
Verbeke, A., Kano, L., & Yuan, W. (2016). Inside the regional multinationals: A new
value chain perspective on subsidiary capabilities. International Business
Review, 25(3), 785-793.

52

Vernon, R. (1966) International Investment and International Trade in the Product Cycle.
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 80, 190-207.
Viswesvaran, C., & Ones, D. S. (1995). Theory testing: Combining psychometric meta‐
analysis and structural equations modeling. Personnel Psychology, 48(4), 865885.
Wang, S. L., Luo, Y., Lu, X., Sun, J., & Maksimov, V. (2014). Autonomy delegation to
foreign subsidiaries: An enabling mechanism for emerging-market
multinationals. Journal of International Business Studies, 45(2), 111-130.
Williams, C. R. (1967). Regional management overseas. Harvard Business Review,
45(1), 87.
Williamson, O. E. (1975). Markets and hierarchies. New York: Free Press.
Witt, M. A. (2019). De-globalization: Theories, predictions, and opportunities for
international business research. Journal of International Business Studies, 50(7),
1053-1077.
Witt, M. A., & Jackson, G. (2016). Varieties of capitalism and institutional comparative
advantage: A test and reinterpretation. Journal of International Business
Studies, 47(7), 778-806.
Xu, D., & Shenkar, O. (2002). Note: Institutional distance and the multinational
enterprise. Academy of Management Review, 27(4), 608-618.
Young, S., & Tavares, A. T. (2004). Centralization and autonomy: back to the
future. International Business Review, 13(2), 215-237.
Zeng, R., Grøgaard, B., & Steel, P. (2018). Complements or substitutes? A meta-analysis
of the role of integration mechanisms for knowledge transfer in the MNE
network. Journal of World Business, 53(4), 415-432.

53

Table 1. Overarching research traditions on the drivers of subsidiary autonomy
Research tradition

Common variables

Agency theory

HQ-SUB conflict
Goal alignment
Strategic relatedness
Shared values

Opportunism
Goal Alignment

Institutional distance
Cultural distance
Institutional constraints

Legitimacy
Responsiveness
Embeddedness

Subsidiary power
Vertical dependence
Subsidiary resources
Local responsiveness
Value chain breadth

Efficiency
Value creation
Bargaining Power

Institutional theory

Global strategy A

Mechanisms

Exemplars of rationale
1.) Headquarters will allocate
autonomy when mechanisms to
monitor subsidiaries and mitigate
goal conflict are implemented.
2.) Headquarters will retain control
to protect own interests and
prevent subsidiary opportunistic
behavior.
1.) Headquarters will allocate
autonomy in institutionally distal
environments due to knowledge
gaps between home and hostcountry markets.
2.) Headquarters will retain control
in institutionally proximal
environments to monitor
subsidiary behavior.
1.) Headquarters will allocate
autonomy to enable innovation and
the development of resource-based
advantages, reflective of the
MNE’s strategy.

Select literature
O’Donnell (2000)
Scott et al. (2010)
Ambos et al. (2011)
Lazarova et al. (2017)
Ambos et al. (2019)

Gomez & Werner (2004)
Gaur et al. (2007)
Fenton-O’Creevy et al. (2008)
Slangen & Hennart (2008)
Kawai & Strange (2014)

Rugman & Verbeke (2001)
Mudambi & Navarra (2004)
Birkinshaw et al. (2005)
Venaik et al. (2005)
Zhan & Chen (2013)

2.) Headquarters will retain control
when subsidiaries are vertically
integrated and focused on global
integration.
Notes: The table is illustrative and in no way exhaustive of all possible theories, variables, explanations and literature; A = This category encompasses
several distinct research traditions, but in this study, it refers mostly to resource-based theorizing; for the sake of brevity, some of the citations in this table
are not included in the reference list but are available upon request.
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Table 2. Summary of main constructs included in final sample
Construct

General Definition

Autonomy

Degree of subsidiary decision-making
latitude (centralization)

Goal alignment

Extent to which a subsidiary and its
headquarters have the same goals/vision

Past performance

Past subsidiary financial and
operational performance

Institutional distance

Degree of similarity between the MNE
home and subsidiary host country

Host country constraints

Extent to which the host country
environment is presents challenges

Value chain breadth

Number of value chain activities a
subsidiary undertakes

Localization

Degree of subsidiary local
responsiveness (global integration)
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Exemplars of label(s)
Autonomy
Decentralization
Tightness of control
Shared vision
Goal conflict
Organizational identification
Return on assets (ROA)
Sales growths
Innovation performance
Institutional distance
Cultural distance
Regulative distance
Host country volatility
Environmental complexity
Domestic political risk
Subsidiary functions
Value chain scope
Miniature replica
International strategy type
Local responsiveness
Local differentiation

Select literature
Jarillo & Martinez (1990)
Taggart (1997)
Nobel & Birkinshaw (1998)
Birkinshaw et al. (2000)
Williams & van Triest (2009
Hombrug & Prigge (2014)
Newburry et al. (2003)
Nell et al. (2011)
Nguyen & Rugman (2015)
Luo (2001)
Verbeke et al. (2013)
Meyer & Estrin (2014)
Slangen (2013)
Wang et al. (2014)
Santangelo et al. (2018)
Bouquet & Birkinshaw (2008)
Ambos & Birkinshaw (2010)
Nell & Ambos (2013)
Gomez & Werner (2004)
Ambos & Schlegelmilch (2008)
Rabbiosi & Santangelo (2018)

Table 3. HOMA results

Predictor

K

N

Corrected
R-mean

95% confidence
interval

Q-test

Agency Theory
Goal alignment
33
5754
-0.047
-0.116 to 0.022
213.20*
Past Performance
20
3679
0.058
-0.035 to 0.151
139.56*
Institutional Theory
Institutional distance
54
12160
0.018
-0.050 to 0.086
732.59*
Host country constraints
29
8821
0.018
-0.062 to 0.099
378.33*
Global Strategy
Full operations
15
2689
0.123
-0.018 to 0.265
185.85*
Localization
24
3320
0.080
-0.028 to 0.188
217.47*
Additional – Context
Industry pressures
37
10527
-0.076
-0.147 to -0.006*
433.44*
Geographic Distance
11
1835
-0.019
-0.088 to 0.050
20.81*
Additional – Subsidiary
Greenfield entry
32
9900
-0.050
-0.112 to 0.013
263.03*
Wholly owned
12
3230
-0.035
-0.158 to 0.088
107.75*
Global product focus
12
2428
0.039
-0.111 to 0.189
175.29*
Subsidiary age
77
18721
0.019
-0.009 to 0.047
240.16*
Subsidiary size
94
20018
0.009
-0.018 to 0.036
308.66*
Additional – MNE
MNE size
25
6011
-0.032
-0.088 to 0.024
92.21*
MNE experience
19
2812
0.006
-0.060 to 0.071
53.38*
Additional – HQ-SUB
Socialization
23
4206
-0.177
-0.298 to -0.057*
328.03*
Formalization
24
4251
-0.181
-0.352 to -0.010*
698.10*
Communication Frequency
15
3189
-0.137
-0.208 to -0.066*
59.98*
Notes: K = number of study relationships; N = total sample size for K studies; Q-test = Cochran’s sample
heterogeneity test.
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Table 4. MASEM path model results
95% Confidence interval
Variable
Coef.
P > |Z|
Lower
Upper
Agency Theory
Goal alignment
-0.069
0.021
-0.127
-0.011
Past performance
0.077
0.010
0.018
0.136
Institutional Theory
Institutional distance
0.030
0.298
-0.026
0.086
Host country constraints
0.029
0.315
-0.028
0.086
Global Strategy
Value chain breadth
0.115
0.000
0.057
0.174
Localization
0.079
0.006
0.023
0.135
Controls
Industry pressures
-0.053
0.068
-0.110
0.004
Greenfield entry
-0.052
0.073
-0.109
0.005
Subsidiary age
0.017
0.562
-0.040
0.074
Subsidiary size
-0.007
0.815
-0.065
0.051
MNE size
-0.051
0.084
-0.108
0.007
MNE experience
0.028
0.345
-0.030
0.087
Log likelihood
-22062.16
Observations
1218
Notes: Chi-square = 46.74 (0.00) p-value in paratheses; RMSEA = 0.00; CFI = 0.99; TLI = 0.99;
Observations based on harmonic mean.
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III.

CONFIGURING FOR PRODUCT INNOVATION:

A DIFFERENTIATED FIT PERSPECTIVE ON FOREIGN SUBSIDIARY
AUTONOMY

INTRODUCTION
Because innovation by foreign subsidiaries is a key source of competitive advantages for
the multinational enterprise (MNE), understanding how MNEs can manage their foreign
subsidiaries to foster innovation is a fundamental undertaking of global strategy research
(Rugman & Verbeke, 2001; Almeida & Phene, 2004; Phene & Almeida, 2008;
Beugelsdijk & Jindra, 2018). The success of an MNE is often linked to its ability to
“assimilate, generate, and integrate knowledge” in its geographically dispersed
subsidiaries (Phene & Almeida, 2008: 901). To a large extent, foreign subsidiaries are the
drivers of innovation within contemporary MNEs, especially when it comes to the
generation of local product innovations that may be subsequently leveraged across the
MNE network (Monteiro & Birkinshaw, 2017).
Prior research highlights decision-making autonomy as a key driver of product
innovation by foreign subsidiaries (Venaik, Midgley & Devinney, 2005; Harzing &
Noorderhaven, 2006; Beugelsdijk & Jindra, 2018). Autonomy—the extent to which a
subsidiary makes strategic decisions in its operating environment, without interference by
MNE headquarters—gives subsidiary managers the latitude to become locally embedded,
develop network ties, and compile valuable inputs for novel product offerings (Kawai &
Strange, 2014). With increased autonomy, subsidiary managers can make strategic
decisions in areas such as marketing (Hewett, Roth & Roth, 2003; Gammelgaard et al.,
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2012; Homburg & Prigge, 2014) and research and development (Feinberg & Gupta,
2004). Indeed, Beugelsdijk and Jindra (2018: 529) posit that MNE subsidiaries “are not
able to develop product innovations when they lack the required decision-making
autonomy”.
In this study, I employ a differentiated fit perspective to argue that the role of
subsidiary autonomy in fostering foreign subsidiary product innovation warrants more
nuance. The differentiated fit perspective has its origins in contingency theories
(Venkatraman, 1989) and hinges on the notion that subsidiaries can be structurally
differentiated to achieve an optimal trade-off “between the cost of each structural element
and its efficacy in the context of the subsidiary” (Nohria & Ghoshal, 1994: 493). Whether
subsidiary autonomy leads to product innovation is therefore shaped by interactions
between autonomy and complementary organizational and environmental conditions
(Ambos, Asakawa & Ambos, 2011). As such, a differentiated fit prism suggests two key
points of departure from existing theory and research.
First, prior literature implicitly assumes that increased autonomy will result in the
generation of novel knowledge that often yields subsidiary innovation. Yet, although
autonomy may provide the latitude to leverage knowledge locally, it does not necessarily
generate the requisite knowledge that underpins product development. Accordingly,
drawing from prior work on global innovation and knowledge sourcing, I suggest that
subsidiary autonomy more likely results in product innovation when it is complemented
by the internal generation of knowledge through research and development (R&D)
(Asakawa et al., 2018; Beugelsdijk & Jindra, 2018) or externally by sourcing knowledge
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from management consultants in the host country (Creplet et al., 2001; Back, Parboteeah
& Nam, 2014).
Second, while decision-making autonomy may enable the pursuit of novel
products for many subsidiaries, autonomy is not always needed (Palmíe et al., 2016). As
Venaik et al. (2005) note, subsidiary roles and their associated levels of autonomy should
be differentiated depending on the context in which the subsidiary operates. Here, I
proffer that autonomy will be conducive to product innovation for foreign subsidiaries
operating in host environments institutionally distal from the home country because
institutional distance tends to create host-country-related knowledge gaps among parent
MNE managers and to limit the ability of the subsidiary to leverage parent MNE products
in the local context (Tallman & Chacar, 2011). Conversely, in institutionally proximal
environments, parent MNE knowledge is more directly deployable in local conditions. In
such contexts, parent MNEs can structure their subsidiaries to innovate by adapting
existing competencies for the local context, even when decision-making is controlled by
the parent MNE (Cantwell & Mudambi, 2005; Asakawa et al., 2018).
Taken together, my leveraging of a differentiated fit perspective suggests
autonomy may be neither necessary nor sufficient for product innovation (Venkatraman,
1989; Nohria & Ghoshal, 1994). Rather, subsidiary product innovation is the result of the
way in which MNE managers configure structural arrangements and knowledge-related
roles of subsidiaries in different institutional contexts. I utilize fuzzy-set qualitative
comparative analysis (fsQCA) (Fiss, 2007; Ragin, 2009) and data on foreign
manufacturing subsidiaries operating in Europe and Asia to examine my arguments. I
find three combinations of subsidiary autonomy, institutional distance, R&D, and usage
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of management consultants that are associated with subsidiary innovation. The patterns I
identify are largely consistent with my theory but also yield unexpected insights.
My study makes two theoretical contributions. First, I address recent calls for a
contextualized theory of the outcomes of subsidiary autonomy, particularly subsidiary
innovation (Andersson et al., 2016; Cano-Kollmann et al., 2016). I explicate that
subsidiary autonomy and knowledge-related roles are complementary in facilitating
subsidiary product innovation. I further highlight that knowledge can be generated from
two distinct sources that are context dependent, and that subsidiaries can innovate
without autonomy in certain institutional contexts. Second, my study contributes to the
subsidiary management literature (Meyer, Li & Schotter, 2020) whereby prior studies
have “assumed a simple, direct relationship” with respect to the outcomes of autonomy
(Kawai & Strange, 2014: 504). I show that the extent to which autonomy is beneficial to
important outcomes, such as product innovation, may be contingent upon institutional
context and knowledge-related roles of the subsidiary (Geleilate, Andrews & Fainshmidt,
2019).

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
Foreign subsidiary product innovation
Innovation by foreign subsidiaries has received considerable attention in recent decades
(Meyer et al., 2020). Foreign subsidiary innovation is an important capability of MNEs
and often serves as a cornerstone for sustained competitive advantages. To be clear,
innovation is conceptually distinct from R&D. R&D often serves as a key input into the
process of new product development, while innovation constitutes both developing new
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products and ensuring that the products are commercially viable (Phene & Almeida,
2008). Here, I conceptualize innovation as the output, namely new product introduction,
of a broader product development process that may include R&D.
Because innovation is a complex undertaking, both the parent MNE and the
subsidiary can play important roles in this process. Parent MNEs can add value by
coordinating and integrating knowledge flows into foreign subsidiaries (Gupta &
Govindarajan, 2000; Cantwell & Mudambi, 2005; Nell & Ambos, 2013). Subsidiaries, in
comparison, can explore their local environment for new knowledge. By becoming
locally embedded, subsidiaries may tap into knowledge spillovers and establish local
network ties that may facilitate knowledge internalization (Andersson, Forsgren & Holm,
2002). Subsidiaries use local knowledge as an input for product development, sourcing,
and combining new and existing knowledge for novelty (Almeida & Phene, 2008). The
ability of a subsidiary to innovate can thus be shaped by the combination of its local
embeddedness and resources and capabilities possessed by the MNE (Nohria & Ghoshal,
1994).
The literature points to several potential drivers of subsidiary innovation, but one
central means by which subsidiaries may do so is autonomy. Autonomy allows
subsidiaries to adapt to and achieve alignment with the local environment (Young &
Tavares, 2004). Beugelsdijk and Jindra (2018: 530) argue that “the extent to which a
subsidiary is embedded in the local context is fundamentally related to the extent to
which strategic decision-making resides with the subsidiary”. The role of autonomy in
facilitating local embeddedness and innovation is underpinned by two implicit
assumptions. First, autonomy gives subsidiary managers the decision-making latitude to
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act independently, pursue local initiatives, and become locally embedded (Gammelgaard
et al., 2012). Ambos et al. (2011: 304) suggest that strong local linkages are
“indispensable if actors are to acquire core knowledge from local institutions.” Lower
levels of autonomy may limit local exploratory activities and adaptive capabilities
(Monteiro, Arvidsson & Birkinshaw, 2008).
Second, autonomy may create motivation for subsidiary managers to pursue
innovation. Because autonomy signals more trust in the subsidiary, managers of
autonomous units may be more motivated to engage in creative roles within the MNE
(Nuruzzaman, Gaur & Sambharya, 2019). The exchange of trust for autonomy may
reflect confidence by the parent MNE in the subsidiary, which creates space for creative
behaviors that may result in innovation. In contrast, parent MNE control may undermine
the creativity of a subsidiary and its motivation to identify and leverage useful local
knowledge. Because locally specific knowledge is essential to local innovation (Phene &
Almeida, 2008), autonomy may be needed to incentivize knowledge acquisition and its
utilization toward innovation. Indeed, Cantwell and Mudambi (2005) suggest that
autonomy is central to a competence-creating subsidiary.

Autonomy: Complementary mechanisms and boundary conditions
Although past research suggests that autonomy drives subsidiary innovation, I
contend that this notion warrants additional nuance for several reasons. First, granting
decision-making autonomy to a foreign subsidiary is not always conducive to innovation.
Subsidiaries may use autonomy for self-serving behaviors, such as ‘empire building’,
which may not contribute to innovation efforts (Mudambi & Navarra, 2004; Cuervo-
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Cazurra, Mudambi & Pedersen, 2019). While autonomy may “encourage the subsidiary
to promote initiatives and engage in the accumulation of knowledge”, it may not always
entail new knowledge creation (Young & Tavares, 2004: 229).
Product innovation requires that subsidiaries create knowledge as well as leverage
that knowledge locally toward new products. Prior research points to two salient means
by which foreign subsidiaries generate such knowledge. On one hand, subsidiaries can
develop knowledge internally through R&D. When a subsidiary engages in R&D there is
“interplay between the subsidiary's internal creative efforts and the absorption of external
knowledge that might spill over from other firms” (Feinberg & Gupta, 2004: 825). By
being engaged in R&D, subsidiaries may produce the requisite knowledge that fuels
novel products (Andersson et al., 2002; Cano-Kollmann et al., 2016). Importantly, R&D
is not randomly assigned to subsidiaries. It is a strategic mandate that typically comes
from the parent MNE and tends to remain unchanged after assignment (Birkinshaw &
Hood, 1998; Cantwell & Mudambi, 2005).
On the other hand, subsidiaries can externally source knowledge through
management consultant firms (Furusten & Werr, 2005; Hoecht & Trott, 2006). As argued
by Phene and Almeida (2008: 905), subsidiaries “develop linkages to outside sources of
knowledge that act as conduits for knowledge transfer”. Linkages with consultants may
provide a comparative advantage in local knowledge creation (Thrift, 2005). Subsidiaries
may therefore be able to substitute internal knowledge generation with the external use of
consultants (Back et al., 2014). While research suggests that R&D is important for
introducing novel products, consultants may also contribute to such efforts (Song, 2014).
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In some cases, consultants may even increase the pace of innovation (Contractor et al.,
2010; Santangelo, Meyer & Jindra, 2016).
Subsidiaries may also engage in external R&D processes through contracted
research; however, such engagements are typically done in combination with internal
R&D efforts (Ferraris, Santoro & Dezi, 2017). Similarly, while prior research points to
various ways to source external knowledge (e.g., strategic alliances, universities, other
research organizations) these, again, are often enacted to complement a firm’s existing
internal R&D activity. In fact, R&D assignments tend to be given to subsidiaries that are
in a position to share and co-develop knowledge with various external actors (Cantwell &
Mudambi, 2005). Accordingly, management consultants are unique in that they are more
likely to substitute for R&D in the sense that they may operate when internal R&D is
absent.
Another issue with the notion that subsidiary autonomy will yield product
innovation stems from Nohria and Ghoshal’s (1994) argument that a subsidiary’s level of
autonomy should depend on the parent MNE’s ability to make product-related decisions
that fit the host country’s conditions. Xu, Cavusgil, and White (2006: 3) argue that fit is
attained when “the organization's resources and capabilities are aligned with the
opportunities and threats the environment presents”. Contextual differences between two
environments are shaped by extent of similarity or dissimilarity between their institutions
(Xu & Shenkar, 2002). Increasing institutional distance is associated with knowledge
gaps among parent MNE managers, which may erect barriers to integrate subsidiaries and
make fit enhancing decisions (Ambos et al., 2011). Thus, autonomy becomes
increasingly valuable in institutionally dissimilar settings whereby it provides a means to
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become locally embedded and responsive to product demands (Luo, 2003). If, however,
the home and host country institutions are similar, the knowledge held by the parent
MNE might be more readily applied to the local environment, making the benefits
stemming from subsidiary autonomy less salient to product innovation. MNE resources
and capabilities may only require limited adaptations to fit within the host country
context, suggesting autonomy may not always be necessary to facilitate subsidiary
innovation. While the local embeddedness benefits of autonomy may realize in both
similar and dissimilar host country institutional environments, prior literature suggests
that such benefits will be more pronounced in contexts more distant or dissimilar from,
and thus unfamiliar to, the parent MNE (Geleilate et al., 2019).

HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
Nohria and Ghoshal (1994: 492) suggest that autonomy should be “differentiated to fit
the distinctive environmental and resource conditions of the subsidiary.” Fit is a “core
concept in normative models of strategy formulation, and the pursuit of strategic fit has
traditionally been viewed as having desirable performance implications” (Zajac, Kraatz,
& Bresser, 2000: 429). From this perspective, whether increased autonomy translates to
product innovation is not straightforward but rather conditional, and there might be
alternative structural arrangements that yield product innovation.
Prior research maintains that in host environments institutionally distal to the
MNE’s home country, matching resource bundles to the host environment is more
difficult for the parent MNE because of the dissimilarities between the home and host
country (Luo, 2003). With increasing distance, the parent MNE is less likely to develop
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products that will fit the local context of the subsidiary due to knowledge gaps stemming
from contextual dissimilarities. MNE control in distal environments may thus inhibit
product innovation (Baaij & Slangen, 2013). In contexts where the distance between the
home and host country is high, I proffer that decision-making autonomy is key because it
enables subsidiaries to become locally embedded, undertake creative initiatives, and
potentially pursue product innovation (Geleilate et al., 2019). Indeed, higher autonomy
improves the likelihood that the subsidiary develops new competencies (Cantwell &
Mudambi, 2005).
Yet, autonomy in institutionally distal host countries may not necessarily result in
product innovation unless it is complemented with a specific knowledge source, as
oftentimes exploiting the competencies of the parent MNE may not be sufficient for
innovation in a distal host country. When autonomy is complemented by the subsidiary’s
internal generation of product-related knowledge, namely R&D, the subsidiary is more
likely to introduce new products. Phene and Almeida (2008: 905) argue that R&D
provides a subsidiary with “the capability to recognize important knowledge and identify
potential sources of this knowledge”, while autonomy allows the subsidiary to leverage
such knowledge into locally viable products (Beugeusldijk & Jindra, 2018).
Alternatively, because R&D requires a set of capabilities and non-trivial
resources, not all subsidiaries will be given an R&D mandate from their parent MNE
(Birkinshaw & Hood, 1998). For instance, there may be minimal technological
knowledge in the local environment for the subsidiary to extrapolate through R&D
(Santangelo et al., 2016). As Cantwell and Mudambi (2005: 1110) argue, “R&D is
becoming concentrated in sites where local conditions are most conducive to technology
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creation”. Moreover, even if the subsidiary appears capable to engage in R&D, there may
be agency-related reasons for why a subsidiary does not receive an R&D assignment
(Kostova, Nell & Hoenen, 2018). As a result, management consultants may act as a
functional substitute to R&D, providing product-market knowledge that a subsidiary may
lack. “Through the breadth of their experience, knowledge, and resources, external
consultants can provide firms with access to advantages that allow them to ensure value
creation” (Back et al., 2014: 394). Using consultants can also help to reveal gaps in what
consumers want and what the firm is offering, whereby addressing such gaps contribute
to innovation efforts (Sandberg & Werr, 2003). In fact, management consultants may
even accelerate innovation by providing legitimacy to new products through their local
knowledge, experience, and analytical skills (Sturdy, 2011). Hence, while the lack of
R&D activities might hinder product innovation, I argue that a subsidiary can still
introduce new products by sourcing important knowledge from consultants. Taken
together, I suggest the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1: For foreign subsidiaries operating in host country environments
institutionally distal from the parent MNE home country, product innovation will
be associated with higher subsidiary autonomy when autonomy is complemented
by either internal R&D or the use of local management consultants by the
subsidiary.

In host country environments institutionally proximal to the MNE’s home
country, the technological knowledge and capabilities of the parent MNE can be
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leveraged toward product innovation without extensive adaptation (Ambos & Ambos,
2009; Kawai & Strange, 2014). As I have alluded to earlier, in some cases subsidiaries
may be able to exploit the competencies of the parent MNE to configure and introduce
innovative products in the host country (Cantwell & Mudambi, 2005). This suggests a
structural arrangement possibly entailing low levels of subsidiary autonomy, as parent
MNE control is a means to ensure that the subsidiary remains integrated and wellconnected to intra-MNE knowledge pools (Keupp, Palmíe & Gassmann, 2011).
Accordingly, autonomy may in some cases drive subsidiary innovation, but it is not
necessary for all contexts.
Yet, some MNEs may still grant autonomy to subsidiaries in institutionally
proximal host countries, as such host countries might require some degree of
customization but not to the extent that warrants an R&D assignment. Even when a
subsidiary exploits the competencies of the MNE, decision-making autonomy may allow
subsidiaries to make nuanced adaptations that fit the host country context. While R&D
may yield similar insights in terms of identifying limited product adaptations, it may not
be necessary, and rather costly (Sanna-Randaccio & Veugelers, 2007). Moreover, in
other situations, parent MNEs might not want to engage in product-related decisions,
even for subsidiaries in institutionally proximal host countries, because the allocation of
parent MNE managerial resources to such decisions might entail high opportunity costs
(Mudambi & Pedersen, 2007). In sum, subsidiary autonomy might not be strictly needed
for product innovation in institutionally proximal host countries, but it is nonetheless one
means by which subsidiaries in such contexts can adapt MNE competencies into product
innovations that fit the host market.
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In comparison, when decision making for subsidiaries in institutionally proximal
environments is controlled more by the parent MNE, the implicit assumption is that
parent MNE managers are relatively more familiar with the host country. Yet, although
the parent MNE has a smaller knowledge gap vis-à-vis the local environment,
subsidiaries still need some local, product-specific information to innovate (Lee &
Beamish, 1995). Accordingly, I proffer that MNEs may use consultants to provide such
knowledge for product innovation (Back et al., 2014). A subsidiary may, therefore,
exploit the competencies of the MNE, while the external consultants will provide local
knowledge to alter the products around consumer demands as well as make appropriate
product-related decisions (e.g., marketing strategy). Hence, I argue that in institutional
environments proximal to the MNE home country, product innovation can be achieved
either by granting decision-making autonomy to the subsidiary or by leveraging external
knowledge from local consultants. Formally stated:

Hypothesis 2: For foreign subsidiaries operating in host country environments
institutionally proximal to the parent MNE home country, product innovation will
be associated with either subsidiary autonomy or parent MNE control combined
with the use of local management consultants.

In sum, I argue that for subsidiaries operating in host countries institutionally
distal from the home country, autonomy will be conducive to product innovation but only
in conjunction with either R&D or the use of local management consultants.
Alternatively, for subsidiaries operating in host countries institutionally proximal to the
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home country, product innovation may be associated with subsidiary autonomy and
R&D, but it can also be achieved through the use of local management consultants when
decision making is controlled more by the parent MNE. Overall, these arguments imply
that institutional and organizational settings configure in particular ways to foster foreign
subsidiary product innovation. Figure 1 depicts my conceptual model.

---Insert Figure 1 here---

METHODOLOGY
Data and sample
Obtaining data on intra-MNE structural arrangements is often challenging for
international business researchers because they are not easily observable. Accordingly, I
follow prior studies with a similar research objective (Back et al., 2014; Maksimov,
Wang & Luo, 2017; Nuruzzaman et al., 2019) and utilize data from the Management,
Organization, and Innovation (MOI) survey implemented by the World Bank (WB) and
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) (Bloom & Van Reenen,
2010). The MOI survey aims to compare management practices in European and Asian
economies and to assess the efficacy of said practices. WB and EBRD compiled a
uniform stratified sample of approximately 1,800 manufacturing companies, with
production as well as downstream roles, from 12 countries in a way that is representative
of firm size, industry, and foreign ownership in each country. The sampling is based on
Bureau van Dijk’s Orbis database as the population (Bloom & Van Reenen, 2010) and
was then compared to the Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey
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(BEEPS) by the WB and EBRD to demonstrate the resemblance between the survey and
the population.
The MOI survey data encompasses all subnational regions within the participating
countries, but, expectedly, the sample reflects mostly the major cities within each
subnational region. A standardized instrument and sampling methodology were used in
all countries to yield comparable results. Each firm was contacted at least 4 times but as
many as 15 times to increase participation rates. A total of 1,925 firms were targeted in
the sampling strategy and 1,777 completed the survey. The MOI research team conducted
face-to-face interviews primarily with managers who have an in-depth understanding of
firm operations. The managers were informed that they would not be evaluated based on
their responses in order to prevent potential desirability biases in answers (Bloom & Van
Reenen, 2007). The interviews were conducted at the physical location of each
respondent firm and in the native language of the respondent. The interviewers were
unaware of the actual performance details of the firm, and there was not an identifiable
interviewer fixed effect or systematic bias (Bloom & Van Reenen, 2010).
Using the entire MOI dataset as my starting point, I undertook two data cleaning
steps consistent with prior studies (Nuruzzman et al., 2019). First, I included only those
observations relating to foreign subsidiaries of MNEs. This criterion reduces the original
sample of 1,777 responding firms to 228 foreign subsidiaries. Second, I removed all
observations where my constructs (e.g., autonomy) related data are incomplete. The final
sample consists of 71 foreign subsidiaries operating in 11 host countries and 13 industry
sectors. I tested for differences between the groups of 228 and 71 subsidiaries in terms of
average product innovation. Results indicate there is no statistically significant difference
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between the two groups (p = 0.62), suggesting the removal of observations with missing
data does not cause us to select on the dependent variable. In total, the final sample of 71
subsidiaries represents MNEs from 30 different home countries. I present the
characteristic of these subsidiaries in Table 1.

---Insert Table 1 here---

Of the represented host countries in the sample, Germany is the most common
(37%) followed by Serbia (13%), Poland, and India (10%), while the United States
(20%), Germany (10%), and Sweden (8%) are the most common home countries. All of
the 71 subsidiaries operate in the manufacturing sector. The most common industry is
fabricated metal products (16%) followed by consumer foods (13%) and plastics and
rubber (10%). The average subsidiary size is 686 employees. Although the majority
(66%) of subsidiaries are considered large (> 200 employees), approximately 33% are
small and medium-sized (< 200 employees) (Golovko & Valentini, 2014), thus providing
reasonable variety in that regard. The age of the subsidiaries in the sample ranges from 10
years to 176 years, with the average age being 47 years. Hence, the subsidiaries are
mostly established units, allowing us to ameliorate potential biases stemming from
dynamics related to very young subsidiaries (Birkinshaw & Hood, 1998). In sum, the
most common subsidiary in my sample can be generalized as a relatively large,
established manufacturing subsidiary.
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Construct measurement
I follow prior works and measure the outcome of interest, product innovation, as a
dichotomous variable (Bertrand & Mol, 2013; Santangelo et al., 2016; Monteiro, Mol &
Birkinshaw, 2017; Nuruzzaman et al., 2019). If a subsidiary has introduced a new
product in the marketplace and/or significantly modified a product within the last 3 years,
then the outcome is coded as “1”, otherwise it is coded as “0”. This measure typically
encompasses significant improvements to products, such as technical specifications and
components and, therefore, purely aesthetic modifications are not considered product
innovation (Garud et al., 2016). Looking at the entire sample, firms who introduced new
products within the last 3 years saw an average of 28.04% of their sales accounted for by
the new product. For my subsample of subsidiaries, new products accounted for
approximately 24.16% of sales thereby demonstrating that innovative firms are
significantly reliant on their new products. Prior research suggests that new product
introductions are a valid indicator of innovation output (e.g., Piening, Salge & Schäfer,
2016; Beugelsdijk & Jindra, 2018).
In a similar vein to Tran, Mahnke, and Ambos (2010) and Hombrug and Prigge
(2014), I measure subsidiary autonomy in the business functions most relevant to my
outcome. My measure is based on three questions: “Where are decisions taken on new
product introductions for this establishment?”; “Where are pricing decisions for this
establishment taken?”; and “Where are advertising decisions for products made at this
establishment taken?” If the decisions were not solely made by the MNE headquarters,
then each of these items assumes the value “1”, otherwise, it is coded as “0”. This
construct captures the extent to which the MNE headquarters are involved in a
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subsidiary’s local decisions, which is in line with existing measures of subsidiary
decision-making autonomy (Young & Tavares, 2004). The three items loaded onto a
single latent factor and exhibited adequate reliability (α = 0.86) (Jarvis, MacKenzie &
Podsakoff, 2003).
R&D is a dichotomous variable where “1” represents a foreign subsidiary that
conducted R&D as of the most recent fiscal year, or “0” otherwise (Keupp et al., 2011).
Prior research suggests that R&D is a key mechanism by which subsidiaries generate
knowledge internally to fuel product innovation (Frost, 2001; Nuruzzaman et al., 2019).
The MOI survey defines R&D to participants as “creative work undertaken on a
systematic basis in order to increase the stock of knowledge. Research and development
is distinguished from market research and product testing by the presence in research and
development of an appreciable element of novelty” (MOI, 2010: 20). Where data is
available, I observe that the average R&D investment per year exceeded $8 million
(USD), which suggests the non-triviality of R&D operations among subsidiaries in my
sample. Moreover, because conducting R&D often entails costly investments, it is highly
uncommon for subsidiaries to frequently start and stop such processes (Gilmore,
Andersson & Memar, 2018). Indeed, Mudambi and Swift (2014: 127) argue that “firms
that minimize or resist opportunities to disrupt the R&D process are thought to add the
most value for shareholders of the firm”. Although the survey asks about the most recent
fiscal year, my measure likely reflects subsidiaries that exhibit an R&D mandate that is
stable over time.
The use of local Management Consultants is a dichotomous variable where “1”
represents that the foreign subsidiary has contracted consultants as of the most recent
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fiscal year, or “0” otherwise (Back et al., 2014). As Maksimov and colleagues argue,
“seeking external assistance through management consulting is a reliable indicator of
management knowledge upgrading” (Makismov et al., 2017: 864). With these measures
of R&D and consultant use, I am able to create a crisp distinction between subsidiaries
that utilize the underlying mechanisms versus those that do not, thus offering a
conservative test of their effect on product innovation.
To measure institutional distance, I follow prior studies (e.g., Contractor et al.,
2014; Marano, Tashman & Kostova, 2017) and match each home and host country to the
world governance indicators (WGI) database (Kaufmann, Kraay & Mastruzzi, 2006;
Cuervo-Cazurra & Genc, 2008; Rabbiosi & Santangelo, 2018). I include all six
dimensions of the WGI because the dimensions are highly correlated such that one factor
explains 97% of the variance (Beugelsdijk, Nell & Ambos, 2017; Rabbiosi & Santangelo,
2018). I aggregate the six dimensions into one overall score for each country and then
take the absolute difference between the aggregate scores of the home and host country,
i.e., each country pair. A higher value indicates a higher institutional distance between
the home and host country and, thus, a larger knowledge gap for the parent MNE
managers. My measure of institutional distance is more strongly predicated on
differences in formal institutions between the home and host country environments, but
as expected, it is highly correlated with a measure of cultural distance (r = 0.51, p < 0.01)
calculated using the Kogut and Singh (1988) index. This pattern is consistent with prior
IB studies highlighting the co-evolutionary nature of formal and informal institutions
(Tung & Verbeke, 2010; Zaheer, Schomaker & Nachum, 2012), but there are clearly
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cases where the two measures may not align (Beugelsdijk, Ambos & Nell, 2018). I
explore the potential implications of this issue in a series of additional analyses below.

Analytical technique
To effectively test my hypotheses, I use fsQCA (Ragin & Fiss, 2016) whereby I
assess the extent to which the membership of cases (i.e., subsidiaries) in causal conditions
(i.e., autonomy, R&D and consultants, and institutional distance) relates to their
membership in the outcome (i.e., product innovation). Based on Boolean algebra, this settheoretic technique allows for both conjunctural causation, in which I examine the causal
conditions in concert rather than individually, and equifinality, whereby more than one
configuration of causal conditions can lead to the same outcome. These features
accommodate the complementarity and substitution effects implied by my theorizing and
allow for configurations of autonomy, R&D and consultants, and institutional distance to
emerge from the data. FsQCA assumes complex causality and nonlinear relationships
(Fiss, 2007), and is thus better suited for my study than regression modelling, which
assumes singular causality and generally does not handle well interaction terms involving
more than three variables (Fiss, 2011). My hypotheses would require four-way
interactions in a logit model, but such interactions are very difficult to interpret even
when statistical power is adequate. As a set-theoretic technique, fsQCA is able to
effectively analyze medium-N samples sizes (Misangyi et al., 2017), further making it a
viable technique for this study.
Before conducting fsQCA, it is necessary to calibrate the raw data into conditions
by assigning membership scores over the interval [0, 1]. A score of 0.00 indicates full
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exclusion from a set (i.e., complete non-membership), while a score of 1.00 indicates full
inclusion (i.e., complete membership), and a score of 0.50 indicates the crossover point at
which it is not clear whether a condition is present or absent. Product innovation, R&D,
and the use of consultants are dichotomous variables, so I calibrated the subsidiaries as
either full members or full non-members of each condition. Subsidiary autonomy is a
multi-item construct, but all items are made dichotomous and represent aspects of
product-related decisions. I therefore consider that the degree of autonomy might be
reflected in the number of aspects under the perusal of the subsidiary. Because I have
three items, such an approach suggests a natural grouping (Pajunen, 2008): subsidiaries
that have autonomy in all three aspects (calibrated as 1.00), subsidiaries that have
autonomy in two aspects (calibrated as 0.66), subsidiaries that have autonomy in one
aspect (calibrated as 0.33), and subsidiaries that have no autonomy in any aspect
(calibrated as 0.00). Such an approach allows for gradation in the autonomy condition
and provides a theoretically viable solution to capturing differences between highly and
mostly autonomous subsidiaries versus controlled and mostly controlled subsidiaries.
Finally, institutional distance is based on a continuous variable that does not lend
itself to natural calibration anchors, so I followed prior studies utilizing the direct
approach in such instances (e.g., Ragin, 2008; Fiss, 2011; Lewellyn & Fainshmidt, 2017).
The “direct method” of calibration suggested by Ragin (2008) allows for the three
qualitative anchors that structure fuzzy sets: the threshold for full membership, the
threshold for full non-membership, and the crossover point. Namely, I used the 75th
percentile to denote full membership, the average as the crossover point, and the 25th
percentile to denote non-membership. Examining the calibrated data, I observe that the
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distinction between membership and non-membership in this condition is consistent with
theoretical expectations and prior research. For instance, Germany-India is calibrated as
1.00 (dissimilar), Poland-Germany as 0.46, and Russia-Belarus as 0.02 (similar).
Note, I do not include control variables in my model, as the notion of controls that
compete to explain variance in an outcome variable is not salient in techniques based on
Boolean Algebra. Here, “conditions are included if and only if they are considered to be
among the chief causes of the outcome” (Schneider & Eggert, 2014: 324). If I were to
include “controls” as done so in traditional regression analyses, this may actually be
problematic by increasing the complexity of the model and thus obfuscating the results.
Keeping the number of causal conditions low does not hurt the explanatory validity of the
model and is often desirable (Fiss, Sharapov & Cronqvist, 2013).
In the next step, fsQCA requires the determination of a minimum level of
membership in the outcome needed for a configuration to be said to exhibit that outcome
(consistency threshold). I use 0.80 as the consistency threshold, in line with prior
literature (Bell, Filatotchev, & Aguilera, 2014). I observe a sharp drop of ten points in
consistency between 0.83 and 0.73, providing additional support for using 0.80 to
distinguish between cases consistent versus not consistent with the outcome (Crilly,
2011). I also specify that configurations exhibit a PRI consistency higher than 0.80 to be
coded as exhibiting the outcome (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012). Next, I determine a
minimum number of cases per configuration (frequency cutoff) for a configuration of
causal conditions to be considered in the analysis. I set the frequency threshold to three in
order to ensure the configurations I identify are not spurious. This frequency is
appropriate for my medium sample size and allows us to capture 94% of the cases, which
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is in line with recommendations to capture at least 75% of the truth table (Ragin, 2009).
In other words, each possible configuration must have at least three representative cases
(i.e., three subsidiaries) in order to qualify for further analysis. In Table 2, I present a
nested truth table that shows all possible configurations, their frequency, and consistency
with the outcome.

---Insert Table 2 here---

ANALYSES AND RESULTS
I first conducted a Necessity Analysis to examine whether any of the causal conditions
are necessary for the outcome. Necessity is determined by the extent to which the
outcome is a subset of the causal condition; that is, a given causal condition must be in
place to produce the outcome (Ragin, 2006). A causal condition is said to be “almost
always necessary” for a given outcome if the consistency value exceeds 0.90 (Schneider
& Wagemann, 2012). Results indicate that neither the presence nor the absence of any
causal condition is necessary for achieving product innovation, highlighting the
appropriateness of a configurational approach and providing evidence for my assertion
that autonomy may not be necessary for product innovation.
I then conducted the Sufficiency Analysis to identify the combinations of
conditions that are sufficient for the outcome to occur. Sufficiency is determined by the
extent to which a given combination of causal conditions is a subset of the outcome
(Ragin, 2006). I display the intermediate solution, which is appropriate when theory or
substantive knowledge suggests relationships (i.e., directionality) between the causal
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conditions and outcome. By specifying the expected relationships prior to the analysis,
the solution may be simplified using the assumption that adding a redundant causal
condition to a configuration already linked to the outcome would still produce that
outcome (Ragin & Sonnett, 2005). In this study, the presence of no single condition
“should be” associated with the outcome based on prior theory. Hence, the intermediate
solution is equal to the complex solution.
I also utilize the parsimonious solution to distinguish core from peripheral
conditions. The parsimonious solution is a further simplified solution relying on ‘difficult
counterfactuals.’ Whereas ‘easy counterfactuals’ reduce the complex solution to the
intermediate solution by including remainders consistent with theory, ‘difficult
counterfactuals,’ on the other hand, make no such distinction and reduce the data
regardless of researchers’ assumptions, producing the most concise and simplified way to
express the solution (Grandori & Furnari, 2013). For core conditions, there is a strong set
relationship between these conditions and the outcome that would be highly unlikely to
be reduced in the face of additional information. However, as Dwivedi, Joshi, and
Misangyi (2018: 390) note, “an interpretation of core conditions as being theoretically
more important than contributing conditions is only relevant when one a priori theorizes
about such a distinction… Therefore, I denote this distinction for transparency, but do not
distinguish between the conditions in my theoretical interpretations.”

Main results
In Table 3 I present my main findings. My results yield three configurations that
are sufficient for the presence of product innovation. In Configuration 1 (C1), subsidiary
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autonomy and R&D are associated with product innovation, while institutional distance
and the use of consultants may be present or absent. Configuration 2 (C2) contains the
absence of subsidiary autonomy and institutional distance, the presence of consultants
and either the presence or absence of R&D. Configuration 3 (C3) contains the absence of
subsidiary autonomy, R&D, and consultants, while institutional distance is present.
---Insert Table 3 here--The solution has an overall 0.72 level of coverage and 0.90 level of consistency.
These fit statistics indicate that the configurations account for, or ‘cover,’ 72% of
subsidiaries who are members in the outcome and lead to the outcome 90% of the time
they are in place. In other words, the three identified configurations in Table 2 account
for a substantial majority of innovative subsidiaries in my sample. Individually, C1 has a
raw coverage of 0.35 and C2 a raw coverage of 0.29 with a consistency level of 0.95 and
0.87, respectively. Furthermore, their unique coverages are 0.34 and 0.27, suggesting that
they are common pathways to the outcome and explain 63% of the membership in the
outcome condition, product innovation. In comparison, C3 has a much lower raw and
unique coverage of 0.09, with a 0.83 consistency level. These fit indicators suggest C3 is
a less common and less consistent pathway to the outcome, compared to C1 and C2.
Turning to my hypotheses, C1 and C2 speak to hypotheses 1 and 2. Considering
C1 and C2 together, when subsidiary autonomy is present, institutional distance can be
either present or absent (C1), however, when institutional distance is absent, subsidiary
autonomy is also absent (C2). Furthermore, both configurations contain a knowledge
source, namely R&D in C1 and consultants in C2. This pattern suggests that R&D can
work alongside autonomy to drive innovation in both institutionally distal and proximal
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host countries, but in proximal environments parent MNE control can lead to innovation
as well when accompanied by the use of consultants. Consequently, autonomy is
particularly valuable in distal environments and is associated with product innovation
when complemented by subsidiary R&D. However, because I hypothesize that
consultants can be a functional substitute for R&D in distal settings, I find only partial
support for hypothesis 1. Next, in C2 I see the presence of consultants and the absence of
subsidiary autonomy and institutional distance, which supports hypothesis 2.
Finally, the pattern suggested by C3 is unexpected, as it suggests that decision
making by the parent MNE among subsidiaries in an institutionally distal environment is
associated with product innovation, and both knowledge sources are absent. Nonetheless,
it is a possible pathway for a subsidiary to exhibit product innovation in the absence of
autonomy.

Additional analyses
I ran several additional tests to assess the stability (robustness) of my results and
provide corroborating evidence.91 First, I ran an additional sufficiency analysis using a
frequency threshold of two cases, as opposed to three, to potentially cover more of the
outcome and to assess the implications of my frequency threshold of three (Ragin, 2009).
In doing so, I gain a slight improvement in solution coverage (3%). Importantly,
however, the findings are analog to my main results with the exception of one additional
configuration wherein subsidiary autonomy, consultants, and institutional distance are
present. This configuration is consistent with hypothesis 1, indicating that when

1

Not all tables resulting from the additional analyses are presented. They are available upon request.

83

subsidiaries operate in institutional environments distal from the parent MNE, product
innovation is associated with subsidiary autonomy alongside a knowledge source. It is
also consistent with my theorizing that consultants may act as a functional substitute for
R&D.
Next, in my main analysis, I specified no easy counterfactuals, namely that no
condition “should be” associated with the outcome (Ragin, 2006). Because some prior
research suggests that R&D (Phene & Almeida, 2008) and autonomy (Beugelsdijk &
Jindra, 2018) can play a significant role in product innovation, I ran an additional test
where I specify that these two conditions should contribute to the outcome when present.
The results are nearly identical to the main solution. I do find a configuration where
institutional distance is absent and the usage of consultants is present, although in C2
(Table 2), subsidiary autonomy is absent. The absence of autonomy does not significantly
alter the results and aligns with my theory which suggests that in institutional
environments proximal to the parent MNE, the subsidiary needs to leverage knowledge
from consultants or have local autonomy. Furthermore, I find that the presence of
subsidiary autonomy and consultants leads to product innovation, which aligns with
hypothesis 1 where autonomy needs to be complemented by either R&D or consultants
for product innovation.
I then ran a logit model predicting product innovation using the four variables in
my study. Results suggest that R&D is the relatively strongest predictor (β = 1.01, p =
0.15), however, none of the predictors are statistically significant (p > 0.10). I then ran an
additional logit regression while controlling for subsidiary size (number of employees)
and subsidiary age (years from establishment), as prior studies suggest that they might
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play a role in innovation (e.g., Golovko & Valentini, 2014). Again, no predictor is
statistically significant at conventional levels of 0.05. While these results may be related
to the medium sample size, they suggest that the relationship between autonomy and
product innovation is not straightforward and lends itself to a configurational approach, at
least in my data.
Next, Beugelsdijk et al. (2018: 1113) argue that “the distance construct as well as
its operationalization are continuously being debated in practice”. There are at times
‘polarizing’ opinions as to whether a cultural distance or an institutional distance measure
is more appropriate (Tung & Verbeke, 2010; Beugelsdijk et al., 2018). Because
institutional distance is a fairly broad construct, and the correlation between cultural and
institutional distance suggests the two are not identical, I ran an additional sufficiency
analysis with both cultural distance and institutional distance. I find six configurations,
as presented in Table 3.

---Insert Table 3 here---

C5 and C6 (Table 3) are analog to C1 in the main results (Table 2). In both cases,
the results are consistent with my theorizing. C5 and C6 suggest that autonomy and R&D
are associated with product innovation when both distances are either high or low,
consistent with C1. Next, C4, C7, and C8 (Table 3) are analog to C2 in the main results
(Table 2). C4 is identical to C2, however, when adding cultural distance, C7 is similar to
C2 with the exception that R&D becomes absent. Furthermore, if cultural distance is
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present as shown in C7, then institutional distance can be either present or absent, the
usage of consultants is present, and R&D is absent.
Relatedly, I find that in C8 (Table 3) the absence of subsidiary autonomy,
institutional distance, and R&D, alongside the presence of cultural distance and either
the presence or absence of consultants are associated with product innovation. When
considered in relation to C4, the addition of cultural distance makes R&D absent and
consultants present or absent. These results suggest that adding cultural distance seems
to create an interplay between the types of knowledge sources needed for product
innovation to occur. In the absence of autonomy, cultural distance poses difficult
challenges for MNEs and their subsidiaries (Xu & Shenkar, 2002) and it is thus likely
that they use consultants as conduits for product innovation because R&D may entail
high opportunity costs (Mudambi & Pedersen, 2007). Lastly, C9 (Table 3) suggests that
the absence of all conditions leads to product innovation. This pattern is in line with the
main analyses and with some prior research suggesting that in institutional environments
proximal to the home country, some parent MNEs may retain control of both knowledge
generation and making strategic decisions for the subsidiary (Ambos & Ambos, 2009). If
parent MNE managers have a relatively better knowledge of the host country, the
subsidiary can mostly leverage product-specific knowledge from the MNE and then, due
to institutional similarities and the close integration with the headquarters, the subsidiary
can more easily communicate its adaptive suggestions for local product offerings.
However, the coverage of this configuration is minimal, suggesting it is an uncommon
path to product innovation. Overall, I find that the addition of cultural distance as a
potential proxy for informal institutional distance adds some nuance but does not
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substantively alter the main findings. Furthermore, by adding cultural distance to my
model, I lose 0.07 in solution coverage. Hence, the main results better capture
membership in the outcome condition while simultaneously improving model parsimony.
Finally, I examined the configurations of causal conditions associated with the
absence of product innovation, as fsQCA is able to accommodate asymmetry in the
conditions that associate with the outcome versus those that associate with the negation
of the outcome. This analysis is not necessary because of the set-theoretic nature of
fsQCA, but it can be a useful exercise in some cases to further flesh out insights
pertaining to the outcome. In other cases, it may not reveal much (e.g., Fiss, 2011).
Indeed, this analysis yielded no configurations that are consistently associated with the
absence of product innovation. Similar to Fiss (2011), this finding suggests that there are
many ways to not innovate, but there are no consistent patterns to do so with the causal
conditions in my model.

DISCUSSION
I set out to advance a more nuanced, contextualized theory of the outcomes of foreign
subsidiary autonomy, namely subsidiary innovation. I leveraged a differentiated fit
perspective to argue that institutional distance, knowledge-related roles, and autonomy
interact in complex ways to bring about innovation. In doing so, I implied that subsidiary
autonomy may not be necessary for innovation, rather it is conducive to innovation in
particular configurations. Utilizing fsQCA and data on foreign subsidiaries in European
and Central Asian host countries, I found three distinct configurations associated with
subsidiary product innovation that provide support for my theoretical predictions.
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However, I also uncover some unexpected patterns. Next, I discuss the theoretical
implications of these findings.

Implications for research
My study highlights that the value of subsidiary autonomy, in my case in
facilitating product innovation, is contingent upon the subsidiary’s internal and external
context (Geleilate et al., 2019). Prior studies have attempted to examine whether
subsidiary autonomy is beneficial for product innovation (e.g., Kawai & Strange, 2014;
Beugelsdijk & Jindra, 2018, Nuruzzaman et al., 2019). In identifying some boundary
conditions for the effects of autonomy, my study advances a more accurate theory and
suggests that research on subsidiary autonomy can make further progress by theorizing
when it may be most fruitful. For instance, in the context of higher institutional distance
between home and host countries, decision making autonomy is conducive to local
embeddedness and adaptation that often stimulate product innovation, especially when
the subsidiary engages in R&D. Hence, another key insight of this study is the
importance of knowledge-related roles in complementing autonomy.
If autonomy is a partial reflection of strategy whereby higher autonomy tends to
reflect a multidomestic organization (Birkinshaw & Morrison, 1995), my study suggests
that under some conditions, MNEs may be able to combine the efficiencies often
associated with centralized control with local adaptation. For instance, centralized control
in institutionally proximal host countries can result in product innovation when locally
relevant knowledge is sourced from consultants. Similarly, prior research suggests that
MNEs may be more reluctant to establish competence-exploiting subsidiaries in host
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countries institutionally distal from the home country (Ambos, 2005). My study shows
how MNEs may make such subsidiaries innovative, thereby suggesting that even if such
inclination exists, it does not mean that distal subsidiaries will not be innovative. In fact,
my findings suggest that MNEs that pursue locally responsive strategies can make their
subsidiaries innovate, both in proximal and distal environments, as long as they allocate
autonomy and assign R&D mandates.
I also theorized that management consultants may act as a functional substitute for
R&D in distal settings; however, my main analysis does not provide evidence of such an
effect. This suggests that while consultants may provide product-related knowledge
useful to innovation efforts (Back et al., 2014), it might not be entirely substitutable with
R&D in distal settings, suggesting that the value of consultants may be limited by a
distance boundary condition. Yet, in my additional analyses I demonstrate that in
culturally unfamiliar environments, autonomy works in combination with consultants
towards innovation output. The knowledge with which management consultants provided
may, therefore, be more useful to offset cultural and opposed to institutional
dissimilarities. Thus, a key insight of my study is the contextually dependent nature of
consultants across formal and informal settings.
Moreover, my study suggests that autonomy may also be beneficial in
institutional settings proximal to the parent MNE’s home country, though it is not needed
in such contexts. Autonomy may not necessarily be detrimental to innovation in such
settings, but it can be foregone for MNEs that prefer centralized decision-making control.
For subsidiaries operating in institutionally proximal host countries, decision making
control by the parent MNE may not necessarily inhibit the local introduction of new
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products. In such settings, subsidiaries can complement MNE competencies with the use
of consultants, as management consultants can act as a conduit for local knowledge
regarding changes in demand, consumer preferences, and regulations. In fact, much of
prior IB research has overlooked the role of consultants in MNE strategy and success, but
my findings suggest that consultants may help MNEs offset knowledge gaps in some
foreign markets and support innovation even in the absence of more prominent activities
such as R&D (Back et al., 2014).
Finally, my results yield an unexpected configuration whereby the presence of
institutional distance and the absence of both knowledge-related sources as well as
autonomy are associated with product innovation. The coverage of this configuration is
rather small, meaning that it is a narrow (i.e., uncommon) path to product innovation.
Considering prior theory and research, this configuration might reflect a narrow set of
MNEs with a highly hierarchical organizational structure and an international strategy.
While this type of MNE organization is increasingly uncommon in many industries, in
select industries such a configuration can still yield subsidiary innovation. The cases
constituting this configuration are subsidiaries offering mostly standardized products
such as building materials. In these kinds of product spaces, I suspect, the foreign
subsidiary will have a competence-exploiting mandate. Yet, the presence of high
institutional distance together with the absence of subsidiary autonomy creates a tension:
the parent MNE may have knowledge gaps related to the local market, and
simultaneously the subsidiary’s lack of local embeddedness makes it difficult to deploy
products that fit local conditions through small, albeit important, local adaptations.
Possibly, given the distance between the two markets, the parent MNE may be more
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amenable to product adaptation recommendations from subsidiary managers, which
results in product innovation. For a similar subsidiary in a proximal environment,
however, the parent MNE can more easily analyze the fit of its products to the local
context, which inhibits innovation by the subsidiary. Along the same lines, a similar
subsidiary with autonomy would likely suffer from the lack of knowledge sources needed
for product innovation, while autonomy might prevent tighter integration with core MNE
competencies (Bouquet & Birkinshaw, 2008; Ambos et al., 2010). Hence, it is the
combination of institutional distance and decision-making control by the parent that,
perhaps surprisingly, creates the conditions for product innovation in these subsidiaries
(Dellestrand & Kappen, 2012). Nevertheless, because the coverage of this configuration
is rather small, it reflects the limited number of such industries and hence a relatively less
common pathway to subsidiary production innovation.

Implications for practice
My study provides insights for IB practitioners who have an interest in managing
foreign subsidiaries toward innovation outcomes. I provide three ways in which MNE
managers can structure a foreign subsidiary to foster innovation in its local markets.
Particularly, when foreign subsidiaries are given decision-making autonomy and conduct
R&D, they will likely be innovative regardless of the institutional proximity to the parent
MNE home country. Alternatively, managers who are interested in subsidiary innovation
but at the same time wish to centralize control can do so in both distal and proximal
institutional environments, although if the subsidiary is distal, such arrangements may
only be effective in relatively standardized product markets. In a proximal contextual
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setting, the parent or subsidiary may need to leverage external knowledge sources, such
as management consultants, to substitute for autonomy. To the extent that autonomy
reflects an international strategy, managers can glean insights as to which knowledge
sources and institutional contexts may work best with high or low autonomy. My study
may, therefore, help MNE managers to align the structure and strategy of their
subsidiaries to facilitate local innovation. Overall, managers should take into
consideration both the internal and external context of the subsidiary when product
innovation is the desired outcome.

Limitations and future research
My study is not without its limitations. First, my sample is limited to subsidiaries
located in Europe and Central Asia at a specific point in time and, therefore, I am hesitant
to make broad generalizations to other contexts. Although I demonstrate considerable
variation in my measure of institutional distance, future research may wish to expand
upon my sample with respect to both countries and time windows to further examine the
theoretical framework I develop.
Second, due to data limitations, I use dichotomous (crisp) measures of product
innovation, R&D, and the use of consultants. This approach provides a more conservative
test of the relevance of these conditions, but at the same time, it does not allow us to
assess the potential role of gradation along these dimensions. Future research could refine
my findings by examining the degrees of knowledge sources that shape levels of product
innovation.
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Third, although my focus on consultants is novel to research on autonomy, I was
unable to identify whether the parent MNE or the subsidiary contracted the consultants.
Future research into the role of consultants can shed light on who drives this form of
external knowledge acquisition in foreign subsidiaries, especially those for which the
parent MNE makes more of the strategic decisions.
Finally, the cross-sectional design underpinning my data prevents us from making
strong claims of causality. It could be that some innovative subsidiaries receive more
autonomy as a reward (Ambos & Schlegelmilch, 2007; Ambos, Andersson &
Birkinshaw, 2010). However, a longitudinal design might not help resolve this issue, as I
do not know what the appropriate time lag might be—time lags might be MNE-specific,
and I do not know when the current level of autonomy was achieved. I have taken a first
step toward identifying configurational patterns within the autonomy-innovation
relationship, but qualitative research may be best suited to further unpack the processes
translating autonomy to innovation over time.

Conclusion
Despite the limitations, my study contributes to theory of subsidiary autonomy
and innovation. I argue that autonomy may foster product innovation only in certain
contexts and when deployed with complementary knowledge sources that can come from
either within or outside the MNE. I utilize fsQCA and data on foreign subsidiaries
operating in Europe and Central Asia and find three configurations of conditions
associated with product innovation: two consistent with my theorizing and one
stimulating further theoretical elaboration. I highlight the contingent role of autonomy in
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fostering foreign subsidiary innovation and demonstrate that subsidiaries can innovate
without autonomy in certain institutional and organizational setting. I hope that my study
stimulates further discussion on the outcomes of subsidiary autonomy and encourages
novel inquiry into the role of subsidiary autonomy in MNE success.
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Figure 1. Conceptual model of configurations for subsidiary product innovation
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Table 1. Descriptive information of cases in data
Case
Host Country

Home Country

Belarus
Belarus
Bulgaria
Bulgaria
Bulgaria
Germany
Germany
Germany
Germany
Germany
Germany
Germany
Germany
Germany
Germany
Germany
Germany
Germany
Germany
Germany
Germany
Germany
Germany
Germany
Germany
Germany
Germany
Germany
Germany
Germany
Germany
India
India
India
India

Russia
Russia
Greece
Greece
Iceland
Austria
Austria
Austria
Belgium
UK
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
France
France
Luxemburg
Sweden
Sweden
Sweden
Sweden
Sweden
Denmark
Finland
Portugal
Italy
China
Korea
Japan
USA

Industry
(main product)
Automotive Parts
Electronics
Basic Metals
Paper Products
Textiles
Plastics & Rubber
Consumer Food
Automotive Parts
Chemicals
Plastics & Rubber
Paper Products
Machinery & Equipment
Fabricated Metal Products
Fabricated Metal Products
Fabricated Metal Products
Paper Products
Electrical Equipment
Chemicals
Plastics & Rubber
Chemicals
Machinery & Equipment
Fabricated Metal Products
Electronics
Consumer Food
Consumer Food
Electrical Equipment
Plastics & Rubber
Plastics & Rubber
Electrical Equipment
Fabricated Metal Products
Paper Products
Fabricated Metal Products
Machinery & Equipment
Machinery & Equipment
Automotive Parts

Subsidiary Characteristics
Subsidiary
Subsidiary
Decision Making
Employees
Age
800
20
Autonomous
2878
67
Controlled
54
19
Controlled
77
18
Controlled
280
26
Controlled
200
86
Controlled
444
176
Controlled
770
22
Mostly Autonomous
4359
10
Controlled
1343
144
Mostly Controlled
2875
142
Controlled
280
56
Controlled
296
38
Controlled
453
115
Mostly Controlled
432
47
Mostly Autonomous
224
55
Mostly Controlled
250
39
Controlled
1060
38
Autonomous
3978
58
Autonomous
564
126
Controlled
100
60
Controlled
598
128
Controlled
998
46
Controlled
6492
110
Controlled
220
37
Controlled
1850
99
Autonomous
107
59
Controlled
82
65
Controlled
1160
128
Autonomous
987
57
Autonomous
379
49
Autonomous
160
29
Controlled
400
19
Controlled
120
32
Mostly Controlled
100
19
Controlled
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Management
Consultants
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
Yes

R&D
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No

India
India
India
Kazakhstan
Kazakhstan
Lithuania
Lithuania
Lithuania
Lithuania
Lithuania
Lithuania
Poland
Poland
Poland
Poland
Poland
Poland
Poland
Romania
Romania
Romania
Romania
Romania
Russia
Russia
Russia
Serbia
Serbia
Serbia
Serbia
Serbia
Serbia
Serbia
Serbia
Serbia
Uzbekistan

USA
USA
Germany
Japan
Moldova
France
Finland
Denmark
Germany
Sweden
Finland
Japan
France
USA
USA
UK
Germany
Denmark
Hungary
Netherlands
Germany
Netherlands
Hungary
Germany
Germany
Finland
France
Romania
UK
Germany
Austria
Switzerland
Montenegro
Croatia
Romania
India

Non-mineral Products
Textiles
Automotive Parts
Consumer Food
Consumer Food
Textiles
Fabricated Metal Products
Machinery & Equipment
Non-mineral Products
Consumer Food
Consumer Food
Electrical Equipment
Non-mineral Products
Fabricated Metal Products
Basic Metals
Electronics
Electronics
Plastics & Rubber
Other Manufacturing
Textiles
Fabricated Metal Products
Consumer Food
Plastics & Rubber
Fabricated Metal Products
Fabricated Metal Products
Chemicals
Paper Products
Non-mineral Products
Textiles
Electronics
Automotive Parts
Paper Products
Automotive Parts
Chemicals
Consumer Food
Textiles

125
43
78
1000
201
245
200
100
58
50
200
850
130
2500
300
400
1630
300
76
67
200
50
248
262
358
237
350
62
80
120
77
120
85
220
390
1925
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25
30
28
22
17
111
25
26
26
13
21
21
60
27
25
24
90
23
21
20
12
15
12
19
18
20
47
18
29
37
41
22
14
98
48
22

Controlled
Controlled
Controlled
Controlled
Autonomous
Mostly Controlled
Autonomous
Controlled
Controlled
Mostly Autonomous
Controlled
Controlled
Autonomous
Controlled
Controlled
Controlled
Controlled
Controlled
Controlled
Controlled
Mostly Controlled
Controlled
Mostly Autonomous
Controlled
Controlled
Controlled
Autonomous
Controlled
Mostly Controlled
Mostly Autonomous
Controlled
Controlled
Mostly Autonomous
Controlled
Controlled
Controlled

Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
No

Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
No

Table 2. Nested truth table
Cases
Outcome
Management
# of
Product
% of Total
Configuration B
Consultants
Subsidiaries
Innovation A
1
4
5.6%
1.00
C1
1
0
5
7.0%
0.85
C1
1
1
2
2.8%
1.00
0
0
4
5.6%
0.55
1
1
3
4.2%
0.67
1
0
0
0.0%
0
1
3
4.2%
0.73
0
0
6
8.5%
0.83
C3
1
9
12.7%
1.00
C1
1
0
4
5.6%
0.93
C1
1
1
1
1.4%
1.00
0
0
4
5.6%
0.42
0
1
14
19.7%
0.88
C2
1
0
1
1.4%
1.00
0
1
7
9.9%
0.85
C2
0
0
4
5.6%
0.51
Notes: Cases with less than three subsidiaries are not retained for the sufficiency analysis (Ragin, 2009); A = Values presented are raw
consistency scores; B = Items presented are the configuration each row reflects in the solution.
Institutional
Distance

Causal Conditions
Subsidiary
R&D
Autonomy
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Table 3. Sufficiency analysis results
Condition/Configuration
Subsidiary Autonomy

Product Innovation
C1
C2
C3
•

Institutional Distance
Research & Development

•

Management Consultants
Raw Coverage
Unique Coverage
Consistency
Solution Coverage
Solution Consistency

0.35
0.34
0.95

Ä

Ä

Ä

•
Ä

•
0.29
0.27
0.87
0.72
0.90

Ä
0.09
0.09
0.83

Notes: The use of a filled circle (“•”) denotes the presence of a

•

condition. A larger circle (“ ”) represents a core condition, while a
smaller circle (“•”) a peripheral condition; a larger (“Ä”) represents
the absence of a core condition, while a smaller (“Ä”) the absence of
a peripheral condition.
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Table 4. Sufficiency analysis results including cultural distance
Condition/Configuration

C4

Product Innovation
C5 C6 C7 C8

Subsidiary Autonomy

Ä

•

•

Institutional Distance

Ä

Ä

•

Cultural Distance

Ä

•

Research & Development

•

•

Management Consultants
Analog in Main Results
Raw Coverage
Unique Coverage
Consistency
Solution Coverage
Solution Consistency

•

C9

Ä

Ä

Ä

Ä

•

•

Ä

Ä

Ä

Ä

Ä

•

Ä

C2 C1 C1 C2 C2
0.27 0.18 0.12 0.07 0.07 0.04
0.22 0.16 0.11 0.03 0.02 0.03
0.86 1.00 0.90 0.87 0.90 0.95
0.65
0.90

Notes: The use of a filled circle (“•”) denotes the presence of a condition. A larger

•

circle (“ ”) represents a core condition, while a smaller circle (“•”) a peripheral
condition; a larger (“Ä”) represents the absence of a core condition, while a smaller
(“Ä”) the absence of a peripheral condition.
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IV.

HOW MUCH DOES THE MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE MATTER TO
FOREIGN SUBSIDIARY PERFORMANCE?

INTRODUCTION
Because the success of foreign subsidiaries directly affects the success of the
multinational enterprise (MNE), understanding the drivers of subsidiary performance is a
defining issue of international business (IB) research (Peng, 2004; Kostova, Marano &
Tallman, 2016; Meyer, Li & Schotter, 2020). Early IB theory considered the MNE as a
hierarchical organization whereby the headquarters, seeking to exploit non-locationbound firm-specific advantages, was the key determinant of subsidiary performance and
thus MNE success in internationalization (Dunning, 1980; Rugman & Verbeke, 2001).
With increasing dynamism, local adaptation pressures, and complexity of multinational
operations, however, MNEs began to shift towards decentralized networks of
semiautonomous subsidiaries (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1989; Andersson, Forsgren & Holm,
2002; Awate, Larsen & Mudambi, 2015). The commensurate proliferation of subsidiaryfocused research over the last two decades highlights these changes (Meyer et al., 2020),
with much of the emphasis put on subsidiary-level factors in explaining subsidiary
success (e.g., Birkinshaw, 1997; Andersson, Björkman & Forsgren, 2005; Najafi-Tavani,
Giroud & Andersson, 2014; Beugelsdijk & Jindra, 2018; Rabbiosi & Santangelo, 2019).
Although there are good theoretical and empirical reasons to expect that both the
MNE and the subsidiary play a role in subsidiary performance, there is a non-trivial
tension between the two streams of literature because each often implies lesser salience
of the other (Menz, Kunisch & Collis, 2015; Birkinshaw & Hood, 2016). IB research
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provides ample theory and evidence for the importance of the MNE and the subsidiary
itself in explaining subsidiary performance. Still, these are often done in separate
investigations and, at times, in entirely different research streams. Few studies, notably in
the variance decomposition literature, have probed home-country, host-country,
subnational region, and industry effects on subsidiary performance (Christmann, Day &
Yip, 1999; Makino, Isobe & Chan, 2004; Chan, Makino & Isobe, 2010; Ma, Tong &
Fitza, 2013), giving only cursory attention to MNE and subsidiary effects. Consequently,
the relative importance of the MNE vis-à-vis the subsidiary to subsidiary performance
remains unclear, but it is such understanding that can propel a more lucid theory of the
drivers of subsidiary performance and, thus, the success of the MNE more broadly.
Accordingly, in this study, I examine the following research question: what is the
relative importance of the MNE vis-à-vis the subsidiary in explaining performance
differences between foreign subsidiaries? To do so, I first draw on extant IB and
corporate strategy research to explicate the mechanisms that may shape the extent to
which variability in foreign subsidiary performance is explained by the parent MNE or
the subsidiary itself. Such studies have traditionally relied on conventional econometric
methods such as linear regression to investigate the impact of MNE-specific or
subsidiary-specific features, which have helped to gain insights into the mechanisms by
which both the MNE and the subsidiary can affect subsidiary performance. For example,
on the one hand, the locus of decision-making control increasingly resides with
subsidiaries, enabling local embeddedness, entrepreneurial behaviors, and the
development of competitive advantages by the subsidiary (Rugman & Verbeke, 2001;
Cantwell & Mudambi, 2005). On the other hand, the MNE may affect subsidiary
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performance through MNE firm- and home country-specific advantages as well as by
coordinating a network of subsidiaries (Rugman, 2010; Nguyen & Rugman, 2015). The
MNE may also indirectly affect subsidiary performance through channels such as lateral
collaboration (Noorderhaven & Harzing, 2009; Schotter et al., 2017) and reputational
signals (Fombrun & Shanley, 1990; Newburry, Gardberg & Sanchez, 2014).
However, while such studies are instrumental in understanding the underlying
mechanisms, they do not allow for a direct comparison of the importance of the MNE
vis-à-vis the subsidiary. Thus, to gain a better understanding of their relative effect sizes,
I conduct a variance decomposition analysis on a global dataset containing 51,763
foreign subsidiaries of 6,122 MNEs. A growing number of scholars have used variance
decomposition techniques in IB studies (e.g., McGahan & Victer, 2010, Chan et al.,
2010; Ma et al., 2013) and, more frequently, in strategic management research where it
has been used to analyze the relative importance of classes of effects on firm performance
(e.g., Fitza, 2014; Bamiatzi et al., 2016; Fitza & Tihanyi, 2017; Krause et al., 2019). The
method allows for an estimation of the percentage of variability in subsidiary
performance that can be attributed to specific categories to which a subsidiary belongs
(henceforth effect classes) such as its primary industry of operation or, in my case, the
MNE by which the subsidiary is owned. Unlike traditional methods such as linear
regression, which investigate the impact of individual characteristics of effect classes
(e.g., host country institutional environments), variance decomposition is used to measure
the overall impact of all features of an effect class without specifying each feature
separately. Variance decomposition is thereby well-suited to obtain a better
understanding of the relative importance of the MNE and subsidiary effects.
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At the aggregate, I find that the MNE effect in explaining foreign subsidiary
performance is relatively less salient than the subsidiary effect. However, in a second
step, I account for subsidiary heterogeneity (e.g., Boyd et al., 2012) and investigate
theory-driven distinctions among types of subsidiaries that influence the relative sizes of
the MNE effect and the subsidiary effect. I uncover more nuanced patterns whereby, for
some types of subsidiaries, the relative importance of the subsidiary over the MNE is
reversed: in these cases, the variance in subsidiary performance explained by the MNE
effect is substantially more salient than that explained by the subsidiary effect.
This study makes two contributions to the literature. First, I provide insights on
classes of effects, rather than specific variables, on foreign subsidiary performance.
While most prior research focuses on one level of analysis (i.e., the MNE or the
subsidiary), my study complements these efforts by combining insights from two broad
perspectives on foreign subsidiary performance. Thus, I am able to probe the relative
importance of distinct classes of drivers of the success of foreign subsidiaries. Second, I
differentiate among types of subsidiaries, which enables us to explicate that the relative
effects on subsidiary performance are contingent upon subsidiary characteristics. Foreign
subsidiaries have been treated as a relatively homogenous entity in prior studies of
subsidiary performance, which has obfuscated the differential influence the MNE may
have on the performance of its foreign subsidiaries (Nell, Kappen & Laamanen, 2017).
My study thus suggests possible boundary conditions to existing MNE- or subsidiaryfocused theoretical frameworks that seek to explain foreign subsidiary performance.
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LITERATURE REVIEW
In this study, I examine effect classes that explain performance differences of foreign
subsidiaries, namely the MNE effect and the subsidiary effect.101 I do not directly test the
underlying mechanisms behind these effects; however, I believe it is useful to discuss the
underlying theory and some of the potential mechanisms that underpin my effects of
interest. Accordingly, I first review existing literature describing why and how both the
MNE as well as the subsidiary itself are important in explaining performance differences
between subsidiaries.

Foreign subsidiary performance: The dominance of subsidiary-focused research
Ghoshal and Bartlett (1990: 604) argued that the MNE is increasingly “dispersed
in environmental settings that represent very different economic, social, and cultural
milieus.” Because of such complex operating contexts, a central aspect of IB theory has
focused on subsidiaries and how they take on more independent roles within the MNE to
align with local conditions, build network linkages, and generate competitive advantages
(Cuervo-Cazurra, Mudambi & Pedersen, 2019; Geleilate, Andrews & Fainshmidt, 2019).
The internal differentiation of subsidiaries is a challenge to traditional, hierarchical MNE
structures (Nohria & Ghoshal, 1994) as it emphasizes the importance of subsidiaries
1

The relationship between MNE headquarters and their foreign subsidiaries is an example of the effect
higher-order organizational entities can have on lower-order entities. To my knowledge, in the variance
decomposition literature three such effect relationships have been studied: corporate and business unit effects
(e.g., McGahan & Porter, 1997; Bamiatzi et al., 2016), the effect of venture capital owners on their portfolio
companies (Fitza et al., 2009), and the effect of business groups on their members (Chang & Hong, 2002).
The relationship between MNE headquarters and their foreign subsidiaries represent a special form of such
effect classes. They are related to the corporate effect/business unit effect but, in past variance decomposition
studies, business units were defined by the industry sectors in which they operate, thus they are vehicles of
diversification and horizontal integration. By this definition, business units are entities that conduct the
business of more or less diversified corporations. Foreign subsidiaries, on the other hand, are vehicles of
internationalization operating in foreign countries. Thus, past research focusing on foreign subsidiaries
examines them within the context of IB literature.
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developing, deploying, and revising their own resources and capabilities (Rugman &
Verbeke, 2001). Indeed, Kostova et al. (2016: 179) argue that “as the broader field moved
toward a view of the MNE as a complex coordinated federation […] research attention
shifted to foreign subsidiaries’ unique characteristics and their impact on […] the overall
success of the organization.”
Accordingly, prior work has sought to specify the subsidiary-level determinants
of subsidiary performance, often adopting institutional and resource-based arguments
(e.g., Luo, 2003; Ambos, Asakawa & Ambos, 2011; Kawai & Strange, 2014) and
focusing on mechanisms such as local embeddedness and resource development. Table 1
summarizes select studies that inform this view. For instance, because of the global
dispersion of MNE activities, it is often difficult for the parent MNE to effectively
manage each subsidiary due to knowledge gaps related to host country environments
(Kostova, 1999). MNEs may allocate decision-making autonomy as a means to cope with
complex multinational operations, which helps subsidiaries to become more independent
of their MNEs and attain legitimacy among their own stakeholders (Geleilate et al.,
2019). Consequently, subsidiaries may have increased access to local knowledge to
assume new R&D functions and develop innovation-related competencies, thereby
improving performance outcomes (Cantwell & Mudambi, 2005; Ambos et al., 2011).

---Insert Table 1 here---

Subsidiaries may also engage in entrepreneurial behaviors, proactively
undertaking their own initiatives to pursue emerging opportunities, and develop resource-
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based advantages (Birkinshaw, 1997). Such subsidiary behaviors may “lead to
innovations in the internal and/or external market, which potentially transform the
competitive environment as well as the organization” and “are a way to increase the
subsidiary’s as well as the MNC’s overall value” (Strutzenberger & Ambos, 2014: 316).
While such subsidiary driven initiatives may not be viewed with ambivalence by the
headquarters (Birkinshaw & Ridderstråle, 1999), subsidiaries may benefit from such
initiatives in that they develop their own competitive advantages and markets
(Birkinshaw, Hood & Jonsson, 1998; Mudambi & Navarra, 2004).
As this summary suggests, literature that focuses on the subsidiary as an
explanation for performance difference examines how subsidiary characteristics affect
the building of subsidiary-specific capabilities and advantages. Meanwhile, another
research stream focuses on the MNE itself and how MNE characteristics will influence
subsidiary performance.

The role of the MNE
Insights from the IB and global strategy literature highlight that, in addition to the
subsidiary itself, the MNE as a whole can also affect subsidiary performance (e.g.,
Ciabuschi, Dellestrand & Holm, 2012; Foss, Foss & Nell, 2012; Nell & Ambos, 2013;
Ciabuschi, Dellestrand & Martin, 2015; Decreton, Nell & Stea, 2019). Here, I suggest
that the MNE affects performance in at least two ways—through the actions of its
headquarters as well as through means that are distributed across the MNE (Chandler,
1991; Menz et al., 2015; Kunisch, Menz & Birkinshaw, 2019).
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Historically, the headquarters’ value was derived from its capability to minimize
transaction costs by internalizing markets and hierarchically coordinating its subsidiaries.
Subsidiary performance was dependent on the MNE’s ability to build firm-specific
advantages that are non-location bound (Rugman & Verbeke, 2001). Patterns of
headquarters-subsidiary relationships later evolved, focusing on the coordination of
subsidiaries across multiple host locations and the leveraging of local resources and
capabilities (Kostova et al., 2016). As this literature accumulated, there was an increasing
understanding that headquarters involvement may “lead to a level of performance in the
subsidiary that is better than the subsidiary could have achieved as an independent, standalone entity” (Nell & Ambos, 2013: 1087).
There are two overarching mechanisms through which the MNE headquarters can
affect subsidiary performance outcomes. First, headquarters create value when they
prevent loss (Foss, 1997). While there is an implicit assumption that subsidiary managers
are more knowledgeable than their headquarters about how to navigate their local market
(Sengul & Gimeno, 2013), oftentimes, subsidiary managers engage in activities that may
result in significant economic costs (Keupp, Palmié & Gassmann, 2011). Further,
subsidiaries may not always operate as stewards of the MNE and its objectives (Kostova,
Nell & Hoenen, 2018). Mudambi and Navarra (2004: 386) note that “rent-seeking and
rent-appropriating behavior are manifestations of opportunism that destroys value.” A
headquarters can prevent losses by using its accumulated knowledge to mitigate both
inefficient resource allocation and opportunistic behavior (Ciabuschi et al., 2015).
Second, headquarters can affect subsidiary performance when it deploys and
coordinates non-trivial resources across the MNE (Foss, 1997). Awate et al. (2015: 64)
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describe the contemporary headquarters as a “network orchestrator” and “integrator of
organizational knowledge.” Headquarters are responsible for organizing resources and
activities in a way that is conducive to strengthening subsidiary competitiveness
(Decreton et al., 2019). Because the MNE headquarters is often a larger, more resourcerich entity, its ability to leverage valuable, diverse resources is usually more significant
than that of a subsidiary.
Although MNE headquarters play a significant role in directly shaping subsidiary
performance, the MNE effect is broader. The MNE may also indirectly affect subsidiary
performance. For instance, while the headquarters retains formal power, subsidiaries may
hold informal power and operate independently of their headquarters (Mudambi &
Navarra, 2004; Cuervo-Cazurra et al. 2019). Birkinshaw et al. (2017: 426) argue that
“[T]his tension is typically resolved through corporate HQ […] focusing on orchestrating
resources and on enabling subsidiary units to develop their unique capabilities and to
work effectively together.” By creating and nurturing linkages between subsidiaries, the
MNE can enable lateral collaboration, which may enhance the agility of subsidiaries and
their development of novel competitive advantages (Yamin & Andersson, 2011; Schotter
et al., 2017). While the headquarters may not be involved in the collaboration processes,
it plays a role in establishing the connections and thus indirectly contributes to subsidiary
performance outcomes.
The indirect effects of the MNE may not even be intentional. The parent MNE
has ownership rights over a subsidiary, and thus the subsidiary cannot “separate itself”
from its MNE (Cuervo-Cazurra et al., 2019). Even if the headquarters has no direct effect
on subsidiary operations, the MNE can still indirectly affect subsidiary performance
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through, for instance, its reputation (Fombrun & Shanley, 1990; Newburry et al., 2014).
A subsidiary's performance might benefit or suffer simply due to the reputation of its
MNE. Therefore, being part of one MNE versus another could be consequential, even if I
assume the headquarters or other actors in the MNE are not involved in subsidiary
operations, other than legally owning the subsidiary. In sum, there are good theoretical
and empirical reasons to expect a non-trivial subsidiary and MNE effects on foreign
subsidiary performance.

The relative importance of MNE and subsidiary effects
The preceding discussion and extant literature suggest that both the subsidiary and
the MNE exert non-trivial effects on subsidiary performance, but their relative
importance remains unclear. Partly, this lack of clarity stems from such effects often
being analyzed in isolation of each other. As summarized above, research streams within
the IB literature tend to focus on subsidiary-level explanations (e.g., Andersson et al.,
2002; Ambos et al., 2011) or MNE-level explanations (e.g., Dellestrand & Kappen, 2012;
Nell & Ambos, 2013). The former suggests that differentials in foreign subsidiary
performance should be primarily explained by differences among the subsidiaries
themselves. While the latter view, from the perspective of the MNE, suggests that
differentials in foreign subsidiary performance should be primarily explained by
differences among the MNEs that own subsidiaries, implying subsidiary-focused factors
might be non-trivial but are less consequential. These prior studies have thus far helped to
advance my understanding of what specific features and constructs may explain variance
within each of these effect classes (i.e., which MNE and subsidiary features affect
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performance). However, at a more fundamental level, determining the relative
importance of each effect class can be valuable in driving the overall research agenda of a
well-defined research area.
Unfortunately, the usage of traditional empirical approaches, such as the inclusion
of control variables or even fixed effects, does not provide a comprehensive,
simultaneous estimation of the relative importance of classes of effects. Hence, in order
to determine these relative influences, I conduct a variance decomposition analysis. Such
an approach does not explain how exactly the MNE or the subsidiary affect performance;
instead, it determines the relative importance of the MNE and the subsidiary to foreign
subsidiary performance. In a recent paper, Meyer-Doyle, Lee, and Helfat (2019: 1737)
explained why such analyses are important parts of an overall research agenda.
Specifically, they suggest that “such examinations enable scholars to build a better
understanding” of the factors that shape a particular outcome of interest, in my case,
subsidiary performance, which in turn “can guide future research and have practical
implications.” If I want to understand differences in subsidiary performance, a variance
decomposition analysis—measuring the relative sizes of the effect classes that influence
this performance—can help us to determine where to focus my scholarly attention. A
probe into the relative importance of the MNE and subsidiary effects can also uncover
possible boundary conditions to existing MNE- or subsidiary-focused explanations of
foreign subsidiary performance.
Prior variance decomposition research provides initial empirical evidence for
subsidiary and MNE effects on foreign subsidiary performance. However, these studies
were limited to very specific samples and study contexts and did not focus explicitly on
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either MNE or subsidiary effects on subsidiary performance. For example, Makino et al.
(2004) examined host-country effects using a sample of Japanese subsidiaries, controlling
for MNE and subsidiary effects. They found the subsidiary (28.2%) effect to be larger
than the MNE effect (8.2%). Chan et al. (2010) examined subnational region effects in
the US and China while controlling for MNE and subsidiary effects and found both to be
of equal size, around 17%. In a similar study, Ma et al. (2013) examined foreign
subsidiaries in subnational regions of China, controlling for the MNE and the subsidiary
effect; they found a small effect for both the MNE (5.3%) and the subsidiary (8.9%). A
related research stream focused on home country contexts decomposed overall MNE
performance and found that a firm effect can explain a large portion of performance
variance (e.g., Tong et al., 2008; McGahan & Victer, 2010), but these studies did not
capture the subsidiary effect. Table 2 summarizes these past studies and the samples they
used.

---Insert Table 2 here---

In sum, prior variance decomposition studies found mixed results, did not focus
explicitly on the MNE/subsidiary effect comparison, and often used limited datasets.
Hence, there is value in examining the MNE and the subsidiary effects in a more
comprehensive study. In addition, these studies have assumed subsidiary homogeneity
and, thus, any interpretation of the subsidiary or MNE effects may lead to erroneous
conclusions (Fitza & Tihanyi, 2017). These notions guide my empirical efforts in the next
section, where I probe into different types of subsidiaries and apply variance
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decomposition analysis to examine how different subsidiary types influence the relative
size of the MNE and the subsidiary effect.

METHODOLOGY
Data and sample
Although it is often difficult to obtain large-scale data on ownership structures and the
performance of subsidiaries in foreign locations, I follow prior studies (Chacar,
Newburry & Vissa, 2010; Belenzon, Hashai & Patacconi, 2019; Pisani, Garcia-Bernardo
& Heemskerk, 2019) and use Orbis by Bureau van Dijk (BvD), a comprehensive
database that provides the requisite financial and ownership data needed for my analyses.
Specifically, Orbis is a commercial dataset with global reach. It relies on official country
registrars and their chambers of commerce as well as BvDs network of over 160 different
providers to source the data (Kalemli-Ozcan et al., 2015). While Orbis provides data for
firms operating in all regions of the world, there are varying requirements for business
registration and method of reporting and financial data collection in each country. For
countries and regions such as the European Union, which require reporting by law, the
coverage of firms will expectedly be higher. However, despite these shortcomings, Orbis
is, to the best of my knowledge, the only global dataset which accounts for rich firm
heterogeneity (e.g., size, location, sector), and thus it is wildly used in IB and
management research (e.g., Chacar et al., 2010; Belenzon et al., 2019; Pisani et al., 2019).
Following past literature, I implement an initial sampling screen that focuses on
two excluding conditions: I exclude subsidiaries with less than 98% ownership by a
single entity and subsidiaries that have the same country of domicile as its parent
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(Kalemli-Ozcan et al., 2015). This process restricts the sample to only foreign
subsidiaries, which are wholly owned by one MNE.2 This initial screening was satisfied
by approximately 1.5 million foreign subsidiaries.
I then implement several additional screening criteria consistent with prior
studies. First, I exclude subsidiaries with NAICS (4-digit) industry codes that pertain to
administrative and waste services, public administration, and other unclassified industries
(McGahan & Victer, 2010). I also exclude those industries and host- and home-countries
that only have one associated subsidiary, since, in these instances, classes of effects are
not distinguishable from a subsidiary effect (Ma et al., 2013). Next, I exclude subsidiaries
without financial performance information in the most recent fiscal year as well as those
with less than three years of usable data across the sample timeframe (Fitza, 2014).
“[T]his screen ensures that the results are not biased by short-lived entities that were
created to shield resources or to account for unusual activities” (McGahan & Victer,
2010: 150). In addition, I remove MNEs without at least three subsidiaries for which
there are performance data, and similarly, industries and counties for which there are not
at least three MNEs (Ma et al., 2013). I then remove small subsidiaries (£ 30 employees)
as well as those that are inactive or with no identifiable operating status for the entire
period. While prior studies have used various criteria to classify subsidiaries based on
their size (e.g., Beamish & Inkpen, 1998; Chakravarty et al., 2017), my cutoff helps to
ensure that the analyses are not distorted towards very small firms that otherwise do not

2

Some prior studies conducting subsidiary performance decomposition analyses include both partially and
wholly owned subsidiaries (e.g., Makino et al., 2004; Chan et al., 2010; Ma et al., 2013), which may
obfuscate the relative importance of the MNE effect.
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represent normal economic activity.3 Finally, I remove all home and host countries that
are known tax havens (e.g., Cayman Islands) because such subsidiaries may result in bias
in estimating some classes of effects such as the home country effect (Erkan, Fainshmidt
& Judge, 2016).

---Insert Table 3 here---

The final sample consists of 403,567 subsidiary-year observations for the period
2010-2018, which includes 51,763 wholly owned foreign subsidiaries of 6,122 MNEs.
Table 3 provides the characteristics of my full sample. The United Kingdom is the most
common host country (8.16%), followed by France (6.52%) and Italy (5.58%). Of the
250 different industries, management services are the most common (7.81%), followed
by industrial services (5.17%) and computer services (4.10%) (see Appendix C). The
average number of subsidiaries per MNE is 8.46 (s.d. = 10.31), and the average
subsidiary return on assets (ROA) is 4.12% (s.d. = 12.68). My dataset is not restricted to
a specific home- (Makino et al., 2004) or host-country (Chan et al., 2010; Ma et al., 2013)
nor to certain industry sectors (Ma et al., 2013), thus allowing us to decompose foreign
subsidiary performance more comprehensively and to ameliorate potential idiosyncrasies
of decomposing variance within a particular context.
To remain consistent with prior performance-based variance decomposition
studies (e.g., McGahan & Porter, 1997; McGahan & Victer, 2010; Ma et al., 2013), I use

3

Prior variance decomposition studies have engaged in a similar screen and found that results with the
exclusion and inclusion of small firms are analog (McGahan & Victer, 2010). Moreover, there is a steep drop
off in usable data for subsidiaries smaller than 30 employees.
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ROA as my outcome variable (DV) to measure foreign subsidiary performance. To assess
the relative importance of the subsidiary and MNE, I include a subsidiary effect and MNE
effect on the right-hand side; I also include an industry (4-digit NAICS), home country,
host country, and year effects (2010-2018).

Analytical model
To empirically analyze the relative importance of the MNE and subsidiary effects,
I employ variance decomposition techniques consistent with prior studies and use a
simultaneous analysis of variance (ANOVA) method (McGahan & Porter, 1997; Fitza et
al., 2009; McGahan & Victer, 2010; Vedula & Fitza, 2019). A simultaneous ANOVA
uses fixed-effect modeling allowing for effect covariance (McGahan & Victer, 2010),
which is appropriate in my case because prior literature suggests that there is covariance
between effects (e.g., industry, host country) (e.g., McGahan & Porter, 1997).
An alternative approach would be to use multilevel modeling (MLM) methods
(Guo, 2017; Quigley & Graffin, 2017; Krause et al., 2019; Meyer-Doyle et al., 2019),
which take into account hierarchical relationships between effects. However, the classes
of effects used in this study do not necessarily follow a clear hierarchical structure; there
is not a clear hierarchical relationship between industries, host-countries, MNEs, and
home-countries. For example, a subsidiary operates in a given industry, but that industry
spans across multiple countries, and the industry and other lower-level effects are not
nested within the higher-level effects such as the home country and the MNE itself. Sohl
et al. (2018: 23) argue that “[I]n practice, both methods often result in similar effect
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sizes,” and that using a simultaneous ANOVA will control for effect covariance in the
absence of a clear hierarchical structure.4
I follow prior studies (e.g., Fitza et al., 2009; McGahan & Victer, 2010; Ma et al.,
2013; Fitza, 2014; Sohl et al., 2018) and estimate equation (Eq.) 1 as follows:

(1)

ROAs,y = μ + αy + βh + γk + θi + δm + τs + εs,y

In Eq. (1), ROAs,y represents the ROA of subsidiary ‘s’ in year ‘y.’ Subsidiary ‘s’
is then identified in year ‘y’ as operating in host country ‘h’ and industry ‘i’ with an
MNE ‘m’ from home country ‘k.’ The term μ (constant) is equal to the estimated mean of
ROA for the complete sample of subsidiaries. The residual (error) term εs,y is the excess
return of subsidiary ‘s’ in year ‘y’ that is unexplained by the effects in the model.
However, because the data are longitudinal, the residual term “may be serially correlated
over time because of persistent shocks at any level with influence over successive years”
(McGahan & Victer, 2010: 155). If a ‘shock’ occurs in year one (y), it is likely to persist
into year two (y+1), thus making the residual term in Eq. (1) serially correlated. I thus
follow past studies and control for serial correlation (e.g., Fitza, Matuski & Mosakowski,
2009; McGahan & Victer, 2010; Ma et al., 2013). Accordingly, I introduce Eq. (2):

(2)

4

εs,y = rεs,y-1 + ωs,y

However, I conduct MLM with cross-nested effects as a sensitivity analysis.
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In Eq. (2), ‘r’ is the coefficient for the rate of persistence across the included
effects, ‘εs,y-1’ is the previous residual term at year ‘y-1’, and ‘ωs,y’ is the new residual
term that is the stripped of serial correlation. To then determine the portion of the effects
that are not influenced by the rate of persistence ‘r,’ I use algebraic substitution and
introduce Eq. (3):

(3)

ROAs,y = rROAs,y-1 + (1 – r)μ + (1 – p)αy + (1 – r)βh + (1 – r)γk + (1 – r)θi + (1 –
r)δm + (1 – r)τs + εs,y

In Eq. (3) I calculate a null model (McGahan & Porter, 1997) where ROA for
subsidiary ‘s’ in year ‘y’ is explained by ‘pROAs,y-1’, which is the rate of persistence ‘r’
multiplied by ROA for subsidiary ‘s’ in the previous year (y-1). I then algebraically
restrict the rest of Eq. (3), turning all of the remaining effects to zero. This model
assumes that the ROA for subsidiary ‘s’ in year ‘y’ is explained only by persistence ‘r,’
the grand mean ROA, and some remaining error. I take the residual term εs,y and use it as
the dependent variable of my final model. I then calculate the effect sizes based on the
adjusted R2 using this as my final model (Fitza, 2017; Quigley & Graffin, 2017). Finally,
I follow Meyer-Doyle et al. (2019) and derive a relative MNE effect by dividing the
resultant MNE effect by the subsidiary effect.
Due to computational limitations, I am unable to run the entire model at once.
Running a matrix of approximately 400,000 observations is demanding, and most
computer software is unable to conduct a variance decomposition analysis on such a large
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dataset.5 I thus follow prior studies (Fitza, 2014; Fitza & Tihanyi, 2017) and employ a
random sampling procedure, where I create 20 random subsamples, each containing 5%
of my dataset (approximately 25,000 observations each). I run the analysis on each
subsample and aggregate the results. However, for some post-hoc subgroup analyses
below, I did not use this random sample approach as some of the subgroups were small
enough; in these subsamples, I were able to use the majority or all (75-100%) of each
subgroup for my analyses.

RESULTS
The main results are presented in Table 4. The table includes two models, namely a base
model and a model accounting for serial correlation in the dependent variable (r, the
coefficient for the rate of persistence is 0.19). I first note that both the MNE and
subsidiary effects are statistically different from zero (p £ 0.001) across all models,
consistent with expectations. In Model 2, I find that the subsidiary effect explains 36.47%
of foreign subsidiary performance variance, while the MNE effect explains only 6.07%,
suggesting a relative MNE effect of 0.17. I also find significant industry (3.42%), host
country (0.96%) and home country (0.84%) effects, while the year effect (0.18%) is
statistically insignificant at conventional levels. Hence, while both the MNE and
subsidiary effects are important, being the most salient drivers, the subsidiary effect is
substantially more salient in explaining subsidiary performance variability.

5

Measuring the effects is based on the inclusion of a large number of classification (i.e., dichotomous)
variables. Because estimating a model with a large number of independent variables is computationally
demanding, most statistical packages limit the number of independent variables (e.g., Stata limits them to
10,998).
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---Insert Table 4 here---

Post-hoc analyses
Following my earlier emphasis on the potential role of subsidiary characteristics
in altering the relative importance of effect sizes, I go a step further and examine
potential theory-based contingencies. That is, using IB literature as my guide, I conducted
a series of additional analyses to examine how the subsidiary and MNE effects may vary
across subsamples of subsidiaries.
First, prior literature suggests that the MNE effect may be contingent upon initial
founding conditions of the foreign subsidiary (e.g., Martinez & Jarillo, 1989; Birkinshaw
& Hood, 1998). In particular, Slangen and Hennart (2008) argue that each subsidiary’s
entry mode will be associated with distinct sets of activities, firm behaviors, and
trajectories. For instance, an MNE may be more involved in greenfield subsidiary
operations due to the natural relationship between the two (Harzing, 2002), and it may
create more pronounced imprints on such subsidiaries relative to acquired subsidiaries
(Marquis & Tilcsik, 2013). On the other hand, the MNE effect may be more considerable
in an acquired subsidiary because MNEs may often attempt to “fix-up-and-keep” the
subsidiary (Allred, Boal & Holstein, 2005). To examine the potential implications of the
establishment mode, I split subsidiaries into two groups: greenfield and acquired
subsidiaries. The results are presented in Table 5. In Model 3, I find that for acquired
subsidiaries, the subsidiary effect (17.29%) is considerably less salient than
the MNE effect (29.34%). Meanwhile, the subsidiary effect for greenfield subsidiaries is
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38.12%, while the MNE effect is 7.17%, suggesting a 0.19 relative effect. Thus, the
establishment mode of the foreign subsidiary plays a considerable role in determining the
relative importance of the two effects, with the MNE effect being substantially more
important for acquired subsidiaries.6 This nuance cannot be seen in the main results
because the vast majority of subsidiaries are greenfield subsidiaries, thus masking the
different effects for acquired subsidiaries in average MNE effect size.

---Insert Table 5 here---

Second, prior literature suggests that subsidiaries evolve over time; as they
develop their own resources, capabilities, and competitive advantages, they may reduce
their dependence on the MNE (Ghoshal & Bartlett, 1990; Birkinshaw, Hood & Young,
2005). Intuitively, this suggests that the performance of older subsidiaries may be less
affected by the MNE (Nell & Ambos, 2013). Accordingly, I probed the role of subsidiary
age. In Model 5, I sample subsidiaries that are younger than five years and find, again,
that the subsidiary effect (36.94%) is more salient than the MNE effect (19.87%), but
because of the larger MNE effect, the relative MNE effect is 0.54 compared to 0.16 in the
main results (model 2). However, it may be that this age threshold of five years is too
6

I recognize that MNEs deliberately choose which type of foreign subsidiary to establish and in which
location. This raises the possibility of an endogeneity bias in the sense that subsidiaries are not randomly
assigned to MNEs. Such selection effects are usually not considered in the variance decomposition literature
(e.g., Vedula & Fitza, 2019). For example, past variance decomposition studies examined industry or region
effects even though firms choose which industry to enter or in which regions to locate. Instead, variance
decomposition studies ask to what degree certain firm populations differ conditional on the underlying firm
decisions (Adner & Helfat, 2003; McGahan & Porter, 2002; Vedula & Fitza, 2019). In principle, selection
considerations can be attributed to the MNE effect in my study since these selection decisions are a feature
of the MNE. The subsidiary effect I observe in the face of the MNE effect is independent of subsidiary-level
variables that are shared with other subsidiaries across the MNE (e.g., decision processes and capabilities by
MNE managers). Subsidiary-specific variables that are related to the MNE but are not shared with sister
subsidiaries are included in the subsidiary effect.
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low, especially for more traditional, slow-growth industries; therefore, I ran two
additional tests. First, for subsidiaries aged between five and ten years (Model 6), the
MNE effect (18.58%) is relatively less salient than the subsidiary effect (39.79%), with
the relative effect size being 0.47. In Model 7, I sample those subsidiaries ten years and
older and find the MNE effect is 8.78%, and the subsidiary effect is 37.64%.
Accordingly, there is a clear pattern associated with the subsidiary age groupings, and the
MNE appears to be relatively more important during the first five to ten years of a
subsidiary. Regarding industry differences, I examined subsamples of manufacturing and
service subsidiaries and observed no discernible differences in the MNE and subsidiary
effects.
Third, as previously mentioned, there may also be explanations at the MNEsubsidiary interface that could explain foreign subsidiary performance variability. In
particular, as the MNE expands its network of foreign subsidiaries across geographic
markets, the scope and diversity of the network may affect the allocation of headquarters
attention and speed in decision-making processes, suggesting lesser relative importance
of the MNE (Rugman & Verbeke, 2001; Bouquet & Birkinshaw, 2008). Conversely,
smaller MNEs may have a greater opportunity to be involved in local operations,
implying a relatively larger MNE effect on foreign subsidiary performance. Accordingly,
I create four subsamples (quartiles) of subsidiaries based on their MNE network size.7
Going sequentially from Model 8 to Model 11 (Table 4), I see that the MNE effect
decreases from 11.82% to 4.19%, while the subsidiary effect increases from 32.17% to

7

The number of subsidiaries within each MNE network size quartile are 3-15 (1st quartile), 16-39 (2nd
quartile), 40-107 (3rd quartile), and 108-437 (4th quartile).
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40.15%. This pattern suggests that the MNE effect becomes less important as the MNE
network size gets larger.

Sensitivity analyses
In addition to the subsample analyses, I also conducted a variety of sensitivity
analyses. In Table 6, I summarize these additional tests. As previously mentioned, several
recent variance decomposition analyses have used MLM (e.g., Krause et al., 2019;
Meyer-Doyle et al., 2019); however, these studies had a clear, hierarchical structure to
their datasets. My data is not well-suited for the use of MLM, but I ran MLM with my
full sample, where I introduce the year, industry, host and home country, MNE, and
subsidiary effects at the same level (Sohl et al., 2018). I found that the MNE effect
and the subsidiary effects using MLM were 5.26% and 35.48%, respectively, which is
comparable to my main analysis. Thus, my analyses are not sensitive to my analytical
technique.

---Insert Table 6 here---

Next, in order to assess if outliers drive my results, I followed past variance
decomposition studies (e.g., Quigley & Graffin, 2017) and deleted observations below
the 1st and above the 99th percentiles of my dependent variable (ROA). Doing so yields
similar results to my main analysis. 8 Finally, while ROA is the most commonly used
measure to assess the performance of a firm or foreign subsidiary (e.g., Ma et al., 2013), I

8

In a variance decomposition analysis, the concern with outliers is not in how they might affect individual
regression coefficients, instead it is in how they might inflate the effect classes.
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used the full sample and decomposed foreign subsidiary performance using alternative
dependent variables: return on equity (ROE) and return on capital employed (ROCE)
(Sohl et al., 2018). ROE captures how effectively a subsidiary is in using its owners’
equity to create profits or the extent to which it is unable to offset what it owes, and
ROCE captures a subsidiary’s profitability and efficiency in the use of capital. As Table 5
indicates, the use of these different dependent variables does not substantively change the
results, including when I remove outliers similar to my procedure for ROA described
above.

DISCUSSION
In their variance decomposition study, Ma et al. (2013: 68) noted that “The question of
what explains the heterogeneity of foreign subsidiary performance is related to one of the
big questions for the international business field ‘What determines the international
success and failure of firms?’ In my study, I probed a key aspect of said heterogeneity,
namely the relative importance of the MNE and the subsidiary to foreign subsidiary
performance. I leveraged a comprehensive dataset of over 51,000 wholly owned foreign
subsidiaries of 6,122 MNEs during the period 2010-2018, to decompose foreign
subsidiary performance into classes of effects. At the aggregate, and while controlling for
a multitude of effects known from past variance decomposition studies to explain
variability in subsidiary performance, I find that both the MNE and the subsidiary effects
are non-trivial, consistent with theoretical expectations. However, more importantly, the
subsidiary effect is substantially more salient than the MNE effect in relative terms. I
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further uncover contingencies to this pattern, such that the opposite is the case in certain
contexts. My findings have several implications for IB research and theory.

Implications for research
Existing research provides theoretical and empirical insights into the importance
of either the MNE or the subsidiary in explaining subsidiary performance. However,
these studies probed specific features of the MNE or the subsidiary (see Table 1) and,
thus, did not compare the overall effect classes, or they focused on location effects (see
Table 2). While some of these studies did include MNE or subsidiary effects, they used
very specific samples, limited, for example, to China or the US as the host/home county
(e.g., Chan et al., 2010), or focusing on only a handful of MNEs (e.g., Christmann et al.,
1999). My study complements these studies by explicitly focusing on the MNE and
subsidiary effects in a more globally comprehensive dataset. Theoretically, I combine
insights from two central perspectives in IB theory in order to focus on the relative size of
the MNE and subsidiary effects. Empirically, I use a large representative sample that
crosses multiple host and home countries, thereby providing robust evidence for the
salience of the respective research streams.
Menz et al. (2015: 640) argue that “both streams study the same elephant, but rely
on different approaches to look at different aspects of the phenomenon”. For example,
traditional internalization theory suggests that the MNE possesses ownership advantages
and can deploy them in foreign locations by internalizing foreign markets (Dunning,
1980). At the same time, the contemporary MNE operates in multiple geographic
markets, making it difficult to internalize all activities in foreign locations. Hence, the
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semi-autonomous subsidiary may take on an increasingly important role in developing
resources, capabilities, and competitive advantages (Geleilate et al., 2019). My study
indicates that the latter view is relatively more salient to explaining subsidiary
performance variability, such that subsidiary-specific differences account for more
variance than MNE-specific differences.
However, I differentiate among types of subsidiaries and show that the MNE may
have differential effects in explaining subsidiary performance variability (Martinez &
Jarillo, 1989; Birkinshaw & Hood, 1998). Specifically, I introduce several key founding
and contextual conditions that may shape subsidiary and MNE effects, namely subsidiary
establishment mode, subsidiary age, and its MNE network size. I see the introduction of
such contingencies to be an important probe into the salience of various theoretical
perspectives, particularly given the level of analysis at which they are applied. For
example, I find that the relative MNE effect for acquired subsidiaries is the largest across
all my analyses. From an agency theory perspective, which concerns the alignment of
subsidiaries to MNE goals, acquired subsidiaries have different founding characteristics
(Marquis & Tilcsik, 2013), making the MNE’s task to integrate and align subsidiary
operations more difficult. In comparison, greenfield subsidiaries are a part of an MNE
from inception, and thus key differences in the MNE’s acquisition integration capabilities
and experience will be less pertinent. Nevertheless, IB research has mostly overlooked
such MNE-specific characteristics, instead focusing on country-specific (Yiu & Makino,
2002) and subsidiary features (Slangen & Hennart, 2008). Thus, a broader implication of
this study is that examining MNE-level differences, rather than differences in acquired
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firms and their contexts, might be more fruitful when examining the long-term success of
subsidiaries originating in cross-border acquisitions.
Similarly, I also find patterns associated with subsidiary age whereby the MNE is
relatively more salient during the first five to ten years of a subsidiary’s lifecycle.
Younger subsidiaries often reflect a nascent accumulation of resources and capabilities
and thus may suffer from liability of newness in their local markets (Rabbiosi &
Santangelo, 2013), which requires them to rely on their parent MNE for initial support.
Comparatively, older subsidiaries often have more accumulated resources and can more
easily navigate their environments independent of their MNE. Accordingly, my study
suggests boundary conditions to existing resource-based theories and internalization
arguments (e.g., Rugman & Verbeke, 2001), which may be most salient during the initial
start-up years of a subsidiary. In essence, as the subsidiary matures, it increasingly takes
“complete control of its own destiny” (Birkinshaw & Hood, 1998: 778), thereby making
subsidiary-level explanations such as a subsidiary’s engagement with its local
institutional environment more salient.
Results pertaining to a subsidiary’s MNE network size also provide an important
glimpse into the relative importance of the MNE to subsidiary performance, with the
MNE effect being less salient for large MNE networks than that of small MNEs.
Considering prior research, this finding might reflect the importance of theories such as
the attention-based view from the perspective of the MNE, and resource dependence at
the subsidiary-level to explaining subsidiary performance. For instance, MNE attention is
a scarce and critical resource, especially for large, geographically dispersed MNEs
(Bouquet & Birkinshaw, 2008). With increasing MNE size and thus operations in
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multiple geographic and product markets, it becomes difficult for MNEs to allocate
attention effectively. In contrast, smaller MNEs may be more easily able to allocate
attention and thus influence local subsidiary operations, which may be reflected in a
subsidiary’s strategy. Relatedly, the MNE has a greater opportunity to hold key resources
and thus control subsidiary operations, which limits a subsidiary’s decision-making
latitude and increases dependence on its parent MNE. Hence, my study suggests that the
explanatory power of both MNE- and subsidiary-focused theories may depend on the size
of the MNE, whereby MNE-focused explanation of subsidiary performance, such as
attention and dependence mechanisms, appear relatively more salient.
Using such contingencies helps to shed light on the different levels of influence
the MNE may have on foreign subsidiary performance. These contingencies suggest that
different theoretical explanations of subsidiary performance may apply to different types
of subsidiaries. Hence, and in returning to the non-trivial tension between the MNE and
subsidiary perspectives I explicated in the beginning of this paper, a potential resolution
to such tension may be in more seriously considering subsidiary heterogeneity in many of
the theories I apply to explain subsidiary performance or, more broadly, MNE success in
foreign locations. While, at first glance, the two views imply lesser importance of the
other, the results of this study suggest this does not have to be the case. Indeed, both
views can co-exist, but not for the same type of subsidiary. Delineating which specific
theoretical perspectives are suited for distinct types of subsidiaries at the MNE or
subsidiary level of analysis is a promising avenue for future research on subsidiary
performance and management.
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Implications for practice
My study carries several important implications for managers. First, I provide
MNE managers with insights into those channels most salient to determining the
performance of their subsidiaries in foreign locations—put differently, I show under what
conditions can MNEs affect their subsidiaries the most. Notably, I show that the MNE
plays a significant role in determining its acquired subsidiary’s performance when the
subsidiary is in its first five to ten years of its lifecycle. In comparison, while greenfield
and older subsidiaries may benefit from its MNE, their performance variability is less
affected by the MNE. Hence, decisions at the MNE-level may have more pronounced
effects for certain subsidiary types, and thus MNE managers should be cognizant of their
differential impacts. Second, I also suggest that the MNE effect for subsidiaries in large
MNE networks is trivial in comparison to the subsidiary effect. While the MNE may
provide advantages to its subsidiaries in foreign locations, it is subsidiary-specific
differences that drive performance variability. To the extent that the MNE depends on the
performance of its foreign subsidiaries, MNE managers may wish to focus on subsidiary
characteristics and activities as opposed to those of the MNE, more broadly.

Limitations and future research
Finally, this study is not without limitations. First, my analyses enabled us to
assess the relative importance of the MNE and subsidiary effects to performance
variability; yet, as with all variance decomposition studies, my study does not examine
why the effect classes are of particular size—the analysis does not allow for the isolation
of specific sources of variance within each effect. For example, I theorize that differences

137

in MNE attention may yield varying levels of variance explained by an MNE effect
(Bouquet & Birkinshaw, 2008), but I do not capture such explanations explicitly. Instead,
variance decomposition studies can emphasize relative effect sizes, which, as described
above, enhances my general understanding but can also be an important input into
directing future research (Meyer-Doyle et al. 2019). Therefore, future research can use
more nuanced subsamples to understand the interplay between the MNE and subsidiary
effect. The main thrust of such inquiry would extend my findings and contribute to the
ongoing subsidiary management discussions.
Second, although I account for serial correlation in my empirical models,
subsidiary performance may be subject to environmental shocks that cannot be
systematically measured. This concern is evident in the large portion of unexplained
variance in the results. Keeping in line with prior variance decomposition analyses (e.g.,
McGahan & Victer, 2010), I see an opportunity for future research to supplement my
findings with more nuanced work on interactions and contextual characteristics both
internal and external to the firm. As I demonstrate, subgroup analyses help to probe into
the unexplained portion of subsidiary performance variability, and thus subsequent
studies may again benefit from such techniques.
Third, there is an emergent stream of research that focuses on the use of MNE
regional headquarters (e.g., Ambos & Mahnke, 2010). Regional headquarters act as an
arm of the global headquarters and are an additional channel by which the MNE can
affect subsidiary performance differences. However, a regional headquarters performs
similar tasks to the MNE headquarters, albeit with a specific geographic focus and, thus,
the effect of the regional headquarters may be subsumed in the MNE effect.
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Nevertheless, I see a fruitful opportunity for future variance decomposition research to
assess the relative importance of a regional headquarters effect.
Finally, while the scope of my data offers a considerable improvement over prior
studies (e.g., Makino et al., 2004; Chan et al., 2010; Ma et al., 2013), it still has some
shortcomings. The BvD data has a global scope but, due to differing reporting
requirements, more data is available within Europe and the United States than for some
other countries and regions (e.g., Africa). Thus, while it is conceivable that my dataset is
quite representative of MNEs and their foreign subsidiaries, some countries are still
underrepresented. In addition, my large dataset might be subject to increased possibilities
for statistical noise as I do not restrict my sample to specific operating contexts to control
for potential heterogeneity. While I engaged in several, detailed cleaning steps, I
acknowledge that my data may still have certain characteristics that can affect my
findings. For example, a subsidiary may have recently changed its industry classification,
and thus focusing on only one industry per subsidiary may result in effect
over/underestimation (Guo, 2017). Future research that wishes to probe into the relative
importance of an MNE and subsidiary effect may wish to control for such issues by
further refining the sampling processes.
Despite these limitations, my study advances understanding of how much and
under what conditions the MNE matters vis-à-vis the subsidiary to foreign subsidiary
performance. I provide insights into the relative effect of the MNE, demonstrating that it
varies across a selected set of subsidiary characteristics. Doing so sheds light on the
relevance and limits of MNE-focused and subsidiary-focused explanations of subsidiary
performance. In sum, I hope that my study will propel future scholarly work in this area.
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Table 1. Subsidiary and headquarters effect on subsidiary performance
Research Stream

Select Theories

Mechanisms

Institutional theory

Embeddedness
Legitimacy

Contingency theory

Differentiation
Alignment

Resource dependency

Power
Control

Network theory

Collaboration
Power

OLI paradigm
(Internalization theory) A

Exploitation
Mobility

Attention-based view

Influence
Coordination

Headquarters attention is a valuable
resource for subsidiaries and those who
receive attention often perform better.

Resource-based view

Efficiency
Effectiveness

Headquarters resource contributions
influence the efficiency and
effectiveness of subsidiary outcomes.

Subsidiary Focused

Headquarters Focused

Key Insights
Subsidiary local embeddedness and
legitimacy in foreign markets exert a
positive effect on performance
outcomes.
Subsidiary differentiation enables the
formulation and implementation of
context specific strategies which
improves performance.
Subsidiary power can enhance
performance as it provides an ability to
autonomously make decisions.
Subsidiary collaboration and use of
organizational networks have a positive
influence on performance.
The mobility and exploitation of firmspecific advantages is an important
determinant of performance in
internalized foreign markets.

Select Citations
Luo (2003); Birkinshaw et al.
(2005); Slangen & Hennart
(2008); Kawai & Strange
(2014)
Delios & Beamish (2001);
Hewett et al. (2003); Newburry
et al. (2003); Najafi-Tavani et
al. (2018)
Johnston & Menuc (2007);
Ambos et al. (2011); Liu et al.
(2016)
Andersson et al. (2002);
Brouthers et al. (2009);
Gammelgaard et al. (2012)
Rugman & Verbeke (2001);
Brouthers et al. (2009); Nguyen
& Rugman (2015); Gaur et al.
(2019)
Bouquet & Birkinshaw (2008);
Ambos & Birkinshaw (2010);
Ambos et al. (2010); Mahnke et
al. (2012)
Chen et al. (2009); Ciabuschi et
al. (2010); Dellestrand &
Kappen (2012); Nell & Ambos
(2013)
Yamin & Holm (2011);
Ciabuschi et al. (2015); ScottKennel & Giroud (2015);
Asakawa et al. (2018)

Headquarters can connect subsidiaries
to improve collaboration and
Network theory
performance outcomes across
geographic and product markets.
Headquarters control positively
O'Donnell (2000); Björkman et
Control
impacts performance when it prevents
Agency theory
al. (2004); Brock et al. (2008)
Integration
(limits) opportunistic behavior and
Alfoldi et al. (2012)
subsidiary isolation.
Notes: A = Relevant to both the subsidiary and headquarters-focused research streams; OLI paradigm and internalization theory are combined for the
purposes of concision (see Rugman, 2010 for an extensive discussion).
Socialization
Collaboration
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Table 2. Variance decomposition studies on subsidiary performance
Research Stream

Authors (Year)

Home countries

Host countries

# of observations

Christmann et al. (1999) A

3

37

99

Findings
MNE effect: 14.0%,
Subsidiary effect: 18.0%

MNE effect: 8.2%,
Subsidiary effect: 28.2%
USA
USA
16,227
–
USA
MNE effect:19.2%
Chan et al. (2010) C
China
China
13,051 – China
Subsidiary effect: 15.6%
MNE effect: 5.3%
Ma et al. (2013) D
19
China
8,043
Subsidiary effect: 8.9%
Notes: Variance explained by each effect in percent; A = Results reported in Table 3 (data may include domestic subunits); B = Results reported in
Table 2 (Model 3); C = Results reported in Table 1 (Model 3 & Model 4); Results are an average of both models; D = Results reported in Table 3; E
= Results reported in Table 7, Model 1 (all firms, ROA as the dependent variable); F = Results reported in Table 2, Model 4.
Subnational Region
Effect or
Country Effect

Makino et al. (2004) B

Japan

79

Table 3. Full sample characteristics
Subsidiaries

51,763

MNEs

6,122

Ownership degree

Wholly owned

Industries

250 (4-digit NAICS)

Host Countries

78

Home Countries

81

Observations

403,567

Time span

2010-2018

Mean number of subsidiaries per MNE

8.46

Standard deviation of the Number of subsidiaries per MNE

10.31

Dependent variable (ROA) Mean

4.15

Dependent variable (ROA) Standard deviation

16.68

Data source

ORBIS database
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28,809

Table 4. Variance decomposition results and comparison to relevant past studies
This Study

Makino et
al. (2004)

Chan et al. (2010)

Ma et al.
(2013)

Autocorrelation
USA
China
Full C
Full F
correction B
Sample D
Sample E
Model
1
2
Year
0.22 NS
0.18 NS
0.10 NS
0.30 NS
2.60
0.04 NS
Home Country
0.79
0.84
0.90
Host Country
0.83
0.96
4.30
Industry
3.10
3.42
5.00
12.8
5.90
5.65
MNE
5.69
6.07
8.20
18.8
19.5
5.28
Subsidiary
34.60
36.74
28.20
16.8
14.4
8.87
Relative MNE Effect A
0.16
0.17
0.29
1.12
1.35
0.60
Persistence r
0.19
0.22
Observations
403,567
403,567
5,183
16,227
13,051
8,043
Notes: Variance explained by each effect in percent; NS = Not significant (p > 0.05); A = denotes a relative effect size (i.e.,
MNE effect / subsidiary effect); B = r, the coefficient for the rate of persistence is 0.19; C = Results reported in Table 2,
Model 3; D = Results reported in Table 1, Model 3; E = Results reported in Table 1, Model 4; F = Results reported in Table
3, selected effects to compare with the effects captured by my study; Dependent variable for Models 1 and 2 is ROA.
Base Model

Table 5. Post-hoc variance decomposition results
Entry Mode
Subsidiary Age
Network Size (percentile)
Acquired Greenfield
0 – 5 yrs 5 – 10 yrs 10+ yrs
0 – 25 25 – 50 50 – 75 75 – 100
Model
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
Year
0.04 NS
0.23 NS
0.70 NS
0.11 NS
0.10 NS
0.25 NS 0.46 NS 0.17 NS
0.14 NS
Home Country
0.72
0.62
0.94
0.75
0.72
0.89
0.52
0.80
0.85
Host Country
0.72
0.76
0.85
0.68
0.89
0.85
0.71
0.80
1.04
Industry
2.73
2.65
3.16
2.98
3.19
2.98
2.19
3.13
3.13
MNE
29.34
7.00
19.87
18.58
8.78
11.82
9.49
8.20
4.19
Subsidiary
17.29
37.78
36.94
39.79
37.64
32.17
33.49
37.18
40.15
Relative MNE Effect A
1.70
0.19
0.54
0.47
0.23
0.37
0.28
0.22
0.10
Persistence r
0.20
0.19
0.05
0.05
0.16
0.19
0.23
0.19
0.18
Observations
30,233
289,932
57,702
74,306
260,079
51,078 49,077 79,652 109,889
Notes: Variance explained by each effect in percent; NS = Not significant (p > 0.05); A = denotes a relative effect size (i.e., MNE effect
/ subsidiary effect); Dependent variable is ROA; Subsample observations may not equal full sample observations due to missing data;
Network size percentiles are based on all network sizes with the removal of duplicates sizes (e.g., two MNEs with 10 subsidiaries).
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Table 6. Sensitivity variance decomposition results
MNE Effect
Subsidiary Effect
Relative MNE Effect
Base Model A
5.44
34.47
0.16
Multilevel Model
5.26
35.48
0.15
ROA (without outliers) B
5.67
36.65
0.15
ROE
4.64
29.35
0.16
ROE (without outliers) B
4.86
31.35
0.16
ROCE
6.50
28.56
0.23
ROCE (without outliers) B
7.20
31.99
0.23
Notes: Variance explained by each effect in percent; A = Table 4, model 1; B = Observations below the
1st and above the 99th percentiles are deleted.
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Appendix A. Final sample
Year
1986
1988
1989
1991

Authors
Singh, J.
Ghoshal & Bartlett
Ghoshal & Nohria
Roth et al.

1992
1994
1994
1996
1996
1997
1998
1998
1998

Roth & Nigh
Ghoshal et al.
Gupta & Govindarajan
Andersson & Forsgren
Roth & O'Donnell
Very et al.
Birkinshaw
Birkinshaw et al.
Lubatkin et al.

1999
1999
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2001
2001
2002
2002
2002
2002
2002

Chang & Taylor
Gupta et al.
Birkinshaw et al.
Birkinshaw & Hood
Gupta & Govindarajan
Kim & Park
O'Donnell
Richards
Luo
Venaik et al.
Birkinshaw et al.
Boateng & Glaister
Foss & Pedersen
Frost et al.
Tsa

2003

Child et al.

2003

Hewett et al.

Study
Performance, Slack, and Risk Taking in Organizational Decision-Making
Creation, Adoption, and Diffusion of Innovations by Subsidiaries of Multinational Corporations
Internal Differentiation within Multinational Corporations
Global Strategy Implementation at the Business Unit Level: Operational Capabilities and Administrative
Mechanism
The Effectiveness of Headquarters-subsidiary Relationships: The Role of Coordination, Control, and Conflict
Interunit Communication in Multinational Corporations
Organizing for Knowledge Flows within MNCs
Subsidiary Embeddedness and Control in the Multinational Corporation
Foreign Subsidiary Compensation Strategy: An Agency Theory Perspective
Relative Standing and the Performance of Recently Acquired European Firms
The Determinants and Consequences of Subsidiary Initiative in Multinational Corporations
Building Firm-Specific Advantages in Multinational Corporations: The Role of Subsidiary Initiative
Managing Mergers Across Borders: A Two-Nation Exploration of a Nationally Bound Administrative
Heritage
Control in Multinational Corporations (MNCs): The Case of Korean Manufacturing Subsidiaries
Feedback-seeking behavior within multinational corporations
Consequences of perception gaps in the headquarters–subsidiary relationship
Characteristics of Foreign Subsidiaries in Industry Clusters
Knowledge Flows within Multinational Corporations
Integrating Distinctive Manufacturing Competence Globally: Its Effect on Business Performance
Managing Foreign Subsidiaries: Agents of Headquarters, or an Interdependent Network?
Control Exercised by U.S. Multinationals over their Overseas Affiliates: Does Location make a Difference?
Determinants of local responsiveness: perspectives from foreign subsidiaries in an emerging market
Autonomy, Networking and Interunit Learning in a Model of MNC Subsidiary Innovation and Performance
Knowledge as a Contingency Variable: Do the Characteristics of Knowledge Predict Organization Structure?
Performance of international joint ventures: evidence for West Africa
Transferring knowledge in MNCs: The role of sources of subsidiary knowledge and organizational context
Centers of Excellence in Multinational Corporations
Social Structure of "Coopetition" within a Multiunit Organization: Coordination, Competition, and
Intraorganizational Knowledge Sharing
The performance of cross-border units in China: a test of natural selection, strategic choice and contingency
theories
Conditions Influencing Headquarters and Foreign Subsidiary Roles in Marketing Activitiesand Their Effects
on Performance
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2003

Kim et al.

2003
2003
2004
2004

Luo
Newburry et al.
Gomez & Werner
Jaw & Liu

2005

Gomez & Sanchez

2005
2005
2005
2006

Holtbrügge
Persaud
Venaik et al.
Drogendijk & Slangen

2006
2006

Luo
Myloni et al.

2006
2006
2007
2007
2007

Zellmer-Bruhn & Gibson
Zhang et al.
Ambos & Schlegelmilch
Boehe
Johnston & Menguc

2008

Ando et al.

2008
2008
2008
2008
2008

Bouquet & Birkinshaw
Dooms & van Oijen
Fenton-O'Creevy et al.
Fey & Furu
Slangen & Hennart

2008
2008
2009
2009
2009
2009
2010
2010

Slangen & Hennart
Takeuchi et al.
Law et al.
Lovett et al.
Noorderhaven & Harzing
Williams & van Triest
Ambos & Birkinshaw
Amobs et al.

The Global Integration of Business Functions: A Study of Multinational Businesses in Integrated Global
Industries
Market-seeking MNEs in an emerging market: How parent–subsidiary links shape overseas success
Autonomy and effectiveness of equity international joint ventures (IJVs) in China
The effect of institutional and strategic forces on management style in subsidiaries of U.S. MNCs in Mexico
Towards an integrative framework of strategic international human resource control: the case of Taiwanese
subsidiaries in the People's Republic of China
Human resource control in MNCs: a study of the factors influencing the use of formal and informal control
mechanisms
Configuration and Co-ordination of Value Activities in German Multinational Corporations
Enhancing Synergistic Innovative Capability in Multinational Corporations: An Empirical Investigation
Dual Paths to Performance: The Impact of Global Pressures on MNC Subsidiary Conduct and Performance
Hofstede, Schwartz, or managerial perceptions? The effects of different cultural distance measures on
establishment mode choices by multinational enterprises
Autonomy of Foreign R&D Units in an Emerging Market: An Information Processing Perspective
The effect of corporate-level organisational factors on the transfer of human resource management practices:
European and US MNCs and their Greek subsidiaries
Multinational Organization Contact: Implications for Team Learning and Performance
The Paradox of Dueling Identities: The Case of Local Senior Executives in MNC Subsidiaries
Innovation and Control in the Multinational Firm: A Comparison of Political and Contingency Approaches
Product development in MNC subsidiaries: Local linkages and global interdependencies
Subsidiary size and the level of subsidiary autonomy in multinational corporations: a quadratic model
investigation of Australian subsidiaries
Parent country nationals or local nationals for executive positions in foreign affiliates: An empirical study of
Japanese affiliates in Korea
Weight versus Voice: How Foreign Subsidiaries Gain Attention from Corporate Headquarters
The Balance Between Tailoring and Standardizing Control
Human resource management in US subsidiaries in Europe and Australia: centralisation or autonomy?
Top management incentive compensation and knowledge sharing in multinational corporations
Do multinationals really prefer to enter culturally distant countries through greenfields rather than through
acquisitions? The role of parent experience and subsidiary autonomy
Do Foreign Greenfields Outperform Foreign Acquisitions or Vice Versa? An Institutional Perspective
When Does Decision Autonomy Increase Expatriate Managers' Adjustment? An Empirical Test
The antecedents and consequences of successful localization
Parental control: A study of U.S. subsidiaries in Mexico
Knowledge-sharing and social interaction within MNEs
The impact of corporate and national cultures on decentralization in multinational corporations
Headquarters’ Attention and Its Effect on Subsidiary Performance
What are the consequences of initiative-taking in multinational subsidiaries?
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2010
2010

Chen et al.
Dossi & Patelli

2010
2010

Scott et al.
Tran et al.

2011
2011
2011
2011

Ambos et al.
Ecker et al.
Keupp et al.
Nell et al.

2011
2011
2011
2012

Rabbiosi
Schüler-Zhou & Schüller
Tseng
Cheng & Yu

2012
2012
2012
2012
2013

Foley et al.
Mahlendorf et al.
Ngo et al.
Raziq et al.
Chiao & Ying

2013

Li et al.

2013
2013
2013
2013
2014

Nell & Ambos
Slangen
Verbeke et al.
Zhan & Chen
Chen et al.

2014

Crespo et al.

2014
2014
2014

Hombrug & Prigge
Kawai & Strange
Manolopoulos

2014

Meyer & Estrin

2014

Mudambi et al.

Host-country policies and MNE management control in IJVs: Evidence from China
You Learn from What You Measure: Financial and Nonfinancial Performance Measures in Multinational
Companies
Developing subsidiary contribution to the MNC—Subsidiary entrepreneurship and strategy creativity
The Effect of Quantity, Quality and Timing of Headquarters-initiated Knowledge Flows on Subsidiary
Performance
A Dynamic Perspective on Subsidiary Autonomy
Management Control and the Decentralization of R&D
Achieving Subsidiary Integration in International Innovation by Managerial Tools
The MNC as an externally embedded organization: An investigation of embeddedness overlap in local
subsidiary networks
Subsidiary roles and reverse knowledge transfer: An investigation of the effects of coordination mechanisms
An Empirical Study of Chinese Subsidiaries' Decision-Making Autonomy in Germany
Subsidiaries' local linkage characteristics and R&D assignments in a small developing economy
Adoption of Practices by Subsidiaries and Institutional Interaction within Internationalised Small- and
Medium-Sized Enterprises
The adoption of high performance work systems in foreign subsidiaries
Influencing foreign subsidiary decisions through headquarter performance measurement systems
Human Resource Flexibility in Foreign Subsidiaries: An Empirical Investigation in Hong Kong
Subsidiary initiatives and subsidiary autonomy: Evidence from New Zealand and Brazil
Network effect and subsidiary autonomy in multinational corporations: An investigation of Taiwanese
subsidiaries
Can locally-recruited R&D personnel significantly contribute to multinational subsidiary innovation in an
emerging economy?
Parenting Advantage in the MNC: An Embeddedness Perspective on the Value Added by Headquarters
Greenfield or Acquisition Entry? The Roles of Policy Uncertainty and MNE Legitimacy in Host Countries
Procedural Justice, Not Absorptive Capacity, Matters in Multinational Enterprise ICT Transfers
Dynamic capability and IJV performance: The effect of exploitation and exploration capabilities
Strategic Orientation, Foreign Parent Control, and Differentiation Capability Building of International Joint
Ventures in an Emerging Market
The performance effects of vertical and horizontal subsidiary knowledge outflows in multinational
corporations
Exploring Subsidiary Desire for Autonomy: A Conceptual Framework and Empirical Findings
Subsidiary autonomy and performance in Japanese multinationals in Europe
Sources of funding for decentralized R&D activity: effects of MNE subsidiaries’ entry choice and laboratory
roles
Local Context and Global Strategy: Extending the Integration Responsiveness Framework to Subsidiary
Strategy
How subsidiaries gain power in multinational corporations
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2014

Richter

2014
2014
2014
2015

Sartor & Beamish
Schomaker & Zaheer
Wang et al.
de Jong et al.

2015
2015
2015

Durand & Jacqueminet
Hemmert et al.
Huang et al.

2015
2016

Nguyen & Rugman
Ahlvik et al.

2016

Li et al.

2016

Liu et al.

2016
2016

Oki
Palmíe et al.

2016

Puck et al.

2016
2016
2017
2017

Santangelo et al.
Singh et al.
Lazarova et al.
Sarabi et al.

2017
2017

Sengul & Obloj
Tao et al.

2018

Ambos et al.

2018
2018
2018
2018
2018
2018

Asakawa et al.
Beugelsdijk & Jindra
Kim et al.
Nguyen & Almodóvar
Nuruzzaman et al.
Pu & Soh

Information Costs in International Business: Analyzing the Effects of Economies of Scale, Cultural Diversity
and Decentralization
Offshoring innovation to emerging markets: Organizational control and informal Institutional distance
The Role of Language in Knowledge Transfer to Geographically Dispersed Manufacturing Operations
Autonomy delegation to foreign subsidiaries an enabling mechanism for emerging-market multinationals
Does country context distance determine subsidiary decision-making autonomy? Theory and evidence from
European transition economies
Peer conformity, attention, and heterogeneous implementation of practices in MNEs
What drives the R&D capacity growth of foreign subsidiaries? A study of MNE subsidiaries in Korea
Reexamining the relationship between control mechanisms and international joint venture performance: The
mediating roles of perceived value gap and information asymmetry
Internal equity financing and the performance of multinational subsidiaries in emerging economies
Aligning corporate transfer intentions and subsidiary HRM practice implementation in multinational
corporations
Institutional distance and the quality of the headquarters–subsidiary relationship: The moderating role of the
institutionalization of headquarters’ practices in subsidiaries
The delicate balance: Managing technology adoption and creation in multinational affiliates in an emerging
economy
Subsidiary Autonomy and Factory Performance in Japanese Manufacturing Subsidiaries in Thailand
Coordination mechanisms for international innovation in SMEs: effects on time-to-market and R&D task
complexity as a moderator
Ownership mode, cultural distance, and the extent of parent firms’ strategic control over subsidiaries in the
PRC
MNE Subsidiaries Outsourcing and Insourcing of R&D: The Role of Local Institutions
Control mechanisms of MNEs: an empirical study
Locals know best? Subsidiary HR autonomy and subsidiary performance
Is inpatriate assignment experience a ticket to the top of a foreign subsidiary? The moderating effect of
subsidiary context
Better Safe Than Sorry: Subsidiary Performance Feedback and Internal Governance in Multiunit Firms
Expatriates, subsidiary autonomy and the overseas subsidiary performance of MNEs from an emerging
economy
Unravelling agency relations inside the MNC: The roles of socialization, goal conflicts and second principals
in headquarters-subsidiary relationships
Internal embeddedness, geographic distance, and global knowledge sourcing by overseas subsidiaries
Product innovation and decision-making autonomy in subsidiaries of multinational companies
Stakeholder influence, institutional duality, and CSR involvement of MNC subsidiaries
Export intensity of foreign subsidiaries of multinational enterprises: The role of trade finance availability
A microfoundations approach to studying innovation in multinational subsidiaries
The role of dual embeddedness and organizational learning in subsidiary development

154

2018
2018
2018
2018
2018
2019
2019
2019

Rabbiosi & Santangelo
Santangelo et al.
Valentino et al.
Villar et al.
Weng & Cheng
Alexiou et al.
Chen et al.
Hakala et al.

2019
2019
2019
2020
2020

Kingkaew & Dahms
Lunnan et al.
Yu et al.
Sarabi et al.
Scott-Kennel & Saittakari

Host country corruption and the organization of HQ–subsidiary relationships
Institutional antecedents of subsidiary external embeddedness: Coping with regulatory competitive constraints
Establishment modes and network relationships of foreign subsidiaries
Subsidiary-specific advantages for inter-regional expansion: The role of intermediate units
The more, the merrier? How a subsidiary's organizational identification with the MNE affects its initiative
Productive organizational energy mediates the impact of organizational structure on absorptive capacity
Entrepreneurial Orientation in Multinational Corporations: Antecedents and Effects
Entrepreneurial Orientation and International New Entry: The Moderating Role of Autonomy and Structures
in Subsidiaries
Explaining autonomy variations across value-chain activities in foreign-owned subsidiaries
Dealing with headquarters in the multinational corporation: a subsidiary perspective on organizing costs
Does attention from headquarters influence subsidiary behavior? A social psychological perspective
Entrepreneurial leadership and MNE subsidiary performance: The moderating role of subsidiary context
Sourcing or sharing in MNE networks? National headquarters and foreign subsidiaries as knowledge conduits
in SMOPECs
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Appendix B. Additional tables
Table 1B. Common operationalizations of the autonomy construct
Study

Citations A

Label

Bartlett &
Ghoshal (1988)

1,130

Autonomy

Jarillo &
Martinez (1990)

563

Autonomy

Operationalization
(1) Introduction of a new product; (2) product modifications; (3)
process modifications; (4) organizational restructuring; (5)
recruitment and promotion; (6) career development plans.
(1) Purchasing; (2) manufacturing; (3) R&D; (4) marketing.

Select literature
Ghoshal et al. (1994)
Kostova & Roth (2002)
Takeuchi et al. (2008)
Harzing (2002)
Phene & Almeida (2008)
Ahlvik et al. (2016)

(1) Manufacturing operations; (2) raw materials procurement; (3)
product/process research and development; (4) accounting/legal
activities; (5) government and public relations; (6) human resource
Birkinshaw et al. (1998)
Roth & Morrison
684
Configuration
management; (7) product distribution; (8) customer service; (9)
Foss & Pedersen (2002)
(1992)
product promotion and advertising; (10) information systems and
Ambos et al. (2010)
data processing; (11) sales activities; (12) cash flow management;
(13) raising and managing capital.
(1) Market area decisions; (2) product range supplied; (3) advertising Taggart (1998)
Taggart (1997)
373
Autonomy
and promotions; (4) R&D; (5) production; (6) manufacturing
Fey & Furu (2008)
technology.
Li et al. (2013)
(1) Direction of R&D; (2) which new R&D projects to pursue; (3)
Nobel &
documentation standards and norms; (4) R&D budget; (5) hiring and Luo (2006)
Birkinshaw
746
Centralization
firing; (6) cooperation with other units; (7) cooperation with external Zhang et al. (2006)
(1998)
firms or organizations; (8) training programs; (9) salaries; (10)
Keupp et al. (2011)
transfer of personnel.
Notes: A = Citation count taken from Google Scholar as of November 2020; The list is not exhaustive, although more recent operationalizations build on
the ones presented here; some of the literature in this table is not included in the reference list but is available upon request.
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Table 2B. Meta-analytic correlation matrix
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13

Variable
Subsidiary autonomy
Goal alignment
Past Performance
Institutional distance
Host country constraints
Full operations
Localization
Industry pressures
Greenfield entry
Subsidiary age
Subsidiary size
MNE size
MNE experience

1
-0.047
0.056
0.018
0.018
0.123
0.080
-0.076
-0.050
0.019
0.009
-0.032
0.006

2
33 (5754)
0.272
-0.006
0.005
0.077
-0.064
0.080
0.010
0.017
0.053
0.030
0.125

3
20 (3679)
4 (700)
-0.003
-0.130
0.051
-0.073
-0.065
0.024
0.005
0.044
0.061
0.092

4
54 (12160)
11 (1769)
5 (2285)
0.092
-0.099
0.006
-0.026
0.052
-0.051
-0.031
0.042
0.017

5
29 (8821)
5 (1367)
3 (473)
11 (3688)
0.047
0.013
0.012
0.123
-0.012
0.026
0.024
-0.044

6
15 (2689)
6 (1335)
4 (810)
6 (1003)
3 (452)
0.075
-0.127
-0.058
0.090
0.185
0.068
-0.068

Variable
9
10
11
12
13
1 Subsidiary autonomy
32 (9900)
77 (18721)
94 (20018)
25 (6011)
19 (2812)
2 Goal alignment
3 (328)
11 (1619)
13 (2338)
4 (465)
5 (500)
3 Past Performance
4 (838)
10 (1783)
13 (2169)
3 (470)
4 (601)
4 Institutional distance
18 (3564)
30 (7064)
41 (8297)
12 (4889)
9 (1359)
5 Host country constraints
10 (3620)
17 (5739)
19 (5063)
12 (3180)
10 (1652)
6 Full operations
3 (476)
9 (1478)
10 (1570)
3 (410)
3 (508)
7 Localization
5 (1131)
14 (2376)
17 (2699)
3 (464)
4 (618)
8 Industry pressures
7 (1162)
16 (3358)
21 (3512)
5 (1818)
4 (532)
9 Greenfield entry
24 (8110)
28 (7405)
6 (1074)
9 (1511)
10 Subsidiary age
0.083
60 (12855)
16 (3465)
10 (1287)
11 Subsidiary size
-0.089
0.145
18 (3772)
16 (2358)
12 MNE size
-0.032
0.089
0.167
9 (1442)
13 MNE experience
-0.093
0.178
0.059
0.180
Notes: Lower left off-diagonal values are the sample size weighted average correlations and upper right values are
N (total study samples) and K (total sample sizes).
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7
24 (3320)
4 (433)
5 (668)
13 (2688)
3 (474)
3 (355)
0.046
-0.021
-0.018
-0.038
0.069
-0.074

8
37 (10527)
7 (1529)
8 (2557)
19 (4477)
7 (2680)
4 (734)
7 (1217)
-0.056
-0.010
0.043
0.116
0.084

Table 3B. Additional meta-analytic subgroup analyses
Predictor

K

Corrected
R-mean

95% confidence
interval

Q-test

Result

Goal alignment
---Subsidiary
26
-0.030
-0.109 to 0.049
192.03*
---Headquarters
5
-0.123
-0.301 to 0.055
17.64*
No differences
---Mixed
2
-0.104
-0.249 to 0.040
0.32
Past performance
---Financial
14
0.053
-0.047 to 0.153
67.29*
No differences
---Mixed
6
0.070
-0.141 to 0.282
71.70*
Institutional distance A
---Formal distance
12
0.065
-0.156 to 0.286
452.83*
--------High formal
6
0.060
-0.379 to 0.498
384.50*
--------Low formal
6
0.067
-0.014 to 0.149
13.16*
No differences
---Informal
42
0.001
-0.045 to 0.046
172.88*
--------High informal
20
0.017
-0.061 to 0.094
98.66*
--------Low informal
20
-0.011
-0.070 to 0.047
66.42*
Holistic Autonomy
---(A1) Goal alignment
27
-0.065
-0.141 to 0.011
168.65*
---(B1) Past performance
12
0.051
-0.065 to 0.167
87.36*
---(C1) Institutional distance
40
0.031
-0.055 to 0.118
709.90*
F1 > F2
---(D1) Host country constraints
28
0.026
-0.058 to 0.110
374.30*
---(E1) Value chain breadth
13
0.111
-0.050 to 0.273
181.94*
---(F1) Localization
18
0.185
0.078 to 0.292*
131.22*
Functional Autonomy
---(A2) Goal alignment
6
0.034
-0.124 to 0.192
33.11*
---(B2) Past performance
7
0.070
-0.101 to 0.241
52.11*
---(C2) Institutional distance
14
-0.012
-0.054 to 0.030
13.00*
---(D2) Host country constraints
2
-0.076
-0.216 to 0.064
0.91
---(E2) Value chain breadth
2
0.203
0.091 to 0.315*
0.07
---(F2) Localization
6
-0.263
-0.350 to -0.176*
4.94*
Notes: A = To perform high and low splits I standardized the distance variable on a 0 to 10 scale, whereby a value of 5
was used as a cutoff for high and low splits (Kirca et al., 2011; Geleilate et al., 2019); Results are based on overlapping
confidence intervals.
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Appendix C. Additional tables
Table 1C. Home and host country sample characteristics
Country
AE
AO
AR
AT
AU
AZ
BB
BE
BG
BM
BR
BS
BY
CA
CH
CL
CN
CW
CY
CZ
DE
DK
DZ
EE
ES

MNEs
11
3
3
171
49
3
3
124
3
78
17
7
4
57
268
10
106
18
116
15
609
140
3
17
120

Subsid.
7
567
1553
1987
446
33
357
19
9
2762
45
1744
1894
1170
70
325
2660

ROA
1.37
7.51
-0.92
3.72
7.17
0.72
-0.80
-2.16
3.87
5.25
5.22
6.28
3.18
5.64
4.62
7.15
2.36

Country
FI
FR
GB
GI
GR
HK
HR
HU
ID
IE
IL
IN
IS
IT
JP
KR
KW
KY
KZ
LB
LI
LR
LT
LU
LV

MNEs
83
303
345
6
13
31
7
14
3
48
29
62
3
212
539
50
3
108
3
3
15
4
11
345
6

Subsid.
920
3376
4223
3
353
19
425
845
10
1010
7
1178
38
2888
130
767
44
14
237
126
399

ROA
5.70
2.68
3.90
13.38
0.91
4.03
3.76
5.59
9.48
3.68
0.36
0.45
3.58
1.15
3.70
7.85
3.99
8.88
7.09
6.03
6.01

Country
MH
MT
MU
MX
MY
NL
NO
NZ
PA
PH
PL
PT
QA
RO
RS
RU
SA
SC
SE
SG
SI
SK
TH
TN
TR

MNEs
3
12
14
13
27
269
91
14
8
5
22
19
2
3
3
10
5
5
220
48
10
4
15
3
20

Subsid.
3
59
17
126
600
1118
887
358
56
2742
1087
1294
382
1640
1769
2812
292
987
902
293

ROA
1.66
9.65
3.51
3.13
6.56
4.98
4.52
6.25
1.25
4.77
2.44
4.00
4.89
4.26
4.94
5.16
5.93
4.63
5.35
3.94

Country
TW
US
VC
VE
VG
ZA
AL
BA
CI
CO
EC
EG
KV
MA
MD
ME
MG
MK
NG
PE
PK
UA
UY
VN
AVG

MNEs
71
908
3
3
68
23
76

Subsid.
11
45
8
76
7
528
6
3
4
272
3
26
3
42
3
17
3
249
19
354
664

ROA
5.05
-5.23
3.84
4.82
7.86
2.84
7.19
6.97
3.75
1.98
1.72
6.08
-16.34
5.83
5.88
4.36
11.92
2.75
2.45
5.75
4.15

Notes: Country list includes both home and host countries; MNEs = number of MNEs per each home country (81 home countries); Subsid. = number of
subsidiaries per each host country (78 host countries); ROA = average ROA for all subsidiaries within each country across all sample years (2010-2018).
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Table 2C. Industry classification characteristics
# of
Mean ROA
Subsidiaries
11
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing and Hunting
209
2.51
21
Mining
447
0.85
22
Utilities
821
-0.16
23
Construction
1418
1.00
31
Manufacturing
1460
4.08
32
Manufacturing
3887
4.58
33
Manufacturing
7353
4.40
42
Wholesale Trade
14544
4.93
44
Retail Trade
1477
2.57
45
Retail Trade
481
1.94
48
Transportation and Warehousing
1853
3.50
49
Transportation and Warehousing
329
4.57
51
Information
1541
4.24
52
Finance and Insurance
1584
3.70
53
Real Estate Rental and Leasing
2655
0.63
54
Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services
6093
5.46
55
Management of Companies and Enterprises
4044
2.24
61
Educational Services
69
-0.39
62
Health Care and Social Assistance
222
2.73
71
Arts, Entertainment, and Recreation
136
2.11
72
Accommodation and Food Services
553
0.38
81
Other Services (Except Public Administration)
587
4.24
Notes: To conserve space, I describe my sample by the 2-digit NAICS classification. More
granular presentations are available upon request.
Industry
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